By AMM Shawkat Ali

BUREAUCRACY is a generic term that cuts across civil service and the public sector as whole. If Max Weber’s definition is accepted, it is a necessary adjunct to any large organisation, public or private. Over time, however, it has become synonymous with civil service, a term which also lacks any precise definition. The simplest way to look at it is to distinguish it from the military. In the countries of the subcontinent emerging from British imperial tradition, there is still some evidence of this concept. The residential areas of civil servants designated as ‘civil lines’ during British colonial days are known by the same term even today in source cities of the subcontinent.
   
   Evolving concept of civil service
   Greek and Chinese philosophers developed more or less an identical concept of civil service. The commonality of views rested on the fact that the administration of the government must be run by a chosen few. Confucius said, ‘The administration of Government lies in getting proper men.’ Platonic philosophy was also based substantively on the same concept. Plato said, ‘The kind of man we should choose from among the Guardians will be those who are found to be full of zeal to do whatever they believe is good for the commonwealth and never willing to act against its interests.’ The Ottoman Empire, under Suleiman the Magnificent, was also wedded to the concept of getting the best man available for civil service.
   The evolution of the civil service system in different countries has been largely influenced by different stages of political development. There is generally, however, more or less a common pattern which has emerged through the different stages. This process of development can be described as transition from being servants of the king or emperor to servants of the state and to servants of the public and finally a protected service. The development of modern civil service system is based on the ideals of permanency in career, recruitment strictly based on merit through competitive examination and political neutrality. The research on comparative civil service system has led to the finding that over time both developed and developing democracies have tried to follow these ideals. It is possible to argue that attributes of permanency, competition-based selection and political neutrality are essentially a British creation. It can also be argued that in other post-colonial societies these attributes came to be followed in varying degrees in course of administrative reforms and in some of these countries such as Australia, emerging from British colonial rule, the old tradition of permanency has been discarded and new style of performance-based management system introduced. It is said that the reform measures ending the concept of permanency is a significant step away from the Westminster system, which will not be reversed. However, the civil servants still remain wedded to the old system while the politicians are bent upon demolishing the system. This has created confusion in respect of the continuing relevance of the system.
   An important development during the mid-1990s is the creation of a senior public service in the Netherlands (Meer et al, 1997). The creation of the senior public service arose out of the perception on the part of the policymakers of the necessity to create a civil service to meet the challenges of the growing dynamism of the government with more and more international elements centring on increasing complexity in policies were being added. The stress is on capturing the management potential in a global perspective. Promotion or mobility to foster skill to meet the dynamic environment also remained a guiding principle to professionalise the civil service at the top level. Candidates for the senior public service are selected from among civil servants from grade 17 and above. The selection is made by the ministries in consultation with the director general of the senior public service acting on behalf of the interior minister. The senior public service is a more refined framework of the policy document of 1994, which was titled ‘On course for a General Administrative Service’. This service consisted of all civil service personnel at the central government from grade 10 to 19. The system of recruitment is laid down in a transparent manner.
   
   United States
   The civil service system in the United States is generally associated with what has come to be known as the spoils system. The US constitution vests the president with extraordinary powers in the selection of executing department personnel. However, over time, the spoils system in part gave way to a merit-based system. The abuses inherent in the spoils system became specially pronounced during the three decades following 1845.
   The Civil Service Reform Act 1978 has introduced major reforms. The Office of Personnel Management replaced the CSC. Under this act, the top-level employees are grouped into a senior executive service. Increases in pay, formerly based on length of service only, have been tied to performance for senior and middle-level employees. Thus the civil service system became more flexible (Encyclopaedia, 2000).
   During the 1980s, under the Reagan presidency, public service diminished both in size and moral (Ingraham, 1997). The problems of compensation for members of the senior service came to the fore, budget cuts and hiring freezes led to problems of capacity for many federal agencies. The emphasis during the 1980s and early-1990s shifted to specialised rather than standardised civil service system. This basically centred on a ‘survival of the fittest’ approach. Agencies with better performance records argued that they should not be penalised by shortcomings and limited resources of others.
   The changing pattern of recruitment to civil service in the agencies was clearly visible. Agencies on the whole were exempted from central civil service procedures and standards and the central system itself became more flexible than in the past. Nowhere is this more visible than in the recruitment system. Nearly 70 per cent of the recruitment of 38,000 permanent full-time employees came in through exceptional or special recruitment method (Kettle, Ingraham, Sanders and Homer, 1996).
   A more comprehensive attempt to translate the thematic vision of working better with less costs found expression in an attempt to reinvent government (Kamenski, 1997). Reinventing government, entrepreneurial government, high performance government, etc are part of the new jargons that dominate the debate on civil service reform. Yet, as some scholars have argued, ‘they all relate in a very fundamental way to the thorny issues of the past’ (Ingraham, 1997). Some of the legislations proposed to achieve the objectives of changing traditional civil service structures and procedures did not get the support of the Congress. Notable among these are the Reinvention Bill, the Omnibus Civil Service Reform Act and the Performance-based Organisation Legislation.
   On the whole, most scholars agree that compared to other industrialised countries, the US is a ‘laggard’ in bringing about changes in the civil service system (Aucoin, 1995). The approach to changes in the civil service system has been incremental rather than radical.
   
   Canada
   Civil service reform measures in Canada also evolved over time starting from 1868. During the 1970s and 1980s such measures were characterised by achieving gender equity, stress on career development of indigenous people, reduction in the size of civil service and emphasis on managerial skill through special programmes. Later, the creation of a new classification led to the establishment of administrative trainee for the purpose of recruiting and training a number of university graduates to become senior civil servants. The programme, still later, extended to other within the civil service.
   During the 1990s, the trends in the development of civil service included identification of core characteristics that define effective performance, stress on leadership and managerial talent and development of standards of competence to measure merit and opening of assessment centre for executive appointment, reduction in the size of civil service through the early retirement incentive and early departure incentive. In 1995, a management trainee programme was introduced to develop recent university graduates to the middle-management level.
   The above review of cross-country experiences in the dim distant past and the present times tends to point out that the present has reinvented the past in matter relating to civil service reforms. The core elements of the current approach hinge on merit-based initial requirement as well as promotions and introduction of some kind of elitism in career advancement for those who have to shoulder responsibilities. Additionally, two more elements are part of the civil service management system that owe their origin to the British civil service. These attributes are permanency in career, subject to rules of conduct and political neutrality.
   
   South Asian context
   Only Bangladesh and Pakistan can be said to have made radical departure from the past in redesigning civil service structure. However, the contribution of such changes towards better governance has been found to be negative. India can be said to have remained unaffected by any radical changes either in structure or functions of civil service. This, in part, is attributable to the continuity of the democratic system and in part to the leadership and vision of the founders of the Indian republic. Bangladesh has been less fortunate in this regard and its political history bears striking similarities to that of Pakistan. However, there is a difference. Since the overthrow of the military regime of General Ershad in 1990, there is at least continuity of elected government apparently wedded to parliamentary form. Despite this positive development, the quality of political management of civil service remains highly controversial.
   
   Bangladesh
   The outcome of years of neglect in reforming, right-sizing the machinery of the government and the public sector, led to the burning issues of efficiency and productivity, both human, and institutional and material. The issues of accountability, transparency in public transactions, which clearly belong in the public domain, have inexorably led to a chronic systemic debility and weakening of the sinews of all organs of the government, much like the disease of muscular dystrophy in human beings. It could indeed be contended without fear of serious contradiction that the matters to reform and reconstruction were seldom wisely chosen. Rapid political changes effected through extra-constitutional means often destabilise civil service management. This is clearly proved by the events from 1975 to 1990. This period witnessed transition from multiparty framework of governance to one-party rule, however short-lived, and two almost successive martial law governments. The period also witnessed a plethora of home-grown as well as externally-induced reform plans much of which remained unimplemented. Rapid political changes are not solely responsible for such a state of affairs. This impression is confirmed by the developments after 1990 when the major political parties made a public commitment to institutionalise multiparty framework of democratic governance. The period after the 1990s witnessed a number of domestic and external initiatives for civil service reform programmes, which also remain unimplemented. Clearly political vision and will were supplanted by piecemeal exercise – simply for appearance with no commitment to any follow-up action. This resulted in a colossal waste of time and effort. Furthermore, these studies are somehow just rehash of earlier works and quite often uneven in quality. Even so, whatever reform in management should have been implemented was also not implemented. What explains this scenario?
   Rapid political changes and lack of political vision and commitment have already been mentioned. Yet the question of absence of political vision needs to be qualified. This is because the constitution does provide for such a vision. It requires, for instance, a law of parliament for civil service. In addition, it describes civil servants as ‘persons in the service of the Republic’ signifying their political neutrality which has remained a fiction, not a fact. The civil service law to be made by parliament is yet to see the light of the day. As a result, executive style of decision-making in civil service management makes room for not only politicisation but also ad hoc decisions thus making the operative environment for civil service unstable and uncertain. Worse still, there has not been any parliamentary debate on the action taken by the executive on the issue of initiating a civil service law or on the reform measures recommended by various studies. This is an institutional failure. It needs to be realised that bureaucratic authority is mainly derivative. Without political support and direction, the bureaucracy can do very little.
   The argument of institutional failure insofar as it relates to implementation of some of the reform measures is substantiated by the failure of some of the cabinet sub-committees vested with the responsibility of making appropriate recommendations to the cabinet. Evidences of this are available during the post-1991 era, which require further investigation and study.
   Apart from the constitutional vision, the other aspect that explains political inaction relates to a rapid political change and a propensity for each successive government to discard whatever is left by the government preceding it. Thus, the Administrative and Services Reorganisation Committee report of 1973 was supplanted in 1977 by the Rashid Commission report. The concept of senior service pool of 1979 was abolished by the Ershad government in 1989. The concept of upazila government of 1982 was abolished by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party government of 1991. The BNP government did set up a committee to downsize or right-size the government but did not implement the recommendations made by the committee. As if nothing had happened prior to 1996, the Awami League government instituted a Public Service Reform Commission but did not do much to implement its recommendations.
   The development during the post-2001 era under the four-party coalition government led by the BNP is marked by scattered attempts of reforms in civil service management. The areas include training, career planning and regulatory framework for promotion. A training policy has been put in place and a career-planning unit installed in the Ministry of Establishment. What is known is the frequent shuffle and reshuffle of civil servants with scant regard to career management. The regulatory framework for promotion has evoked public criticism and is the subject of a lawsuit in the High Court.
   
   Right to information law
   A more recent subject of reform relates to transparency. Civil society organisations have been asking for a right to information law. Some ideas including a draft law were given by PARC in 2000. Nothing much has happened since then. It is understood that a leading multilateral aid giving agency is now involved in working out the details for such a law. It is not that the existing management framework is wholly non-transparent and acts as a roadblock to the citizen’s right to know. All important decisions of the government are published in the official gazette for public information. Similarly, the prevailing secretarial instructions make it mandatory for a civil servant to acknowledge in writing any communication received from a citizen and to inform about the results of action within a reasonable time-frame. As regards political neutrality, the rules of conduct prohibit a civil servant to approach any member of parliament for personal matters. The remedy lies in strict enforcement of secretariat instructions and rules of conduct.
   This is not to say that no further improvement in the management framework is needed. What is needed is to strengthen the management system and reduce the gap between principles and practice. This is where the political actors in power can contribute to prevent the system to collapse. The next step will be to identify new areas of improvement rather than make blanket recommendations through further studies on areas already covered by the existing management framework.
   The wheel of reforms in civil service management has now come full circle. The concept of the senior service pool of 1979 is now under examination for revival along with the concept of clustering ministries according to analogous functions as recommended by PARC of 2000. The much controversial promotion rules are also under examination by a major multilateral aid-giving agency. The merry-go-round of reforms in civil service management will continue without any efficiency in management unless areas of reform are correctly identified, pacing and sequencing of reforms are appropriate.
   
   Flashes of silver lining
   Under the present caretaker government, one can see some flashes of silver lining in the attempt to overhaul the administrative structure and process of decision making. In the area of civil service management, the much controversial and politicised Public Service Commission has been reconstituted. The government has also embarked upon the task of reforming civil service management structure and processes. Reportedly, there is a move to introduce professionalism by adopting what is called organising ministries into cluster based on sectoral management. The entire scenario, however, remains as yet unclear.
   
   Citizens’ charter
   There has been announcement of citizens’ charter providing the citizens information about their right to obtain different services from government offices. The approach sounds good enough although it appears to be more or less a carbon copy of similar attempt in the United Kingdom during the Thatcher era. With a kind of hindsight, it may also be interpreted as a continuation of failed attempts of similar nature in the past. Thus during 1979-80, the Ministry of Agriculture, in cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation, introduced what came to be known as small farmers’ charter. Needless to say, it existed in paper only. During 2001-2006, the government also introduced what is known as patients’ charter. It has the same fate as in the case of small farmers. One can only sum up all such attempts by using the cockney expression used for Thatcher’s attempt by saying “you a’int see nothing yet.”
   
   The other side of the coin
   The trend of efforts for civil service reforms in 2007, despite all the good intentions, appears piecemeal adding further problems to the already existing amorphous structure and functions of civil service. The focal point of civil administration in the district and the units below simply does not exist. The same appears to be the case in the secretariat. The striking example, among others, is the rather ill-conceived attempt at police reform. Police is defined in the constitution to be a disciplined force. Reform programme reportedly claims it to be a service provider. Its supervision and policy management is proposed to be vested in a commission and locus of accountability of the commission remains unexplained. It is also not clear if the commission will supplant the Public Service Commission in the matter of discipline which is its constitutional responsibility for members of civil service of which police is one. Equally, it is also not clear if the proposed commission will dilute the home ministry’s accountability to the parliament.
   The entire argument of police reform rests on the ground that it should be kept immune from political influence. This argument applies with equal force across the civil service system. Will it then make sense to create separate commissions for each of the twenty-eighty other cadres? What then will happen to the executive which is a constitutionally recognised and mandated organ of the state?
   
   The next steps
   The next steps for Bangladesh lie in number of key areas. These include (a) creation of a senior civil service cadre, (b) reduction of existing cadres, (c) putting in place a civil service act that protects civil servants from under political victimisation, (d) introduction of a fair living wage, (e) a sound promotion policy based on merit to be determined by an objectively verifiable criteria, (f) appropriate deployment policy and (g) measures to put in place a constitutional bureaucracy.
   
   AMM Shawkat Ali is a retired bureaucrat