By Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir

The confrontational nature of Bangladesh polity is in widespread currency; yet, the entrepreneurial organisations and class of people who are engrossed in fixing politics and governance in Bangladesh have made a little crack in framing, let alone unearthing, causes-drivers-determinants-process of such an outcome. This requires a coherent comprehension of the dynamics of political competition and the accumulation strategies pursued by different political parties in their struggle for capture and sustenance of power and material benefit in this resource-scarce country.
   The political process in Bangladesh has evolved in a particular direction, corresponding to the characteristics of political activists and the incentive-structure to reproduce the political system. The particular form of materialist incentives of primitive accumulation of resources through use of power and coercion has led to a system of clientalist political networks in Bangladesh.
   The clientalist resource-dependent networks, for perpetuating their objective of accumulation of wealth and power, are symbiotically connected at vertical layer (local, regional, and national) and are intrinsically interlinked at horizontal level with business, administration, law-enforcing agencies and judicial system. For example, political party leaders employ cadres and mastaans (musclemen) to expropriate public resources and looting or depriving soft targets (minorities, indigenous people, opposition, and general people without political affiliation). The police usually do not arrest the ruling party leaders and cadres for their wrongdoings because they are backed by the government of the day. The administration dishes away bounty to, and benefit from, the ruling political ring. The businessmen elect supporters of the ruling party to lead the business associations.
   The nature of competition is motivated by usurpations of assets and there is an incentive to compete for accumulation of political power of the state. The cadres of newly-elected government who were in opposition before the change of the guard take control from the cadres of the outgoing government who wait for their turn and continue to agitate against the government. This cyclical pattern of control, agitation, and return for control perpetuates the reproduction of politics of confrontation.
   The material basis of this particular form of accumulation has, thus, given birth to a nexus amongst politicians, members of the administration, the law enforcing agencies and the judicial system in Bangladesh. Such a nexus is cyclical and transient, and always houses with the party/alliance in power.
   
   Politics as a form of business
   The political entrepreneurs, mostly coming from the ‘intermediate class’ comprising university and college educated, petty bourgeoisie and well-off farmers, venture participation in politics as a form of investment. Recognising participation in politics like investing in a firm, the leaders and workers have devised an innovative form of incentive structure. In such a setting, allegiance to leader is not based on personal loyalty or traditional legitimacy rather participation in a particular form of exchange between patron and client. Here clients (workers) provide their political support to patrons (leaders) in exchange for payoff as well as patrons provide payoffs to their client by distributing their political power and captured public resources.
   The resource-dependent syndicates, organised through political factions, have emerged. Since independence till 1975, the beneficiaries were the urban middle class and the rural landed elites belonging to the Awami League that ran the country (Kochanek, 2003). The system gained further momentum throughout the military regimes (Chaterjee et al 2005, Maniruzzaman 1994). The military regimes intensified distribution of such rents, primarily striving to gain a kind of legitimacy. The regimes not only created a culture of debt defaults, making the banking system full of non-performing loans, but also appointed a large number of military officials to the civil administration, as their primary source of power were military personnel. During the military regimes in Bangladesh, the size of the armed forces increased from 60,000 in 1975-76 to 101,500 in 1988-89 and the defence budget increased by 18 per cent over the period in contrast to a 14 per cent increase in the national budget. Besides, the longest surviving military ruler, General Ershad, also organised vertically integrated group of people and intermediate class by forming the Jatiya Party and appointed party men to newly-created posts at local and national levels. He has also introduced upazila parishad in order to create a class of patrons-clients in rural areas (Maniruzzaman, 1994).
   There has been continuation of senior military officials entering into politics. The armed forces have not captured the sate power since 1991. Arguably, this is because of the fact that the military has not shown any interest in returning to power as a large number of its ranks and files are happy with remittance earned in lieu of providing services in UN peacekeeping missions.
   In the post-military era, there is a newfound belief in the political landscape of the country that the power will shuttle between the two major parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Awami League. The entrepreneurs interested in accumulation of wealth started to venture into political projects, recognising politics as another form of enterprise, and realising that other means of profiteering is either painful or a long-run affair and that maximisation of profit even out of traditional commercial enterprise is directly related to degree of connection with political processes.
   In the post-military era, both the BNP and the Awami League started giving nomination to businessmen and other faction leaders in the parliamentary elections. This has also become a common knowledge that a huge sum of money is required to secure nomination from these parties. The parties gave nominations to many rich businessmen, gang leaders, and former civil and military bureaucrats in the elections at the expense of many veteran leaders. This is demonstrated in the composition of the elected member of parliaments. The previous parliament had 58 per cent of the MPs who reported business as their profession whereas only 7 per cent were politicians. Besides a good many politicians turned into businessmen or their family members ran businesses on behalf of them. Political influence provides the scope for acquiring business licenses that can be sold or rented to the business in return for money or profit.
   The parliament is hardly vibrant in Bangladesh; even members of ruling party are reluctant to attend the sessions on time. A former prime minister also expressed her anger about the absenteeism of the MPs in the parliament and threatened to dissolve the parliament if such absenteeism of the MPs continued. But the situation remained more or less the same.
   This begs a serious question as to why people spend a huge amount of money to be elected as MPs while, upon elected, are reluctant to attend the sessions of the parliament or legislative business. The answer to the question lies in the nature of political accumulation in Bangladesh relating to capture of resources through primitive accumulation. Research suggests that the MPs, most of them being businessmen, are more interested in accumulating, capturing, and coercing resources than attending the sessions in parliament.
   
   Political process as resource dependent syndicate
   In major political parties the grassroots workers have to maintain relations with a particular local leader, who is either the president or secretary of the local committee. These local leaders appoint workers for other positions in the committee on the basis of loyalty to him rather than relevance and effectiveness of such persons in advancing the interest of the party. The local leaders try to include those persons who are loyal to them but have less bargaining power because they will be able to demand fewer payoffs. The loyalty of a client to his patron is based on mutual benefit where the patron has more advantage than his clients as the client has less bargaining capacity. If the bargaining capacity of the client increases the patron often tends to change his clients preferring the one with less bargaining capacity. Availability of the candidates to join any faction in exchange of fewer payoffs makes it easier for the patron to change his clients. So it paves the way for entry of opportunists in the party. Membership in a committee at any level of the party ensures informal legitimacy, which increases the power and credibility of the individual to extract public resources, without being prosecuted by administrative and legal actions. The regional leaders are responsible for appointing the local leaders while the party high command appoints the higher echelon of regional leaders. These tiers also follow the same system.
   The parties are led by persons who have the ability to provide and/or secure funding. To maintain the reproduction of such practices, the leaders resort to personalisation of politics. This hierarchy is mainly based on the economic benefit that the patron can offer to their client. The clients build muscle for their patron to win elections and to carry out other activities necessary for maintaining the status quo, including influencing local people, threatening the opponents or even to be engaged in assaults and killings.
   Such a system of networked factions provides guarantee of two major objectives. The first relates to centralisation of power within the party by particular factions, who are interested in reproduction of politics as business, protecting them from any dissidents. Secondly, it ensures sustenance of payoffs through alternative mechanisms. The two are mutually rewarding. Both leave a downward pressure for political competition and confrontation.
   The reproduction of the networked system lies in the ability to capture resources and consequential distribution, either directly to grassroots, or through creation of provision for central, regional and grassroots leaders. This requires pursuance of ‘winners-take-all’ strategy and use of power and coercion over administrative, law-enforcing, judicial, and criminal justice systems. In this process the opposition members become totally deprived, waiting with high intent and figured strategies of how to multiply the loss incurred during the period of absence from power. The system thus has been able to create on its own a system of reproduction and welfare system for members belonging to factions of different parties, at the expense of ordinary citizens.
   The networked system of factions in Bangladesh has given birth and sustained a system of private force, parallel to the apparatus of the state, in order to steer the process of acquiring and maintenance of command over the captured resources, as such process warrants considerable expression of intimidation, coercion, and oppression. Thus the faction leaders maintain muscle power by keeping and patronising mastaans or gang leaders. These musclemen are usually known as party cadres who operate under the umbrella of a faction leader. They protect the interest of the faction leader and in return they are paid off. The return on services depends on ability of the mastaan leader and his gang. In return of their support to the leader the mastaans are protected from any legal action.
   The mastaan leaders in cases also transform themselves into leaders of a faction. Moreover, confrontational nature of accumulation by the two main political parties in Bangladesh has increased the importance of mastaan politics as they have been used to torture and intimidate the oppositions.
   The student politics has also been losing ground. A significant part of the membership is either engaged as mastaan or client of a particular faction leader.
   
   Power as an alternative form of exchange
   This particular process of political system has given birth to a different form of exchange, besides the market form of exchange, perpetuated through primitive accumulation, underwritten by coercion and intimidation. This non-market form of exchange is mediated through power and coercion, provides material gains ranging from ‘public’ to ‘private’ properties.
   The factions in Bangladesh are organised to capture resources managed through budgetary processes, including granting of contracts and licenses, resources of the state that are not managed through fiscal processes like natural resources including khas land, chars, forests, water bodies, and rivers, properties of different state agencies, like lands belonging to the railway or forest departments and private properties of soft targets and rival factions. Several illustrations are given below:
   Membership of a political faction is necessary to win business contracts awarded by the state and the publicly-funded organisations. The faction leaders provide contract and license to the party members or to the close allies of the party, though the decision is supposed to be based on technical and financial qualifications.
   The processes of implementation of public works in Bangladesh also require a considerable level of forces. The businesses thus form syndicate, submit offers with high margin, and distribute the contracts and profits amongst the members of the syndicate. To achieve membership of the syndicate requires a certain amount of muscle power; otherwise one would be thrown out of the syndicate. The leaders give contracts to those syndicates which have a more organised capacity and can ensure victory in the election. The size of the syndicate has a certain limit so that the payoffs from the contract can ensure profit for all. If any new player wants to enter into a particular syndicate, s/he has to replace one or more members from that syndicate. S/he can do this by enforcing power on the members of the syndicate. This process often turns into violent and aggressive conflicts, including use of threats or attacks on the lives and properties of the opponents. The members of the syndicate thus keep mastaans under them or maintain constant contacts with the gang leaders.
   No bidding takes place as per the rule of the government because of involvement of the members of the ruling party. Such processes are pervasive at every stratum and tier. For example at the national level, even a former minister stated that the countrywide power shortage was an outcome of this tender politics. The tender process is negotiated at local levels by local MPs. Allegations are there that a minimum of 20 per cent has to be given to the local MP for distribution amongst his network members. If such processes are not maintained, it might turn into violent conflicts. The MPs also benefit themselves by helping to secure lease of lands, and award various appointments to their faction members. These are especially prevalent in appointments of government subvention provided private colleges and schools, as they control the whole appointment process by virtue of being chairman of the managing committees and the governing bodies of these institutions.
   The transaction of land though medium of power is a political process. Encroachment on government land is not an easy task to carry out, essentially requiring strong ties with administration and political parties. The corrupt officials of land and registration departments, upon bribery, provide fake documents and lower courts give the decree of ownership. The leaders of main political parties and local influential persons, powered by family aristocracy or by mastaans linked with political parties, are the major grabbers of public land both in rural and urban areas.
   The elite grabbers are more influential than the petty grabbers. The large real estate companies, ministers, business houses, non-governmental organisations, industrialists are at the top of the lists of grabbers of natural resources who are aligned with the top echelon of policymaking and leaders of different business bodies. Elite grabbers do not necessarily comply with the party politics but still control policymaking at state and party levels. They usually maintain very complex relationships with the functionaries of the state under the so-called patron-client politics. They sustain through a distributive incentive structure. They fund major as well as minor parties in order to maintain their material benefits.
   In rural areas public land and natural resources are distributed among the supporters of the ruling party and who can afford to pay the political parties and corrupt officials. Usually khas land, water bodies and forest lands are distributed through different types of contracts such as award, lease and sales. In this process factions of the ruling party often form a syndicate. This syndicate uses their political influence, manipulate the policy and win contract in favour of them.
   In forest areas vested groups are involved in cutting forest and grabbing forestland. The vested groups are usually comprised of local influential persons and political leaders. This process is intensified with the help of corrupt forest officials. There is a vast amount of wetlands in Bangladesh, which are public property. The government has divided the wetlands in several units (namely ‘jalmahal’). The government has initiated a distribution policy of these ‘jalmahal’ by giving lease to certain people or groups. This process is manipulated by political influence.
   In case of private property, for example, in shrimp ghers (farms) in the southwest region of the country, the grabbers who are politically powerful forcefully grab the lands of individual owners. If the party fails to come into power in the election, the leader flees away and the occupation automatically goes to the new party leaders.
   The power-driven land transaction maintains definitive targeting strategies as well as bases their targets on a pricing policy, instrumentalised in terms of wielding of power. For example, the faction leaders (patron) with their allies such as mastaans, matbars (village headmen) can easily force the government and administration to settle titles of publicly owned assets in favour of their clientele. The areas of such target of accumulation are often public-owned khas lands or state-owned reserve areas like forests, rivers, wetlands.
   Another element of their targeting strategy is that the patrons aim at soft segments of society such as ethnic and religious minorities, and the underprivileged including small and poor land holders in urban and rural areas.
   The distributive nature of such political accumulation intertwines a two-way dependent relationship – a worker is dependent on material incentive to be distributed by the leader while latter depends on the former for concentration of power through use of him as an agent provocateur.
   
   Confrontation as a consequence
   The process of such competition and accumulation is authoritarian in nature, takes aggressive and brutal forms, and cannot afford to withstand even muted dissent and public scrutiny. The process, for its perpetuation, also harbours a mutually rewarding extended network, with vertical and horizontal structure of incentive and accountability.
   This particular process of political accumulation has resulted in intensified competition for finding out alternative forms of payoff mechanisms, in the backdrop of limited fiscal resources, as the budgetary resources of the country is very small (Tk 69,740 core in 2005). The limited amount of budgetary resource leads to carving out different form of accumulation from off-budget resources, which require use of power, coercion and muscle. Thus, it is found to be everyone’s interest to form, maintain, and sustain networks and personalised politics, absence of which is expected to fetch no yield. So personalisation of power becomes necessary to retain command over factions. This motivation increases intolerance, clash and human insecurity of public and private property and lives of individuals.
   The decomposition of data in terms of inter- and intra-party conflicts, provided by ASK, suggests that 56.61 per cent of the total injured were wounded in conflicts among the parties, whereas 24.46 per cent were injured in conflicts within a political party in 2005. A total of 918 (17.67 per cent) people were injured in conflicts between ruling BNP factions. The widespread prevalence of intra-party conflicts reveals pervasiveness of competitive factional politics in Bangladesh, stemming from securing and distribution of resources and privileges between factions within a party. This is demonstrated by the fact that the rate is higher in case of the ruling party, as the figure in the category is as high as 70.93 per cent (988 persons) for the BNP, while the intra-party factional fighting in case of the main opposition, the Awami League was only 28.36 per cent (395 persons).
   The injuries inflicted on the opposition activists by law-enforcing agencies such as the police are higher than those to members belonging to the ruling party. This is explained by the nature of competition prevailing in the political system in the country, which is come to be known as ‘winners-take-all’ strategy. This also speaks of the nature of political accumulation in which the ruling party uses the apparatus of the state, including the police, for clinging to power.
   The intensity of competition not only deprives the citizenry due to malfunctioning of the public order, emanating from chaotic space created by factions, but also due to squeezed public services, resulting from embezzlement of public funds and resources, especially impacting adversely on the poor.
   It is often assumed and largely being propagated by elites of civil society, international financial institutions and Western donors that reforms relating to ‘good governance agenda’, including anti-corruption drive, is the panacea. While these reforms are highly desirable in themselves, there are structural reasons why the implementation of ‘good governance reforms’ in Bangladesh is likely to have a very limited impact. A reliance on these policies alone is, therefore, likely to result in lost opportunities.

   Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir teaches development studies at Dhaka University