When elections are an
end in themselves
by Zayd Almer Khan
Politicians, on both sides of the political divide, will often say that the people of the land that is Bangladesh today have always made the historically correct choice come election time. And they will corroborate their claim by citing voting trends and the corresponding historical context from pre-partition times all the way till the last election in 2001. How much of this historically correct voting record has to do with the peoples political acumen, and how much of it has to do with the overriding emotions of the times (sometimes anti-imperial, sometimes anti-oppression, sometimes anti-autocratic, but at all times anti-incumbent) can be up for debate. But one fact remains: that the deltaic plain of Bengal, later East Pakistan and then finally Bangladesh, has a proud history of elections (and significant popular participation in them) that can be dated back in time longer than that of almost any neighbouring region.
Be that as it may, does a tradition of balloting automatically translate to a tradition of democracy? Can we in all honesty claim that we nurture, in our so-called democratic practices today, a proud tradition of democracy that dates as far back as our electioneering culture does? In fact, is it even correct to claim that, just because we go to polls every five years, we are, indeed, living in a democracy?
Those who traverse the corridors of power today, and those who vie for that privilege at every opportunity, would have us believe that yes, democracy is burgeoning in Bangladesh. Of course, as long as they can engage in the crapshoot of power struggle every few years in the name of elections!
This fallacy, of confusing elections with democracy, is what resulted in the stillborn beginning of the latest revival of democracy in Bangladesh following the peoples upsurge of 1990. The political leadership that took that almost decade-long movement to fruition had secured victory by toppling an autocrat and earning the right to vote, again. But to consolidate that victory would have been to embrace and spread the core principles of democracy throughout the institutions of the political parties, the government, the state, and society.
Instead, what we have today are two leading political parties that divide the nation through the middle, not on the basis of ideology but on their insistence in playing out a feudal, dynastic, almost Shakespearean clash of egos. Neither party practices democracy within its ranks, and thanks to the largely undemocratic caveat of Article 70, this means that it is the will of the individual at the top that is acted out in parliament and not the will of the people who elect parliamentarians.
We have a government that is run, presidential-style, by the office of the chief executive that is so smitten by the power trip that no decision is too small for it to take (hence no decision too small for it to be bypassed).
We have a state that is so crippled by the plotting of our own Capulets and Montagues that the judiciary is incurably plagued with partisan interests, just so the chance to influence elections of the future does not pass anyone by.
And we have a society that has been lulled into believing that this is what democracy is about the cycle of election, jubilation, rejection, boycott, indifference, corruption, and then election again that it runs the risk of becoming disillusioned.
Abdul Manna Bhuiyan, the secretary-general of the ruling BNP, claims in an interview printed in this supplement that the BNP does have internal democracy. But he goes on to justify the fact that the party constitution empowers the chairperson to take unilateral decisions to uphold intra-party command. (Abdul Jalil, the Awami Leagues general secretary, chose to ignore the question). Such is the democracy they practise that the voice of the many can be stifled by one hand alone.
And such is the democracy they are delivering to the people.
It has become a clich to say that the coming election, and its universal acceptability, will be crucial for the development of both Bangladeshs democracy and the country itself. And laudable efforts are being made by various quarters, especially the civil society and development partners, to bring the polarised parties together, on the one hand, and to bring credibility back to our politics by campaigning for deserving, enlightened people to be able to occupy some space in the political arena, on the other.
All well and good. But the real campaign has to be a longer term approach, a campaign for making structural changes in our so-called democratic institutions and our still feudal mindset, so that our honest candidate isnt the anomaly juxtaposed by the elite shoving aside career politicians at the grassroots level but is the norm.
The quest for democracy cannot allow elections to be an end in themselves.
Zayd Almer Khan is deputy editor, New Age
Political calculus in the
season of elections
by NM Harun
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Rieux remembered that such joy is always imperilled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learnt from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and enlightening of men, it roused up its rats again and sent them forth to die in a happy city.
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Y7^FC8~NeK The Islamic discourse is the defining characteristic of the post-75 polity. It is now much more pervasive than in the Pakistan period. Pakistan was created on the basis of the fallacious two-nation theory that is, the Hindus and Muslims formed two nations in the subcontinent as a homeland of the Muslims, not in the religious sense but as a community distinct from the Hindus, to paraphrase Abul Mansur Ahmed. The Bengalis of Pakistan asserted their Bengali nationalism on the secular linguistic basis and won for themselves, through a war of independence against the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.
That secular Bangladesh, since the cataclysmic regime change of 1975, has vanished and the process of establishing an Islamised Bangladesh not on the basis of the two-nation theory of the British period but on the new-found basis of Bengali Muslim nationalism, euphemistically called Bangladeshi nationalism, has been going on unabated. The constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh has been subverted, through martial law proclamations, into a legal, administrative and political instrument for the Islamisation of the state. The land, which has historically been the home of a multi-religious population, has been physically transformed into a so-called Islamic land, with Islamic symbols and injunctions erected and inscribed throughout the length and breadth of the country from the parliament building and cantonment to educational institutions and business establishments, from airports and highways to bridges and culverts, from ships and trains to buses and auto-rickshaws. No politician in the days of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan felt the need to use the honorific of al-Haj but nowadays it has almost become a fashion of the politicians belonging to the big parliamentary parties.
The sway of Islamic discourse is so overwhelming that even those who flaunt their secular credentials, for example, many stalwarts in the Awami League, take a satisfaction, wittingly or unwittingly, in describing Bangladesh as a country of so-called moderate Muslims as opposed to so-called Islamic fundamentalists. Even many intellectuals, who are generally recognised as secularist, do not hesitate to uphold the humane traditions of the Sufis as an argument against the politics of the Jamaat and other Islamist outfits. Which means it is Islam versus Islam, ritualistic evocation of the secular mantra of Bengali nationalism notwithstanding.
The fault-lines: But the foundation of the Islamic polity has not yet been consolidated, politically and constitutionally.
The historical developments, culminating in the birth of Bangladesh, have been distorted and falsified. There is an attempt to establish an Islamic narrative as opposed to the secular narrative of the historical, political and ideological origin of the Bengali nation-state. To this end has been invented a pantheon of Bangladeshi nationalism Bakhtiar bin-Khilji to Sirajuddowlah to Titumir to Nawab Salimullah to Ziaur Rahman. But so long as the memory of 71 is not completely erased or forgotten, the incontrovertible fact remains that the War of Independence and Liberation of 1971 was fought and won on the basis of secular Bengali nationalism and Sheikh Mujib was the undisputed leader of the struggle for independence.
Islam was by no means an issue at the time of liberation and independence, nor was there any pretender to unseat Sheikh Mujib as the founder of Bangladesh.
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Y7^FC8~NeK Besides, there is the High Court judgment condemning the convicts in the Sheikh Mujib murder case to death. The legal process for the implementation of the judgment has remained suspended in the current tenure of the Islam-pasand, BNP-Jamaat government. If a single killer of Sheikh Mujib is hanged, the murder spree of 15 August will be legally condemned as a crime and its political legitimacy as the harbinger of the post-75 polity will be in danger of losing all its shine.
Externally, the increasing trend of Islamisation has become a cause of worry for America, the godfather of post-75 Bangladesh. It patronised Islamic politics here as a measure of punishment for the original sin that Bangladesh committed in 71 in defiance of its imperial diktat and also as an antidote to socialism that the new nation pledged to build. In the post-9/11 era, America is scared of the spectre of bin-Laden and its anti-terror radar is also focussed on Bangladesh.
India, anointed as a regional power by America, is also complaining loudly about the rise of Islamist outfits in Bangladesh.
A low-intensity, undeclared civil war: The origin as well as the basis of the post-75 Islam-pasand polity is martial law in the wake of the bloody, conspiratorial regime-change of 1975 and since then it has remained dominant in state power either through direct martial law regimes or the convenient use of a grotesque quasi-martial law document which goes by the legal fiction of a constitution.
A proper constitution is based on republicanism while martial law is the negation of constitutionalism. The martial law-doctored so-called The Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh was a legal fiction to civilianise the martial law regimes of General Zia and General Ershad and, since 1991, has been a clever device in the service of the post-75 neo-rich political classes to negotiate peacefully the potential civil war that plagues Bangladesh since the dark day of August 15, 1975.
The civil war involves a clash between the forces claiming to uphold the secular/socialist polity that was treacherously overthrown in 1975 in the name of ending the Mujib regime, and the post-75 Islam-based polity of neo-liberal Bangladesh. Its a low-intensity, undeclared civil war because the votaries of the secular/socialist polity have not dared to challenge the usurper post-75 polity ideologically and frontally, and the latter have been trying either to co-opt the defeated forces or eliminate/marginalise them in election politics so that they cease to be power contenders in constitutional changes of government.
This phoney battle of polities has kept the country in a state of perennial destabilisation and, in the process, all the props of the state have been rendered controversial or dysfunctional be it the constitution, parliament, civil and military bureaucracy, or the judiciary. The raging controversies over the issues of nationhood and the War of Independence and Liberation have created a crisis of national identity which inhibits national cohesion.
With the Awami League, whose position on the secular-socialist polity is ambiguous and which is desperate to revive its pre-1971 cordial relations with America, leading the secular/socialist camp, this camp is unlikely to go on the offensive in the ongoing phoney civil war.
But the forces comprising the post-75 polity, under the leadership of the BNP, seem to have some compulsions to seek to bring this battle of polities to a conclusion.
The game called election: Bangladesh is a nation of amnesia, to borrow from the vocabulary of American writer Gore Vidal. Otherwise there would have been no talk about the holding of free, fair and credible elections under the extant constitutional mechanism. It is an open secret that all the elections and referendums since 1978 have been hardly anything but political farce, produced by the domestic and international power-brokers either to legitimise the incumbent rulers or install in power people/parties of their choice to run the government within the bounds of the post-75 polity. Not surprisingly, the 1996-2000 Awami League government also played according to this scheme and so did not raise the political and ideological issues centring on 15 August.
If a general election is now held, whether on schedule or in an extended timeframe, under the present constitutional arrangement, it will not be held to restore the secular/socialist polity as desired by the Awami League-led opposition alliance under the slogan of mukti joddher chetona, the spirit of the Liberation War, but to further consolidate the post-75 polity.
Constitutional and electoral reforms, as demanded by the opposition alliance, will, on the other hand, promote a level playing-field and deprive the domestic and international power-brokers of the scope to play their traditional tricks. Elections will then be fought, won or lost on the mundane issues of prices, power, fertiliser, corruption, etc, which may spell doom for the incumbent BNP-Jamaat government. This will possibly bring the 14-Party Alliance to power, creating, at the minimum, a space for secular-socialist politics and even a scope for the revival of a secular/socialist polity under the changed post-75 conditions through the implementation of High Court judgments on the killing of Sheikh Mujib and the Fifth Amendment and martial law.
Such an election will not be an election as usual only to change a government but will be tantamount to a polity change. This is a danger signal for the post-75 polity.
Prime minister Khaleda Zia is apparently alert to the danger. She has become aggressive and is preparing to fight a last-ditch battle against the votaries of the mukti jhoddher chetona. She has been barnstorming the country, telling the people that Islam will be in danger if the Awami League-led alliance comes to power; that the oppositions reforms agenda is a conspiracy against election as well as the constitutional process; and that the Awami League wants to make the country a vassal (of neighbouring India). She has been asking the cantonment, the guardian angels of the post-75 polity, to play an effective role in holding the forthcoming general elections in a free, fair and neutral manner, as they did in the past.
Looming chaos: The prime minister has obviously opted for a particular element of the election formula of Richard Boucher, the US assistant secretary of state for south and central Asia, which suggests following the regular constitutional process in holding the forthcoming elections. Which means no constitutional and electoral reforms as demanded by the Awami League-led alliance and other opposition forces, and the holding of the elections as business as usual.
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Y7^FC8~NeK This stalemate in the power struggle will reach the most critical stage when the next caretaker government, constitutionally entrusted with the responsibility of holding the general elections, will be inducted into power.
The million-dollar question is: Will the caretaker government, whose role is constitutionally limited to that of a disinterested umpire in the power struggle between the political parties through elections, be strong enough to carry out political mediation or suppress political agitation and still manage to hold the elections within the stipulated three months time?
The obvious answer is no. In the resultant fluid political and constitutional situation, the immediate outlook will be chaos. More so since the people have already savoured the sweet taste of success in the anti-establishment struggles in Kansat, Shonir Akhra, Savar-Gazipur and Phulbari and have found the political leadership inadequate to lead them, there may be a propensity among them to trigger sporadic mass struggles and even to take the law in their own hands to settle scores against the real or perceived anti-people elements/establishments during the soft government of the caretaker period.
Beyond chaos: It seems Khaleda Zia is gambling that if she can deftly play her constitution card even at the risk of producing a chaotic interlude, her rival in the power struggle, Sheikh Hasina, who has aligned the Awami League with the left and radical parties in the 14-Party Alliance, will lose all the sympathies of the neo-rich ruling classes at home and the international guarantor of post-75 Bangladesh, America, whenever the next general elections are held.
There is a catch here. Not the Awami League-led opposition but the Khaleda-led government may, in public perception, be held responsible for instigating chaos by stonewalling the reforms demand. The neo-rich ruling classes and also their foreign patrons, including America, may then opt for Hasinas leadership for restoring stability and also for pre-empting the rise of radical politics.
Besides, Khaleda Zias strategic alliance with the Jamaat has created a Frankensteins monster in the shape of Islamist outfits. If and when the possibility of Hasinas return to power is gone and with that secular-socialist forces become irrelevant in the power struggle, there is every possibility that the Islamist outfits will get emboldened to implement their design to foist Islamic theocracy in the country.
Looking from this perspective, the details of election politics are merely a diversion from the focal point concerning the political destiny of the nation.
The wager now is: will the people be willing to take the country further down the path of Islamisation under the leadership of Khaleda Zia or will they resist this trend, inspired by the uplifting memories of the glorious War of Independence and Liberation?
NM Harun is contributing editor, New Age
The caretakers: a means or an end?
by Shameran Abed
The Caretaker Government Act was passed by the 6th Parliament as the 13th amendment to the Constitution on May 25, 1996. It came about as a result of a two-year opposition movement led by the Awami League, which began in earnest after the rigged by-election in Magura in March 1994 and peaked following the farcical general elections conducted under the BNP government in February 1996.
Apart from being a solution that was the demand of the political parties, especially the ones in opposition, the caretaker system also enjoyed high public acceptability from its very inception. Whatever faith the electorate had had on a political governments desire or ability to hold free and fair elections had been shattered by the events of February 1996 and the oppositions assertion that a fair election was only possible under a non-party caretaker government found high resonance among the public.
However, the caretaker system was not one that was new and untried. Five years earlier, a successful general election had been held in Bangladesh under the non-party interim government of Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed. The 1991 parliamentary election was the first election since the birth of Bangladesh that was truly participatory and was accepted widely as being free and fair. It was this experience that gave rise to the demand for future elections to be held under non-party caretaker governments, which would ensure the representation of all political parties and be able to hold free and fair elections.
The caretaker system was also modeled largely on that of the interim government of Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, with a Chief Advisor as the head of a council of Advisors, which would run the day-to-day affairs of the country for a period of 90 days and hold a parliamentary election within that time. It was further enshrined in the constitution that the last retired Chief Justice would be the first choice as the Chief Advisor of a caretaker government and would select not more than ten Advisors, who would collectively be responsible to the President.
However, this was to be a temporary solution. Suggestions were that caretaker governments would only be required for three consecutive general elections, by which time the election commission was to be adequately empowered and our political parties were to have sufficiently matured to be able to hold free, fair and acceptable elections without the need for a non-party caretaker government. That was at least the hope.
It is important then to consider why the caretaker system can be desirable only as a temporary solution. Firstly, the system is entirely undemocratic. For three months every five years, our country is governed by a handful of eminent citizens who are plucked out of society largely on account of their apparent political neutrality. That we have been fortunate in finding men and women who have performed their duty to the nation admirably is hardly relevant. The reality remains that for those few months every five years we entrust our country to people in whose selection we have had no say.
Secondly, although those who have been chosen to be Advisors in the last two caretaker governments have been citizens with a proven track record of success in their respective professions and efforts have been made to select those whose integrity is above question, the truth remains that the first criteria for selection is perceived political neutrality rather than ability or integrity. Therefore, just as the top leaders of our political parties reward the most loyal with cabinet positions rather than those most able, Chief Advisors are forced to begin by pre-selecting those who are perceived to be politically neutral, thereby bypassing many with greater ability and integrity.
Thirdly, it is manifestly absurd that the political parties that are trusted to govern for five years cannot be trusted to conduct proper elections. Surely, it is shameful that we give five-year mandates to parties in whose commitment to the democratic process we can have so little faith. Although the caretaker system as an intervention is something that Bangladesh takes pride in, the need for this intervention is something that we as a nation ought to feel embarrassed about.
Unfortunately, while the caretaker system has so far performed its role of facilitating free and fair elections and ensuring smooth transitions of power, the inherent problems in our system that led to its adoption have not been addressed. To make matters worse, the caretaker system itself has been made controversial by the very parties that had demanded and adopted it.
Following the general elections under the first caretaker administration in June 1996 in which the Awami League emerged victorious, the BNP rejected the results by alleging that the elections had been rigged by the Awami League. Following their defeat in the general elections in 2001, the Awami League took matters a step further by alleging that the caretaker administration had put together an intricate plan in connivance with the election commission, the armed forces and the President of the Republic to fix the election in favour of the BNP led four-party alliance.
This practice of not accepting the results of elections held under non-party caretaker governments has set a very poor precedence. It is now expected that the major parties that do not come out victorious in the elections will make the obligatory remarks of election rigging by the victors. If our major political parties are not willing to accept the results of elections held under non-party caretaker administrations, what point is there of having such a system in the first place?
In calling into question the integrity of the caretaker administrations by alleging either that they had allowed rigging to take place or that they had actively worked towards fixing the result of the elections, our major political parties have transformed the solution that was the caretaker system into the problem. The direct consequence of this will be that those who are offered positions in future caretaker administrations will invariably be wary of the fact that their integrity will be questioned by the side that loses in the elections. Therefore, the novelty that was once attached to being part of this process in facilitating a democratic transition of power from one government to the next has all but worn off. As a result, the danger is that men and women of lesser calibre, and possibly lower integrity, will form future caretaker administrations.
The caretaker system has not only been made controversial in itself, the introduction of this system has also led to a much more important and wide-reaching problem, that of the politicisation of the highest levels of the judiciary. The constitutional provision that the most recently retired Chief Justice must be the first choice as Chief Adviser of a caretaker administration has prompted successive governments to give judicial appointments and promotions with party interests in mind. Not only therefore has the judiciary not been separated from the executive, as has been promised by both the Awami League and the BNP in each of their election manifestos since 1991, the upper levels of the judiciary has become embroiled in controversy as a result of the short-sightedness of political governments. Hence it is no surprise that we now find ourselves in the midst of the current controversy regarding the next caretaker administration, that of the acceptability of retired Chief Justice K M Hasan as its Chief Adviser.
The BNP led alliance government appointed Justice K M Hasan, a former international affairs adviser to the BNP, as Chief Justice, superseding two Justices of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court who had been appointed to that position before Justice Hasan. The government justified this appointment on the ground that Justice Hasan himself had earlier been superseded by the same two Justices in being appointed to the Appellate Division, and that it was merely correcting the injustice done to him in the past by the Awami League government.
Merely days after Justice Hasans retirement as Chief Justice the following year, the government then raised the retirement age of the Justices of the High Court from 65 to 67, thereby ensuring that current Chief Justice J R Mudassir will remain in his position when this governments term ends, leaving Justice Hasan to head the next caretaker government. This the government justified on the ground that there is a shortage of quality mid-ranking judges, and that a vacuum will be created if the current high-ranking judges retire at 65. However, the timing and manner in which the raising of the retirement age was done nonetheless raises serious questions about the real motive behind this move.
The Awami League led opposition alliance has made clear its stance that it will not contest in the next general elections if it is held under a K M Hasan caretaker administration. If they keep rigidly to this stance, either the elections will take place without the main opposition party, which will not be acceptable to anyone least of all the electorate, or K M Hasan will have to step aside to allow a more acceptable candidate to become the caretaker chief.
Suggestions have been made, reportedly to K M Hasan in person as well, that he ought to stand aside in the interests of a timely election in which all major political parties in the country will participate. If he does stand aside, the next person in line to head the caretaker government as per the constitution will be the Chief Justice immediately prior to Justice Hasan. That person being the late Justice Mainur Reza Chowdhury, the last retired Chief Justice prior to Justice Hasan capable of being the next Chief Advisor is Justice Mahmudul Amin Chowdhury. If the major political parties do not object to his assumption of this position, it would allow one way out of the current impasse.
However, many argue that to compel Justice Hasan to step aside would be to deal a terrible blow to the institution that is the position of Chief Justice of the country. This argument holds significant merit. After all, the constitutional provision that the last retired Chief Justice is to be the first choice to head the caretaker government was not done in the hope that all Chief Justices will be politically neutral. That would be absurd, given that the Chief Advisor is a part of the electorate and is expected to exercise his franchise at the elections. Rather this provision was included out of respect for the position of Chief Justice, and in the belief that a person who has filled that position can be trusted to discharge his duties neutrally, whatever his personal preferences may be.
Hence even though the standing aside of Justice K M Hasan as Chief Advisor when the next caretaker government is formed may be the most practical route out of the current deadlock, this would entirely undermine the position of the Chief Justice of the country. The main opposition parties ought to show respect to that position by accepting that a person who has assumed that position should be capable of holding a proper election. To do otherwise would plunge our country and its politics onto a dangerous course.
The cause of the current controversy regarding Justice Hasan in truth lies deeper than the political neutrality or the lack thereof of this retired judge. It is caused by the systematic politicization by our major political parties of all institutions and professions in this country. From the civil service and the armed forces to doctors, lawyers, engineers and university professors, our political parties have succeeded in polarizing this country along broad party lines. As a result, there is an ever-dwindling group of people left in our country who are perceived to be politically neutral.
That is not to say however that the problem is in civil servants or doctors or even election commissioners or advisors to caretaker governments having political preferences or connections. The problem is that our political parties cannot then trust that these individuals will act neutrally when they are required to do so. Yet, that is exactly what happens in every other democratic country in the world. From the United States and United Kingdom to India and Malaysia, elections are held under political governments, which are hardly politically neutral but act neutrally in order to hold proper elections which will be acceptable to all. If political governments can act neutrally in other countries, it is a great pity that we cannot trust a non-party caretaker government headed by a former Chief Justice to do so in order to hold a free and fair election.
The emphasis therefore must shift from who is or isnt politically neutral to who can or cannot act neutrally. A person of integrity will always act neutrally when neutrality is expected of him. Our constitution was amended to recognize that a retired Chief Justice is someone who can be expected to have the requisite integrity to act neutrally as the Chief Advisor, a provision that was acceptable to all major political parties. Therefore, it is integrity rather than political neutrality that ought to be sought in someone who is given the responsibility of heading a caretaker government. Unless the opposition parties can show that they have cause to question the integrity of former Chief Justice K M Hasan, they should not object to his assumption of the office of the Chief Advisor in the next caretaker administration. If they accept that he is a man of integrity, it logically follows that he will act neutrally in the discharge of his duties, even if he himself may not be politically neutral.
A further controversy that exists regarding the caretaker government is to do with its lack of authority over the ministry of defense, which for those three months come directly under the President. The opposition parties demand that the constitution be amended to bring the Ministry of Defense under the neutral caretaker government rather than to have it under a political President. This appears to be a reasonable demand on the face of it, and as far as aiding in the conducting of fair elections are concerned, the armed forces may be better utilized if they are under the caretaker administration. However, the raison detre of the armed forces is not to hold free elections but to defend the nation in the face of external attacks on our territorial sovereignty. If ever the nation faces such a situation, it must be considered whether the armed forces should be under an elected - albeit indirectly - President or under an un-elected caretaker government.
In the long-term however, the caretaker system must be done away with. However, two changes must take place before this can be done. The Election Commission must firstly be empowered. Once the election commission has the necessary authority to hold elections which political governments will not be able to influence, the need to superimpose an interim caretaker government every five years will no longer exist. Political governments will then act as caretaker governments, as they do in every other democratic country in the world, and the election commission will control all mechanisms in order to hold fair elections. And the second requirement is the internal democratization of our major political parties. For as long as they themselves remain autocratic and family-centric, a real democracy cannot be hoped for in this country. Only when they practice what they preach can we expect our democracy to begin to take a definitive shape.
Shameran Abed is editorial contributor, New Age
Clean finance for competent candidates, credible elections
by Debapriya Bhattacharya
How to curb the influence of black money in the upcoming national elections has been one of the recurring themes which have been a topic of intense debate at the citizens dialogues organised by the Centre for Policy Dialogue across the country since April 2006, in association with Prothom Alo, The Daily Star and Channel-i. All deliberations on getting honest and competent candidates elected to the next parliament through a credible election were underpinned by the concern that high flow of unaccounted money in favour of certain candidates would adversely affect public choice.
The agitation about election finance was motivated fundamentally by the following two major concerns:
1) Rising campaign cost is emerging as a barrier to equal opportunity for political participation.
High flow of black money in election financing ultimately diminishes aggregate public welfare.
It was very impressive to observe how the participants of these regional dialogues, drawn from a wide cross-section of people, were quick to identify that these exorbitant levels of election financing are in fact investments on the part of prospective Members of Parliament (MPs) to secure control over disbursement of public resources and to influence public procurements. The civil society groups could clearly foresee that expenses incurred by the candidates would be soon reimbursed by the voters through means ranging from kickbacks from delivery of public goods to award of public contracts to appointments in public jobs. Admittedly, all these will finally end up increasing the cost of living of the voters.
Regarding how to stop influx of black money into national elections, the suggested solution was apparently very simple: restrict the duties of the MPs to framing laws and designing of other policy instruments; leave the development works to a strengthened local government system. When confronted with the question of how can an MP, having the ambition to get re-elected, really extricate herself/himself from local issues, a large section of the civil society leaders suggested introduction of party-based proportional representation in the national parliament based on a pre-declared set of prioritised candidates. This is supposed to delink MPs from local compulsions.
While the issue of devolution of authority to elected thana or district councils remains a failed case of political goodwill, one is tempted to believe that the nation, in the near future, will seriously explore the possible merits (and demerits) of having a (full or partial) system of proportional representation of parties in the national parliament.
Notwithstanding the above, the fact remains that the citizens would also like to see some effective measures in reducing the capital-intensity of the upcoming election campaign. It is maintained that it would be only appropriate and opportune if we take the bull by the horns and tackle the election finance issue by way of creatively and committedly building on the relevant legal and institutional provisions available in the country.
Election finance: possible nature of reforms
Political finance reforms have taken varying shapes in different countries. Review of concerned literature allows us to identify four major ways by which democratic societies have tried to regulate political finance in general and election finance in particular. These four approaches are as follows:
Imposing limits on election expenditures;
regulating private contributions to election campaign;
provisioning public resources for election campaigns; and
enacting reporting and disclosure requirements.
A scrutiny of the state of affairs with respect to the above four points suggests that existing election finance rules in Bangladesh mostly relate to approach (i) and partly to approach (iv). There is almost a total absence of any legal provision regarding approach (ii), and approach (iii) is acted upon implicitly, albeit marginally.
As we all know, the Presidents Order No 155 of 1972, better known as the Representation of the People Order (RPO), 1972, with all its subsequent amendments provides the legal and regulatory framework for the conduct of elections in the country. Chapter IIIA Election Expenses of the RPO (1972), which was inserted through an ordinance in 1985, lays down the accounting and reporting requirements with regard to election-related receipts and expenditures. The provisions have been sequentially strengthened through various amendments made in 1991, 1996 and 2001.
Imposing limits on election expenditures: The major goal of this approach is to reduce election costs for ensuring equal opportunities for participation in the elections to those who are not rich. Limits may be imposed on total expenditures to be incurred by a political party in an election or on total expenditure per candidate per constituency or on specific elements of costs.
We know that the current limit on per candidate per constituency election expenses in Bangladesh is a maximum of five lakh takas. We also know that the actual expenditure, even for the weakest candidates, exceeds the stipulated amount by many times. And for a strong contestant it is anybodys guess. The candidates are supposed to, inter alia, maintain separate bank accounts, and for election finance to have a voucher for each payment exceeding Tk 100.00 and submit a statement within fifteen days after publication of election results. We further know that most of the candidates neither furnish the required expenditure-related documents nor do they mention the actual expenditure incurred. In fact, the journey of an MP starts with submission of an untrue financial statement to the Election Commission (EC).
If the stated limit on expenditures appears to be unrealistic, we should not hesitate to suitably revise it upward. It may be recalled that in India, in the late 1990s, the expenditure limit for a state assembly candidate was Rs 6 lakh and for a national parliament seat Rs 15 lakhs. But the more relevant issue in this respect is not the level of the limit, but compliance to the limit. Curiously, all successive Election Commissions have shown scant uprightness in enforcing the concerned provisions, while the political parties have craftily abstained from submitting their election-related financial statements.
Regulating private contributions to election campaigns: The major aim of this approach is to lessen dependence on one or a few sources of financing. The RPO (1972) allows the possibility of voluntary contribution to an election fund and stipulates that no donation amounting more than Tk 1,000.00 shall be received by a political party unless it is made by a cheque. Interestingly, a party may be punished with a fine extending up to ten lakhs takas for violation of these provisions. The fact that not a single political party has been hauled up for violating these mandatory provisions may not come as a surprise, even to most nave among us.
However, Bangladesh lacks a legal framework for the corporate sector to make financial contributions to election campaigns. To encourage transparency in business-politics transactions, one may consider making such contributions tax deductible. Indeed, the Tata, Birla and Mahindra groups of India did set up election pool funds in 1997-98 from which contributions were made to political parties, according to certain criteria. In this way they tried to reduce the extortionate demands on them, while practising transparency. The corporate sector in Bangladesh may very well adopt the pool fund approach which will not associate it with any particular party as allocations will be made to a number of parties based on a pre-declared formula.
Provisioning public resources for election campaigns: This provision has been conceived mainly to retain the autonomy of the political agents with regard to their financiers. Financing by the public exchequer may be full or partial, and the recipient may be the party and/or the candidate. However, one has to clarify the eligibility criteria for such financing.
Public funding of elections and/or parties was first introduced in the mid-1950s in Costa Rica and Argentina and later (1959) in Europe by Germany. Nowadays various mechanisms of public financing (or subsidisation) of political parties are used in most of the developed countries. In Bangladesh, election campaigns of the contesting parties are subsidised marginally by the government as they are offered free air-time in the public electronic media.
If we opt to finance the election campaigns through budgetary allocations, how much is it going to cost the country? One may consider one crore takas (about ten lakh takas for ten candidates on an average) as a reasonable amount to be spent in each constituency, which will make the total campaign cost for the government Tk 300 crore, which is less than 0.43 per cent of total public expenditure earmarked for 2006-07 or about 0.06 per cent of the GDP. Even if we increase the allocation to Tk 600 crore, it still remains less than one per cent of the total annual budget of the government, which is less than 0.13 per cent of the GDP. One can readily agree that the aggregate public welfare will be significantly enhanced even after incurring this expenditure as it will reduce the compulsion of our public representatives to extort rent by dint of their privilege to manage public resources.
Enacting reporting and disclosure requirements: This provision is supposed to infuse transparency and accountability into electoral finance and thus to deter black-money holders from participating in the elections as well as to discourage them from financing their proxy candidates.
It has been mentioned earlier that the accounting and reporting provisions contained in RPO (1972) are hardly complied with and are almost never pursued.
The issue of information disclosure has attained new dimensions because of a celebrated ruling of the High Court Division (May, 2005) which empowered the EC to collect a set of information through an affidavit from parliamentary election candidates. The solicited information relates to a candidates academic qualifications, profession, sources of income, criminal records, if any. The assets and liabilities of the candidates and their dependants also have to be reported. The candidates should also report to the EC about the amount of loans taken from banks and financial institutions, personally or jointly. Along with these, it has been advocated that tax returns and asset statements of the candidates for the last three years should also be declared.
It is further suggested that, if it is found later that a successful candidate has committed perjury by suppressing or manipulating the solicited information, his/her seat will become automatically vacant.
We observe with great regret that the EC, instead of capitalising on the opportunity to instil more accountability in election finance, has opted to disregard the guidance from the High Court Division, treating it as not mandatory.
Prospect for election 2007
What are the real prospects for operationalising some of the ideas contained in the foregoing paragraphs? However, enactment of a full-blown regulatory framework for public financing of election expenses for the upcoming elections is a far cry. It is also readily not evident that the society will be able to prepare itself in the remaining period for a transparent mechanism for receipt of private (including corporate) donation for political parties.
However, one does not see why the EC should not make full and unremitting efforts to enforce the necessary conditions regarding election expenses stipulated in the RPO (1972) with its subsequent amendments. In order to make candidates take these provisions seriously, the EC will also have to enforce effectively all other guidelines provided in the electoral Code of Conduct, particularly those having impact on election expenses (number of campaign booths, single colour poster, joint projection meetings, etc).
Whatsoever, the test case of our resolve to curb flow of black-money in election financing is manifested in the challenge in implementation of the directives of the High Court regarding disclosure of information by the candidates.
In this context, one may identify the role of four sets of actors for ensuring the civil societys aspirations for elimination of the influence of the black-money in the upcoming national elections.
First, the caretaker government which is to conduct a free and fair election, has to make the necessary amendments of the relevant legal instruments to strengthen the scope for cleansing the current murky state of election finance. It is said that the caretaker government is not entitled to take any policy decision, but it will be well within its mandate to take measures to regulate election finance for creating a level playing-field for all contestants with a view to improving the prospect of credible election outcomes.
Second, the Election Commission will be the key player in forcing the contestants to comply with the accounting and disclosure rules. Sadly, the current composition and modus operandi of the EC do not raise any hopes in this regard. Indeed, even if the present chief election commissioner and his colleagues really want to do the needful, they will possibly fail to do so as they have already forfeited their credibility in public eyes.
Third, other concerned statutory bodies, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) whatever may be its worth in its present state and the National Board of Revenue (NBR) will have to play an effective and coordinated role in ensuring that the monies spent by the candidates are accounted for in their declared incomes. The ACC and the NBR will also have to review the consistency of the asset statements submitted by the candidates to the EC.
Fourth, most importantly, without voluntary and collective cooperation on the part of the major political parties, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the caretaker government and EC to implement the measures relating to control of high inflow of unaccounted money into the election campaigns. One wonders why the politicians object to such an initiative if it does not take away some of their unfair advantages. At the same time, if the political parties continue to sell nominations to the highest bidders, it will compromise the efforts to streamline election finance.
Bangladesh will have to sort out its current state of election finance which is undermining the democratic system, eroding the value of economic progress and jeopardising social cohesion in the country. The citizens of the country will definitely wait, in eager anticipation, to see whether this time we shall be able to make a transition from money-driven electioneering to an issue-oriented campaign.
Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya is executive director, Centre for Policy Dialogue
Democracy in Bangladesh: Unending quest for free and fair elections
by Ataur Rahman
Democracy is viewed comprehensively in terms of three general approaches: sources of authority of the government, purposes served by the government, and procedures for constituting government. The classical theory of democracy saw it only in terms of the will of the people and the common good. Even in modern times, some political theorists still try to define democracy in the classical vein with idealistic connotations, such as freedom, liberty, egalitarianism, effective citizens control over policy, responsible government, equal participation of the people, etc. In recent years, the concept of governance has also surged up as a new paradigm in democratic politics meaning the rights of people, human dignity, reduction of corruption and ensuring transparency and accountability of the government.
But, in reality, democracy in most Third World countries is mainly limited to elections. It is the minimal definition of democracy and the first condition. While people become leaders by reason of birth, fortune, wealth, violence, co-optation, learning, appointment or examination in other systems of government, the central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern. Therefore a political system is democratic to the extent that its powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.
Democracy in practice
In most countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the movement towards democracy has always been limited until 1990. The surge for democratisation became a global phenomenon after the Cold War, and the transition of many poor countries to democracy in the 1990s produced waves of optimism about the prospects for democracy. The big issues that gradually emerged concerned democracys consolidation problems and performances. It is evident that in most of the newly emerged democracies, inefficiency, corruption, incompetence and domination of special interests are, in fact, rampant. There are strong arguments that political democracy is meaningful particularly for freedom of individual expression of dissent and opposition, and opportunities for changing political leaders and public policies at periodic intervals. There are others who, on the contrary, think that in practice it does not make much difference to the general people whether a country is governed democratically unless there are substantive changes in the lives of the people in terms of their critical needs.
The second condition implicit in democracy relates to the limitations of power. Elected governments or bodies do not exercise total power they share power with other groups in the society and are obliged to remain within the bounds of the constitutions the rules of the game. They also argue that in reality democracy in these countries is transformed into various forms of authoritarian rule, and they doubt whether democracy can be really meaningful in non-Western and poor societies where there are extensive inequalities.
The third condition concerns the freeness and responsibility of political parties that act as the vehicles of peoples wishes and interests. In fact, the stability and institutionalisation of the democratic system depends on the attitude and behaviour of political parties and their perception of peaceful transfer of power or succession of government. But, in practice, political parties have become power-centric and serve as platforms for wealth and influence, giving democracy a bad name.
Bangladesh context
The democratic ingredient in Bangladeshs emergence as an independent entity was mainly inspired by the peoples overwhelming longing to evolve a participatory system of governance based on equality of opportunity, freedom of expression and involvement in the decision-making power of the government. The nation started its journey with a democratic government. The first election in independent Bangladesh was held on 7 March, 1973. A total of 1,091 candidates of 14 political parties contested the elections. The Awami League that spearheaded the independence movement won 293 out of 300 parliamentary seats. The main opposition parties Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) and Jatiya League won one seat each. Independent candidates came out successful in five constituencies. The Awami League secured more than 73 per cent of the votes cast.
The ruling partys overwhelming victory was criticised on many grounds, such as using government privileges, muzzling political opposition, monopolising media coverage, spending money lavishly in electioneering beyond the limits fixed by the Election Commission, and intimidating the opposition. There was widespread accusation that the election was rigged in varying degrees despite the fact that Sheikh Mujibs charisma and Awami Leagues strong party network would have given the ruling party an absolute majority any way. The allegation of the opposition parties appeared in the dailies like Sangbad, Gonokantha, Ittefaq, and the Holiday, a prestigious weekly. The democratic method of elections thus had a bad start with allegations of unfair means like rigging, proxy votes through impersonation, snatching of ballot boxes, political intimidation and use of government facilities. It was from that first election that Bangladeshs search for free and fair elections began.
Since then the Election Commission of Bangladesh had organised the successive elections of 1979, 1986, 1988, 1991, and on 15 February, 1996, 12 June, 1996 and October 2001. The Election Commission also conducted three presidential elections held in 1978, 1981 and 1986. In this context it has played a crucial role in the successful continuation of democratic rule in the last thirteen years. Yet like Bangladeshs democracy, the Election Commission remains a fledgling for a number of reasons: substance and procedures of elections yet to be fully institutionalised and integrity of the EC fully established. Indeed, the conduct of elections by the Election Commission is a continuing process of meeting the challenges and adapting to the diverse demands of political parties that are not institutionalised and developed in terms of the rules of the game and the norms and standard practice of a democratic society.
Elections in democratic era
Following the mass upsurge and fall of the Ershad regime, Bangladesh went for parliamentary elections in March 1991. This election was often termed the fairest election in Bangladeshs history. It was contested by 76 political parties under an interim government headed by Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed. There were as many as 2,774 candidates who ran for the elections. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party came out as the single largest party by winning 140 seats, followed by the Awami League which won 88, Jatiya Party with 35 and Jamaat-E-Islami with 18 seats. Many foreign observers, including the Commonwealth and US-based National Democratic Institute termed the election a model one, which really was free and fair. President Justice Shahabuddin could ensure the neutrality of the civil bureaucracy. But more importantly, he received full cooperation from the armed forces that played a decisive role in taking effective measures against violence, intimidation and fraud. In fact, the 1991 election rekindled new hope and optimism about Bangladeshs democratic future and institutionalisation of democratic procedures.
The holding of parliamentary elections on 15 February, 1996 to meet the constitutional obligation in the face of the opposition movement and stiff resistance created disharmony and unmitigated conflict in the political arena. Against such a background, the formation of a non-party caretaker government through the passage of an Act further to amend certain provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh in search of free and fair elections ushered in fresh hope for sustaining a democratic order. The task of the non-Party caretaker government was extremely challenging in the context of the volatile political environment. But the success of the non-party government can be seen in creating a semblance of neutrality, restoring the image of the Election Commission and re-establishing a reasonable degree of control over the bureaucracy and law enforcing agencies. It was remarkable that both the elections of March 1996 and October 2001 were held in a free and fair manner. This success can be attributed to the ability of the neutral caretaker government and the Election Commission to persuade the political parties to behave responsibly, abide by the electoral Code of Conduct, and the integrity of the Bangladesh Army personnel who could do their duty without involving themselves in partisan politics.
Renewed concern for 2007 elections
Since the end of 2005, the opposition led by Awami League launched a movement that was intended to change both the electoral laws and caretaker government system. The 24-point reforms package of the 14-party alliance and the insistence that they would not participate in the elections unless the reforms are accepted by the incumbent 4-party alliance created a new concern for the 2007 elections.
While the public face of the reforms seems to be benign, the real intention of the Awami League-led opposition is to effect some convenient changes in the neutral caretaker government and the Election Commission. The system of the present caretaker government is built on the power of the president to appoint the last retired chief justice of the Supreme Court as the chief adviser and 10 persons as advisers upon the advice of the chief adviser. The caretaker government is entrusted with the task of conducting elections to the Jatiya Sangsad within 90 days of the dissolution of the parliament. It is heartening that the system of caretaker government worked well in the past two parliamentary elections. The chief advisers and advisers showed utmost neutrality and integrity in performing their tasks in holding elections in 1996 and 2001. The 14-party alliance maintained that the caretaker government worked well in 1996 when they were voted to power, but not in 2001 when the BNP and its allies got the overwhelming mandate of the electorate.
They are now objecting mainly to two things: firstly, the last chief justice is not acceptable to them as the chief of the caretaker government; and secondly, the powers of the president (Article 58 E) need to be transferred to the chief of the caretaker government. The reform package also wants to review and change some electoral laws, ostensibly to curb use of black-money in campaign funding and election expenses.
Real needs
The controversy over the formation of the caretaker government and the continuing rhetoric of the opposition that they will not take part in the ensuing elections unless their reform proposals are accepted, is casting a sombre shadow on the prospect of free, fair and contestable elections in 2007. The time is also running out for the major parties to sit and resolve the issues before the caretaker government takes charge. This needs a dialogue between the parties in an inclusive manner, which is not forthcoming. Most countries of Southeast Asia are enacting laws and regulations for the improvement of the electoral system and are trying to attract people with integrity and competence to democratic politics. These can be done by the Election Commission through formulating the necessary electoral laws relating to campaign finance, public disclosure requirements, stipulated legal and illegal sources of funding, limits on contributions and expenditure, etc.
But to make constitutional changes in the provisions of the neutral caretaker government at this point of time can hardly get a consensus or even majority endorsement by the political parties and the people. Neither the ruling alliance can do it nor is the caretaker government in a position to effect such changes because it is beyond its jurisdiction or power. The opposition parties, therefore, at this point need to go vigorously for electoral campaign to win the hearts and minds of the people and to use the anti-incumbency factor to their advantage.
Concluding remarks
Ironically, the opposition parties are now involved in psychological warfare. They are engaged in a mortal battle on the streets of the capital and city centres to launch a movement that will take them to power through the elections. The recent coalition-building process of parties and their reactions reflect how fiercely the next elections will be contested. In fact, the cause for such inimical and non-compromising nature of politics can be found in the erosion of the credibility of the two major parties. The BNP-led alliance that ruled the country in the last five years fell far short of meeting the expectations of the people. Despite many positive achievements, the price-spiral, widespread allegations of corruption and disharmony within the ruling alliance have created a strong anti-incumbency backlash. The Awami League, on the other hand, could not offer a credible alternative to the policy failures of the ruling alliance. Its political rhetoric and lack of vision in creating a new agenda for the welfare of the people did not inspire confidence and trust. A recent survey by some young scholars under the auspices of the Bangladesh Political Science Association finds that most people are desperately groping for new leadership. They are not happy with the ruling alliances performance, but they are unhappier with the performance of the opposition parties.
Against this backdrop, the two most vital tasks are to ensure the integrity of the Election Commission and to create congenial inter-party relations. In fact, the success of a credible election depends on the ability of the Election Commission to ensure transparency, impartiality, professionalism and accuracy. The current controversy over the chief election commissioner needs to be resolved in a logical and amicable manner. If need be, the incumbent should pave the way for someone else for the greater interest of the nation. But the political parties should cooperate with the Election Commission by following the electoral Code of Conduct and maintaining a peaceful electoral environment. In the last analysis, the political parties and their leadership must be committed to peaceful, free and fair elections by improving their performance and abiding by the rules of the game of democracy. Bangladesh has proved to be fortunate in sustaining its vibrant democracy for the last fifteen years in spite of the adverse propaganda of its antagonists. This shows the dynamism of the people of Bangladesh and their love for democratic ideals. Let optimism prevail over pessimism and positive energy triumph over negative and misdirected efforts.
Election: reform proposals,
reform priorities
by Asif Nazrul
The Representation of the People Order, 1972, is the major law concerning election procedures and processes. It has undergone various amendments, most of which occurred immediately before previous parliamentary elections. Political parties, civil society and the Election Commission together contributed to that process by suggesting and sometimes participating in the reform measures. In view of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 2007, the need for further reforms in election institutions and election law is being felt more strongly by all the concerned stakeholders. Among them, the reform proposal of Awami League-led 14-Party Alliance has become the major focus of political discussion and debate. Reform proposals of other groups have some common elements, although on a few issues they differ from the 14-Partys reform proposals.
Reform proposal of the 14-Party
The reform proposal that was submitted on July 15, 2005 by the Awami League-led 14-Party Alliance dominates the current debates and discussions on the next parliamentary election. It comprises a 5-point proposal to amend the formation and jurisdiction of the caretaker government, a 15-point proposal to make the Election Commission (EC) independent and an 11-point suggestion for reforms of electoral laws and regulations. The more important proposals and the legal changes they entail are scanned below.
Proposals to reform caretaker government
a) Appointments: The reform proposals aim at making it mandatory for the president to appoint persons as chief adviser (CA) and advisers to the caretaker government in consultation with, and on the consensus of, all political parties. The implementation of the proposal will require an amendment of Article 58C of the constitution. The aforesaid article provides for automatic appointment of the last retired chief justice, or in case of his failure, his immediate predecessor, or in case of his failure, one of the retired judges of the Appellate Division as the CA of the caretaker government (CG). It requires a politically acceptable appointment only in case of the unavailability for that position or unwillingness of the aforesaid judges. It remains be seen whether any such CA could ultimately ensure more fairness in an election or whether any such person could actually be found for appointment as CA.
b) President and CGs relationship: The reform proposals are geared to establish a check and balance system between the authority of the president and that of the CG. It requires the president to act in all matters on the advice of the CA. This may result in more participatory or efficient decisions on election issues only if the president and the CA both have mutual respect for each other and coordinate their activities. Implementation of this proposal will entail amendment of Articles 58B.2 and 58E of the constitution.
c) Authority over defence ministry: The reform proposals argue that instead of the president under Article 61 of the constitution, the CG should be entrusted to run the Ministry of Defence. This proposal presupposes that the CA will be more objective and less controversial than the president in using the army for maintaining order during the election period. In reality, this will depend on the availability of a CA through a politically consultative process and will necessitate amendment of Article 61 of the constitution.
The other two proposals on reform of the CG are less significant as they are either wholly or partially already in Article 58D and Clause 7 of Article 58C.
EC reform proposals
a) Appointments: Given the crucial importance of the Election Commission, the reform proposals require the appointment of the chief election commissioner and other commissioners to be made, and their numbers to be fixed, in consultation with the political parties. While these proposals may improve the fairness and acceptability of the Election Commission, their execution can still be uncertain unless any or all of the election commissioners willingly resign and the political parties can manage to reach an agreement on the acceptability of new appointees. Besides, implementation of these proposals will require promulgation of new laws in accordance with Article 118(1) of the constitution.
b) Independence and authority: The strength of the reform proposal lies in suggesting that the EC should have its own independent secretariat that is free of any executive control, and the full financial independence of the EC should be ensured by the abolition of any control of the finance ministry over the release of its funds. Another potentially constructive proposal was preparing computerised voters lists and voters identity cards and the introduction of electronic voting and transparent ballot boxes, although implementation might not be possible before the next election. Disposal of election disputes by the Election Tribunal within two months, as proposed, will require the amendment of Parliament Members Privilege Laws and improvement of procedural aspects.
c) Proposals already in law: A number of proposals that were made by the 14-Party Alliance are already in the Representation of People Order (RPO). For example, expansion of the ECs organisational framework down to the upazila level and its authority to appoint and control its entire staff (already in Articles 88, 120 and127 of the constitution or in practice), full authority of the EC in appointing the returning officers, presiding officers and law-enforcing agencies (already in Sections 7 and 9 of the RPO), authority of the EC to take disciplinary action against officials involved in the election duty (already in Sections 9 (1A) of the RPO and number 13 Act of 1991), full independence of the EC in announcing the election schedule and preparing the election rules (already in Sections 11 and 94 of the RPO), postponement or cancellation of the election for violation of electoral rules and regulations and to issue arrest orders and punish the violators (already in Sections 25, 87, 89A and 91 of the RPO).
Electoral laws reform proposals
a) Checking money and muscle power: The proposals made in this regard are, for a considerable part, mere duplication of the already existing legal provisions. Examples include submission of election expenditure report (44AA, 44B 1.2.3., 44C 1), punishment for submitting false information (73, 74 and 63.1), disqualification of loan defaulters (12A 2) and delimiting election expenditure (44B 1.2.3 in the RPO), prohibiting the exercise of muscle power and providing for stern punishment for such exercise (already covered in the Code of Conduct, 91B), ineligibility of convicted criminals (partly covered in 12.1 aii), misuse of religion and fundamentalist campaign (partly covered in Code of Conduct).
Other proposals that can improve implementation of financial responsibilities of the candidates require amendment of existing laws, in particular the RPO. These include treating the expenditure of anyone in favour of a candidate as the candidates election expenditure, disclosure of family members wealth along with that of the candidate and regular report by him to the EC, making the candidates electoral incomes and expenditures public, and the right of any voter to challenge the statements on candidates financial information.
b) Eligibility of candidates: There is a proposal for disqualifying black-money holders, although that does not spell out how the EC or other offices will define or detect black-money. The proposed ban on government officials and employees from competing in elections in violation of the government service rules is meaningless in that nobody actually does so or can be able to do so because of Article 12(1) of the 1972 Order. The proposed ban on those who opposed the Liberation War is not supported by any existing law and has no relevance as far as financial responsibilities are concerned.
There are important proposals for improving the quality of politics as well. They include initiation of the process of transparent nomination from the grassroots level and ensuring democratic system inside the parties.
c) Mode of election campaign: Regarding the mode of the election campaign, the reform proposals contain innovative ideas like projection meetings to be arranged by the EC. Other proposals are already covered by the existing laws. For example, following the disciplinary provisions for using posters, leaflets, loudspeakers, election banners, graffiti and gates, monitoring by the local election officers and informing the EC of any violation of law (covered in 44B/87A/91A and B), banning structures for election clubs, camps and publicity centres in the constituency (44B [3A.h]) and ensuring equal distribution of air-time on radio and television (followed for registered political parties).
There is a proposal to empower the EC to cancel the candidacy of any violator of election laws that in part reflects Article 91B of the RPO, 1972 before its deletion by the amendment on 2 September, 2001.
d) Internal democracy: The reform proposal provides for some mandatory obligations of the political parties. Those include the political parties obligation to conduct themselves according to the norms of democracy, ensuring regular election of party office-bearers and submitting financial statements, and training by the EC of political workers on election matters. It also provides for firm application of the electoral Code of Conduct and the formation of an all-party advisory committee for extending cooperation to the EC. These proposals can improve democratic exercise in nominating the candidates and require amendment of Chapter V1A of the RPO.
Reform Priorities
The above Sections reveal the need for further reforms of the EC and election-related laws in order to strengthen the transparency, accountability and efficiency of the election system and thus to ensure free and fair elections. One major strategy to achieve those objectives could be strengthening and streamlining the financial obligations of the election candidates and ensuring the implementation and enforcement of those obligations through appropriate and effective procedures and institutions. The following recommendations for mapping out election reform priorities are made by synthesising all the proposals so far made by the political parties, civil society and the EC itself.
1) Independence of the EC: Meaningful independence of the EC by ensuring that it has full control over its secretariat and funds (meaning that the finance ministry cannot interfere with the release of its budget) is absolutely necessary for ensuring that no undue influence can be exerted on its activities. It should, however, not be ignored that independence of an institution alone cannot guarantee its efficiency and effectiveness. The Election Commission should also have the competence, objectivity and adequate authority to perform its duty efficiently and impartially.
2) Appointment of the commissioners: The existing law authorises the president to appoint any persons as commissioners, and in doing so he is bound only to take advice of the prime minister. Given the sensitivity and utmost importance of the services that the commissioners have to deliver, provisions should be made for appointment of the commissioners through a consultative process involving the political parties represented in the parliament, and some criteria is necessary to ensure that the most suitable persons are appointed to those positions. While appointing them, it must also be ensured that the commissioners cannot hold any government office concurrently and, after their retirement, they cannot assume any position in government or semi-government offices.
3) Authority of the EC: In order to make the EC a truly powerful institution that is able to check illegal and corrupt practice during elections, it must be given the authority to debar any candidate from participating in election for gross misconduct and to punish adequately those responsible for pre-polls irregularities, and also to act as a court of contempt. Only a fully independent and powerful EC can take bold and authoritative steps against the use of black-money and muscle power in the election process, and such steps can contribute hugely to make the election system really free and fair.
4) Transparency and accountability of the EC: Unfettered independence and authority can breed autocracy, corruption and irregularities in any institution. Therefore accountability and transparency in the activities of the EC must be established and strengthened by appropriate reform measures. That may be done, among other things, by making provisions for punishment of EC officials in the case of gross misconduct, irregularities and corruption, immediate publication of the activities of the Election Enquiry Committee and the EC in enforcing the financial and other obligations of the candidates and political parties, and by making it mandatory for the EC to prepare and publish annual and periodic reports having all the information on its activities.
5) Regarding ROs and AROs: The returning officers (ROs) and the assistant returning officers (AROs), who are the mid-level officers of the executive branch of the government, appear to be unable (probably in fear of retribution) to take any take any steps against the potential MPs for violation of election laws. In the case of their transfer after the election, it also becomes very difficult to trace the election-related documents and the compliance records. In order to solve these problems, the ROs should be appointed by the EC from amongst its personal officers and preferably from members of the judicial services.
6) Disclosure obligations: The disclosure obligations as set out in the RPO is not inadequate, but provisions for their enforcement and implementation must be improved. These can be done by making the EC accountable for its failure to enforce legal requirements, making mandatory provisions for publishing in the media or official gazette the compliance records of political parties and the candidates, allowing public interest litigation for alleged violation of election laws, establishing a prosecution wing at the EC and allowing the wing to sue any alleged violator of election laws.
7) Streamlining political parties: As suggested in various election reform proposals, mandatory registration of political parties requiring detailed annual income and expenditure information, audit reports, documented records of regular councils and the practice of intra-party democracy for electing party leaders of all tiers and promulgation of stringent laws for fund raising can prevent, check and reduce the dominance of money in the functioning of political parties and thus can pave the way for nomination of genuine politicians in the national elections. Legal measures like mandatory submission of tax returns, income and expenditure reports and debarring bank-loan and utility services defaulters must be introduced to discourage the black-money holders and defaulters from participating in national elections.
8) Disposal of election disputes: Establishment of a sufficient number of benches of the High Court Division to deal with election disputes, procedural reforms like limiting the number of adjournments, simplifying the service of processes and shifting the burden of proof on the accused persons can expedite disposal of election disputes. In addition, the law exempting MPs from appearing before the court during the period of 14 days preceding the commencement of a parliamentary session, during the session and a period of 14 days after the session should be rendered ineffective in relation to the trial of election disputes.
Finally, as long-term measures, introduction of voters identity card and casting of vote through electronic voting machine is absolutely crucial for resolving the long-standing crisis surrounding fake voting and election rigging.
Dr Asif Nazrul teaches law at Dhaka University. This article is an abridged version of a chapter written for the annual governance report of the Power and Participation Research Centre
Independence of EC a prime
requisite for fair elections
by Mohammad Abu Hena
While election remains the only means of transfer of power in a democracy, it is only expected that the legal and institutional instruments for delivering quality elections will be a matter of substantial interest and concern to the people. It is, therefore, a positive symptom, in terms of the need of further democratising our society and state, that the prime stakeholders of the elections the people have gradually developed an active interest in debating on the best possible ways to hold credible polls. That the people have developed such an interest is evident in political discussions taking place everywhere the parlours of the capital to the tea-stalls of rural bazaars.
However, it is through election that a democratic system emerges and works. This underscores the overwhelming importance of the body entrusted with the task of organising, preparing and conducting the elections. This election management body (EMB), usually known as the Election Commission in most democratic polities, inevitably becomes the focus of the concentrated attention of all stakeholders at and before the time of any national election.
The performance of the Election Commission is appraised more critically and justifiably so in fledgling democracies. I believe that post-polls appraisal should be encouraged as a rewarding exercise as it can lead to corrective measures, remedies and appropriate guidelines for the future.
It may be worthwhile to remember that election is not an easy process in any country. The preparation necessary for holding a national election is simply staggering. A thousand and one things need to be judiciously identified, listed and taken care of methodically, each one in due time.
To guarantee free and fair elections, the inescapable conclusion is that the EMB ought to be independent and neutral, free from the control or influence of any outside authority, especially the government. The consensus is that the EMB, which is independent and neutral, should operate impartially in dealing with all political parties, discharge its responsibilities faithfully and thus enjoy the confidence of the electorate.
The public perception of an Election Commissions independence is based generally on its constitutional status, method of appointment and removal of the chief election commissioner (CEC) and election commissioners (ECs) and powers conferred on it by the constitution and relevant laws. To enable the EMB to play its rightful role in nurturing the integrity of the electoral process, it is considered essential that it must not only be independent of government control, but it must also be perceived to be demonstrably so by the general public and political parties. It is also held equally important that the persons appointed to such vital positions deserve to be respected by virtue of their conduct, uprightness, wisdom, ability and neutrality.
To my mind, the important thing that should matter most in modern elections is the independent character of the Election Commission with accompanying powers being stipulated specifically in the constitution. How does our Election Commission measure up to this expectation? Is it independent and, if so, is this independence ensured by the constitution? Are the powers conferred by the constitution and laws adequate enough to protect its independence?
The Election Commission in our country derives its independence from the constitution. Article 118(4) states, The Election Commission shall be independent in the exercise of its functions and subject only to this constitution and any other law. About the appointment of the CEC and the ECs, Article 118(1) says, There shall be an Election Commission for Bangladesh consisting of a Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other Election Commissioners, if any, as the president may from time to time direct, and the appointment of the chief election commissioner and other election commissioners (if any) shallbe made by the president. According to Article 118(3), the term of office of the CEC/ECs is five years from the date of entry into office.
To ensure impartiality, the constitution has debarred the CEC/ECs from acceptance of any appointment in the service of the republic. An EC is, however, eligible only for appointment as the CEC. As regards removal, a CEC or EC can be removed from office in accordance with the constitutional provisions as applicable to a judge of the Supreme Court (Article 118 and 96). The authority of the Election Commission manifests itself in two other provisions of the constitution. Article 120 which says, The president shall, when so requested by the Election Commission, make available to it such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of its functions. And Article 126 which says, It shall be the duty of all executive authorities to assist the Election Commission in the discharge of its functions.
The constitution, the supreme law of the land, has bestowed independence on the Election Commission. Apparently, there should be no bar to the Election Commission in working independently without being susceptible to any influence from any quarters. Experience shows that there are two important prerequisites to such independence. One is the person or persons who constitute the Commission who have the ability, courage and commitment to work impartially, regardless of any pressure. The second is the power or authority to preserve and enforce its independence. Independence is meaningless unless it is backed up by powers enabling its exercise.
One of our most poignant tragedies debilitating good governance is that the right people are hardly in the right places. Appointments are made more often than not on the basis of extraneous considerations rather than on merit or suitability. Selection of respected and able persons such as the CEC or ECs lies at the very core of a successful Election Commission. We must remember that it is dangerous to give powers to a body which is inherently incompetent and motivated. What a disaster it is if you are stuck for five long years with such persons whom you cannot get rid of. I think this is an issue which merits our uppermost concern. While on this subject, I may suggest that although the CEC or ECs are supposed to be appointed by the president on the advice of the prime minister (during the caretaker governments stint, on the advice of the chief adviser), it is judicious, in order to forestall future controversies and also for the sake of transparency, to make appointments to these nationally vital positions in consultation with the major political parties.
There is no specific number stipulated in the constitution for election commissioners. According to existing provisions, the Election Commission can function with the CEC alone. Legally, there may or may not be an EC or more than one EC. I share the view of those who want to amend the constitution by incorporating a specific number of ECs, instead of leaving the matter to the discretion of the president. Considering the workload and my own experience, I believe it is enough to have three commissioners including the CEC. The CECs term should expire on the termination of the term of the parliament and a new CEC should be appointed in the tenure of the non-party caretaker government to generate confidence in the electorate and political parties. There should also be a total prohibition against the appointment of the CEC or the ECs from amongst persons who are known to be partisan or who are members of, or affiliated to, any political party. It may be remembered that the Election Commission has been conceived to be a corporate body under the constitution and laws, invested with the necessary powers and responsibilities. The Election Commission, therefore, needs to work in complete harmony and with true team spirit, preferably through consensus. During my tenure we operated in this manner and found our work extremely productive and rewarding.
A debate has been raging for quite some time over the real independence of the Election Commission despite the stipulation of constitutional provisions to this effect. According to many, lack of effective control over finance and staff has undermined the independence and neutrality of the Election Commission and lies at the very root of its weakness. This point has been constantly and forcefully highlighted in a host of national, regional and international seminars and conferences in the recent past. It has been emphasised that the EMB should enjoy unfettered financial and administrative freedom to carry out its constitutional responsibilities as an independent and neutral body. This, I believe, is a substantive issue which should not hang fire indefinitely. Here are a few concrete suggestions:
(1) A committee comprising the cabinet secretary, principal secretary, finance secretary and secretary to the Election Commission may finalise the budget and related financial matters and, if considered unavoidable, in a session with the Election Commission. As is the practice today, no financial matter should be handled at the lower tiers of the Ministry of Finance.
(2) Today the Election Commission Secretariat is officered mainly by government officials on deputation. This has been a time-honoured system which is outliving its utility and hence needs to be phased out gradually. The Election Commission, to be meaningfully independent, should have full control over its employees including it secretary. Laws should be enacted to give full authority to the Election Commission to recruit, promote, remove or retire its officers and staff as per prescribed procedures.
(3) The Election Commission Secretariat should function exclusively under the superintendence, control and direction of the Election Commission. There is no question of tagging it with any ministry of the government.
(4) It is time now for the Election Commission to give serious thought to the question of appointment of returning officers from amongst its own officers during national elections. This, certainly, may lend greater credence to the independence of the Election Commission and put an end to the long-drawn-out debate over the performance of the officers of the administration.
(5) The secretary to the Election Commission Secretariat may be designated as secretary, Election Commission, and, to avoid any confusion, may be bracketed like the secretary, parliament with the secretaries to the government in the same article of warrant of precedence.
There are many who rightfully question the effectiveness of the Election Commission as it can hardly do anything to regulate the election expenses of candidates and political parties (Articles 44B(3), 44CC, 44CCC of the Representation of the People Order, 1972). The law lays down in mandatory terms the submission of expenditure statements within the prescribed time-limits. Experience indicates that these mandatory provisions are set at naught and observed more in the breach than in compliance. The statements, even if submitted, do not reflect the reality, and those who submit these concocted statements manage to get away with impunity. The Election Commission is seriously handicapped because of the absence of an effective mechanism to monitor and scrutinise the returns of election expenses of contesting candidates or political parties in the manner prescribed by law. There even appears to be no legal provision for action against a political party for non-submission of expenditure statements in connection with election of its candidates. I feel that this vital matter should be addressed with all seriousness. At the time of each election, expenditure teams need to be formed and registers as devised by the Election Commission be introduced and maintained by each contesting candidate and political party for recording day-to-day expenditure (for scrutiny by the commissions officials).
Indiscriminate use of money and muscle in the absence of any check or regulation has already made politics unwholesome, unfit for good people, which is spelling disaster for the country and democracy. If we look at our parliament we can see how painfully the quality of its members has started to slide downward, and how the experienced politicians are grossly outnumbered by businessmen and people with money and muscle power.
The strict observance of the Code of Conduct by the contesting candidates and political parties is a key issue as it paves the way for a fair and peaceful election. It is imperative for an effective Election Commission to assert itself without discrimination in the event of violation of the Code of Conduct. There are penal provisions in the law which need to be applied forcefully against recalcitrants, irrespective of candidates and parties. I feel that the Electoral Enquiry Committee, which investigate breaches of the Code of Conduct, should be given powers to award punishments and, in fact, progressively higher punishments/fines (committee members are necessarily judges they do not have any power to award punishment at present) in the case of repetitions of such breaches. For specified grave offences (to be provided for in law), the Election Commission should be able to disqualify a candidate from contesting the election (Article 91D of RPO appears to be vague). It needs to be demonstrated that examples are better than precepts and that the real importance of any law lies not in its formulation, but in its application.
The issues I have mentioned above are merely indicative. There may be some other issues which should have been touched upon. I look forward to the opportunity to address them, especially the mandatory registration of political parties, which, I believe, can help substantially in the flowering of democratic norms and in strengthening the authority of the Election Commission in our country. There is no alternative to a genuinely independent and stronger Election Commission, coupled with a sound growth of democratic norms in the political culture, for credible elections that virtually contribute to the institutionalisation of democracy.
Mohammad Abu Hena is a former chief election commissioner
So-called white papers and
lack of follow-up action
by Saiful Huda
The first ever white paper that the people of this country experienced was way back in 1971. The then government of Pakistan, through the white paper, not only tried to portray Bengalis as murderers and their leaders as conspirators, but also attempted to justify their ghastly attack of March 25 on innocent people. Such a venture may be acceptable if one looks at it from the Pakistani point of view, but the unfortunate part of that white paper was that the list of people who drafted it also included sons of this soil.
The point I intend to make here is that these white papers can never be white. There are always two sides of any story. If one sees a glass half filled with water, someone else will stick to the point that it is half empty.
But the so-called white paper that the present government published soon after assuming power is unpardonable mockery. The white paper of the BNP-led four-party alliance government carried some of the alleged cases of serious corruption by its predecessor, the Awami League. The allegations were specific but the motive apparently political. People till today have failed to see the beginning of the jihad declared by BNP chairperson and prime minister, Khaleda Zia, against corruption.
In the light of the pre-election pledges by Khaleda Zia to the nation, the white paper on corruption and gross irregularities presented forty case studies, dwelling on allegations of corruption and irregularities in various branches of the administration. Though the number of allegations was substantial, the government chose to proceed selectively in the choice of cases to be pursued.
Khaleda Zia, in her address on October 19, 2001, not only declared that she would take up the corruption cases of Awami League leaders, but said, I also warn the elected members of parliament from BNP and its partners that I shall take immediate action on the reports of corruption against you, which will be firm and exemplary. The face of Bangladesh has been blackened as the most corrupt country. I want to wipe that stain off. I have made commitments to this effect in public and elsewhere. It is the collective responsibility of all of us to redeem this pledge. It should be understood that because of the continuation of corruption over the last five years, many people have supposedly accepted it as a fact of life. People should be freed of corrupt practices. Peoples lives must be brought within the fold of orderly conduct. It is indeed a hard task. I appeal to my countrymen to assist us in establishing a decent administration. Help us to remove the awful reputation of Bangladesh.
Whether the prime minister received any assistance from her countrymen is another story, but the media in all these years of her present regime has been quite vocal on corruption by many of her ministers and officials. We hardly saw any action being taken against them, let alone the declaration of jihad. One of the senior ministers of the BNP told reporters that if Khaleda Zia returns to power in the next elections, her priority agendum will be to curb corruption. He refrained from explaining why she had failed to do so in this regime.
Corruption at all levels was so pervasive in the Awami League regime that in June 2001 the Transparency International, an international organisation, in a survey of 91 countries rated Bangladesh as the number one corrupt country. Though some of the ministers of the then government questioned and dismissed the findings of the survey, their posture did not stand any objective test. Transparency International drew its conclusion on the basis of material from three sources The World Banks Business Environment Survey-2001, Global Competitiveness Report-2001 of the World Economic Forum and Economists Intelligence Unit-2001. All these publications have a respectable status and are more or less dependable.
Since then Bangladesh has continued to top the list of countries where corruption is perceived to be most prevalent. This year Chad, a central African country, shares the title with Bangladesh atop the Corruption Perception Index 2005 of the Berlin-based Transparency International.
I dont blame the politicians only for corruption. But I blame them for not taking action against the bureaucrats who show the ways and means of corruption in the system and justify them in their files. The ministers and ex-ministers are often seen blaming their secretaries or former secretaries for the irregularities, but no bureaucrat has ever seen the dungeons.
Allegations of corruption in high places, appearing in the newspapers or elsewhere, have been the subject of the enquiry leading to the publication of the white paper. It is obvious that corruption occurs generally outside government records, beyond the public eye, and is surrounded by secrecy.
It appeared from the cases recorded in the white paper that despite differences in the contents, there was a structural similarity between the cases. The last white paper included cases of negotiations on rehabilitation of the Ghorasal thermal plant, permission to import PHS telephones, suppliers credit being used or attempted to be used in sectors like energy, telecommunications, etc. There have been frequent efforts at breaking the rules on purchase and making exceptions to the rules. It was alleged that in case of appointing a pre-shipment inspection agency, the then prime ministers step was a clear violation of the law. But in all cases there were bureaucrats who assisted in striking the corrupt deals.
Even during the present government, the bureaucrats who helped draft the white paper against the Awami League had stayed glued to the centre of power, and were either aware of the corruption going on or were directly involved in it.
The politicians have once again failed to learn lessons from the past and, if the opposition wins the next general elections, there will be another set of bureaucrats who will draft another white paper on the corruption of BNP leaders. The bureaucrats are also least bothered with all the corruption charges against them and the politicians in the last four years because they know, perhaps for sure, that another white paper may come out but there will be no follow-up action. And it will be these bureaucrats who will be feeding that government the information and drafting the white paper.
Saiful Huda is city editor, New Age
Politicians should control politics
Businesspeople and bureaucrats joining politics in groups is not a good sign. It is necessary to develop a culture where exclusively career politicians will control the political system,
Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan tells New Age
by Shahidul Islam Chowdhury
Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan, a career politician, secretary general of the ruling BNP, and local government, rural development and cooperatives minister of the government, believes the country needs to develop a culture where politicians, and not businesspeople, who use political power to be billionaires, will dominate the political system. In an exclusive interview with New Age, he talked at length on the existing political culture and also about the functioning of the caretaker government system, strengthening of the Election Commission, movement for competent candidates in the next general elections, violation of party constitution and intra-party transparency in financial affairs. He also explained why it was necessary for the alliance to take the HM Ershad-led faction of the Jatiya Party on board besides giving his views about sale of party nomination, the Awami Leagues warning of movement during the caretaker regime and the role the BNP should play if it were to lose the next general elections. Extracts:
New Age: Do you consider the 2007 general elections crucial for the country?
Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan: Any election is crucial. If the elections are not held, it will put democracy at stake and create a constitutional vacuum. Therefore, elections should be held in time for the democratic process to continue.
NA: The constitutional provisions of interim non-party caretaker government were incorporated, as politicians had lost faith in themselves. How many years should the caretaker system be continued for?
AMB: It is correct that the caretaker government system was incorporated as the politicians had lost faith in themselves. But the system is functioning well. The country had three elections in 1991, 1996 and 2001. Both the Awami League and the BNP got victory under the system, as none of the parties could interfere in the electoral process. So, in my consideration, the caretaker government system should be continued until and unless politicians regain trust in themselves.
NA: It was assumed that the country might need caretaker system for more or less three five-year terms; and the political governments would be able to make the electoral system credible, as well as acceptable to all, by making the Election Commission truly free from interference of different quarters and by reforming the electoral laws. But neither the Awami League nor the BNP governments took steps to strengthen the commission. Why?
AMB: We need to bring positive change, including strengthening of the Election Commission, in our political culture.
NA: The BNP was doubly responsible for strengthening the Election Commission. Why did your party not take steps to make the commission stronger?
AMB: Three elections have been conducted in fair way in the past 15 years. We have tried to make the elections more credible.
NA: Politicians nowadays are losing ground to businesspersons and civil and military bureaucrats in controlling the political system. Do you consider it a problem? Why do you not take steps to stop such erosion?
AMB: Anybody can join politics. Businesspersons and bureaucrats can also contribute to the political system by utilising their long experiences. But their joining in politics in groups is not a good sign. They can select representatives to speak on their behalf in the political system. But it is necessary to develop a culture where exclusively career politicians will control the political system as they work on political affairs all the time. On the other hand, businesspeople become busy making money out of politics and bureaucrats building their own fortune.
NA: Will the BNP take steps to reduce awarding party nominations to businesspeople in the 2007 parliamentary polls?
AMB: Some businessmen have joined politics long time ago. Many of them have become part of the political process. But we should discourage awarding nominations to the businesspeople who want to compete in elections only because they have money and want to use political power as a springboard to be a billionaire. And all the political parties should think twice before awarding nominations to businesspeople.
NA: What is your opinion about the competent candidate movement by a section of civil society?
AMB: Theoretically, competent candidate is a good term. But here, civil society is divided and biased. Anybody can question the standard used to label a candidate as competent. In fact, a competent candidate should have unquestionable patriotism, an ideology, respect to the democratic processes and norms, and moreover, commitment to the people of the country.
NA: Is there democracy in the BNP?
AMB: We practise democracy in accordance with the partys constitution. The leadership at the grassroots, including unions, thanas, districts and metropolises, has been elected by party councillors. Yes, we havent had a national council in several years. In the BNP, the national council is empowered to change leadership and form the national committee. We felt less necessity for holding the council, as we will not change the leadership. Khaleda Zia holds the post of the chairperson and nobody contests for the post. According to the constitution, the chairperson is empowered to select members of the central executive committee. It is an old practice exercised in many parties.
NA: There are allegations that the BNP leadership often flouts the party constitution
AMB: The party chairperson is empowered to take necessary decisions regarding party operations. It helps to uphold intra-party command.
NA: Is there transparency in financial affairs of the BNP?
AMB: We are transparent. The BNP is not a solvent party. We operate a party fund to maintain the partys [central] office and utility services. Ministers, party MPs and leaders of the central committee contribute to the party fund regularly. We collect funds for the party by selling nomination forms [for parliamentary elections]. We collect funds for special meetings and functions separately form well-wishers.
NA: Why does the BNP leadership deem it necessary to include the HM Ershad-led Jatiya Party in the alliance?
AMB: Yes, we won absolute majority in the 2001 parliamentary elections without the Jatiya Party in the alliance. This time we want to get the Jatiya Party, which was in the alliance in the near past, back in the coalition to be sure, once again, of maintaining almost the same result in the next elections. Moreover, we feel getting more parties in coalition will be helpful to avert conspiracy by political quarters and to maintain political stability.
NA: There are reservations about Jamaat-e-Islami and its activities among a section of voters and in some BNP leaders too. Does the BNP have plans to reduce dependency on Jamaat-e-Islami for ensuring victory in the general elections?
AMB: The BNP is the largest and the most popular party in the country. We are not dependent on any party, as we can win elections on our own strength and peoples support.
NA: Will you take steps to stop selling party nomination during the general elections?
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