By Emajuddin Ahamed

HOW should the military power be used in a democratic society? What should be the optimal uses of military power in a free society? What should be the nature of civil-military relations in a country like Bangladesh? These are some of the questions that are analysed very briefly in this write-up.
   In the developed capitalist countries, especially in Western Europe, Britain, North America, Australia, New Zealand, supremacy of the civilian authorities has been the order of the day. Civilian rule also remained predominant in the centrally planned societies of the communist World. Both the capitalist and socialist countries have had two important societal characteristics in common. One is the presence of a broad-based consensus among the politically relevant sections of population on the nature of political power, nature of incumbents and so on. Where this consensus is developed, there develops a corresponding belief that exercise of military power by the civil government is only legitimate and thus acceptable. In the developed western countries this consensus has been brought about mainly by fabricating a strong mutuality of interests of the various social forces, generated over a longer period of times, though in the communist countries this was achieved within a shorter period, quite often with a tincture of coercion.
   The other characteristic is the depth and width of organisational cohesiveness that bind the social groups in such associations as trade unions, political parties, churches and other professional groups. The politics of a society has been, in these cases, the struggle for the definition and exercise of power in that society. Political power has thus become more and more broad-based, spread out almost equitably to all sectors of society through a network of organisations. The broad-based societal consensus accords legitimacy to the civilian authorities and organisational alacrity strengthens political institutions. The armed forces, under the circumstances, become used to their prescribed role and thus become professionalised in the art of defending the country and not lording over it.
   In the developing world the situation is different, however. The military elite have been playing crucial political roles in most of these states. In fact, more than two-thirds of these states have experienced military intervention already and many more are likely to do so in the future. The military elite do it either directly by displacing civil authorities or indirectly through them.
   Bangladesh has also been affected by this malfeasance. The pre-dawn coup of August 15, 1975 by a handful of junior officers, with the help of two battalions of the armoured corps of the Bangladesh Army, was the first indication of their overt intention to take over. The August coup of 1975, which resulted in the violent death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the constitutional head of the state, was closely followed by a series of coup and countercoup until May 30, 1981 when General Ziaur Rahman, another constitutional head of Bangladesh, was killed brutally by a group of 20 to 22 military officers at Chittagong in another abortive coup. Bangladesh was under martial law under General HM Ershad from March 24, 1982 to the end of 1986. If we look at the history of Bangladesh, we find that the military elite ruled for more than nine years. Another period of four years passed through under the shadow of martial law, with the men-in-uniform in the background. What is more significant is that the military elite not only assumed a political role in Bangladesh, but they also claimed that they should have the right to do so. Before the formal assumption of power in March 1982, General Ershad demanded that the military in Bangladesh should be accorded constitutional role to ensure protection of the political system (New York Times; November 14, 1981). All these tend to take us to the grey zone of the extent of military intervention and reasons for such intervention, especially in the context of Bangladesh politics.
   
   How to stabilise democratic use of military power in Bangladesh
   How, then, can we stabilise the democratic use of military power by ensuring civilian control over the armed forces in Bangladesh? This issue has been discussed and debated by a large number of social scientists from different angles of vision. They have put forward a host of suggestions in this regard and that ranges from outright abolition of the armed forces to military professionalisation. Some scholars have suggested that a democratic state for its civilian supremacy may eliminate the coercive capabilities of military or reduce them to virtual insignificance. In rare cases, however, the armed forces have actually been abolished. Today we find only a few instances where the armed forces do not exist. These are, in fact, exceptional cases, created out of intricate historical situations, and not applicable to most states. Even in Japan, which does not maintain land, sea and air forces, through its 1947 constitution, forced on it by the United States, the existence of ‘police reserve’ and ‘national defence force’ has compromised the situation. The national defence force is as good as its national army. Costa Rica, a small state in Latin America, disgusted with repeated military coups, thwarting democratic growths in the country, abolished its armed forces in 1948-49.
   Some scholars have suggested that democratic use of the military power may be ensured if the armed forces are formed with citizen soldiers. The Swiss Federation has done it by making military service a constitutionally imposed obligation in 1848 and 1874. With the exception of the top officers who are full-time professionals, the Swiss military is still composed of citizens on temporary duty. In most other European countries since the World War the land forces comprise troops raised by conscription for brief terms of service civilians-in-uniform. In the east, Singapore has also adopted this process.
   These two methods, elimination of armed forces or diffusion of military power among the citizens, do not seem to answer the needs of most of the states in the developing world. In some cases, it is the military which symbolise national independence and sovereignty of the state, and in the formative phase of nation building this is highly significant. In some cases, the military strength embodies the penultimate phase of foreign policy of states striving for economic emancipation and national integration in these days of intense competition. In many other cases, the armed forces serve as the brokers of peace in different parts of the globe within the framework of the United Nations, the national army being the potent instrument. In all these cases, the national army stands out as representative of the state. How can we then think of abolishing the armed forces?
   The concept of citizen army may be appealing to many, but reality is different. Even the citizen army needs a strong national army as its nucleus. Moreover, it is not likely to meet the demands of continuous rigorous training of the forces and its capability to handle the most modern and sophisticated weapons, which characterise the dynamic and innovative armed services these days. There are many other ways of getting citizens involved in the defence services other than this one.
   Naturally the last option is military professionalism which tends to create and sustain trust on the regime to which the military owes loyalty and obedience and which it is obligated to defend. The military, especially its officer corps, must be indoctrinated in such a fashion that they would accept their loyalty to the regime as an article of faith. They must believe that military rule is an aberration and never an alternative to democratic order. They must also believe that firepower is not a substitute for the mandate of the people. These, in fact, constitute the core of military professionalism. A professional army is expert in man-management, capable of handling organisational affairs, technically-oriented and subordinate to political authority. Modern professionalism is also corporative in the sense that it generates group consciousness, encourages formation of corporate professional associations and maintains clear line of demarcation between military and civilian affairs. The military should be professionalised to the art of defending their country and reaching out to the people in times of natural calamity and other crises, if necessary.
   Military professionalism in a society is enhanced if and when the civilian rulers themselves are steeped in democratic ethos. They should also be professionalised to the art of good governance and must be adept in forging the political system on the basis of consent and consensus. We must add that for the democratic use of military power in a state two conditions are absolutely necessary: (a) if the military exist, as they surely will, then they must be subject to civilian control; and (b) the civilians who control the military must themselves be subject to the democratic process. If the two are synthesised, there is no room for alarm, but it is indeed a very, very difficult process. The success in the area demands contributory conditions both from within and without. There must be full-flowering of democratic culture in the polity and a respectful recognition of democratic order at the global level. These are the two sure guarantees of success of a democratic polity.
   
   Emajuddin Ahamed is a former vice-chancellor of Dhaka University