Jamaat today finds itself in the most enviable situation, with the BNP becoming more and more dependent on its support in a power-sharing electoral contract, and the Awami League desperately trying to break up the BNP-Jamaat concordat. The Jamaat has to do little. It simply sits pretty while both the AL and now the ruling BNP go on appropriating religious symbols and idioms in order to get what they mistake as the religion-driven votes as in the case of the BJP of India, and a sham non-communal All India Congress

Enayetullah Khan

This article is inspired by the attempts of think-tanks to: (a) probe the strategic underpinnings of the centre-right ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s tactical electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami professing an Islamic theocratic state, and also with the Islamic Oikya Jote, a rag-tag platform of 11 madrassah-based religious parties; (b) lay bare the myth of the popular vote-base of all the parties of the latter stripe put together; (c) and critique the evident ‘rise of fundamentalist forces’, as alleged, under the overt and covert abetment-scheme of the forces of the right religious reaction now taking deeper root in the state apparatus and institutions like the academia, the umbrella cultural organisations, and the text-book turntable playing the records of revisionist compositions, cancelling the immediate-past partisan and cultist edition of history.

   While there are other incidental questions arising out of the years-long opposition Awami League’s (AL) campaign at home and abroad to depict Bangladesh as the latest devil after the spectre of political Islam and being home to Islamic terror, the current times have brought into sharp focus some of the American and European security concerns. They pertain to the string of grenade/bomb terrorism in public places like that of the May 2004 broad-daylight blasts at the Shah Jalal shrine in Sylhet, in which the newly accredited British High Commissioner, Anwar Choudhury, was injured, and some subsequent grenade/bomb attacks on the Sylhet Awami League’s indoor meetings and outdoor rallies claiming the lives of one or two important local AL leaders.

   The grenade terror-streak, culminating in the August 21, 2004 afternoon mayhem in a street-mobilisation rally in front of the AL’s central office of what used to be the landmark Gulistan vicinage, was the scariest of all. It was politically loaded more than ever, with the AL president and leader of opposition in parliament, Sheikh Hasina, escaping a direct hit by a hair’s breath and surviving an instant death trail of 21 AL partisans, including Ms Ivy Rahman, an AL presidium member, and a diva, if I may say, among the party Amazons. The sneak grenade terror had by then assumed a political dimension, with constant finger-pointing by the AL at the spook of fundamentalist assassins, though no less blaming it on the BNP. It did not go unheeded in the international arena. Hence, besides floods, cyclones and corruption, Bangladesh in 2004 became perceptibly qualified to fit the descriptions of the ‘Cocoon of Terror’, home to the next ‘fundamentalist Islamic revolution’ steered from within the government by the Jamaat-e-Islami and waged without by the 10,000 foot-soldiers of Bangla Bhai, leader of the Islamic vigilante group who is now on the run, and the deadly cargo of arms at Chittagong’s outer anchorage.

   If the greatest ever arms haul in the port city’s Karnaphuli river-jetty in the small hours of April 2, 2004, following a series of lesser hauls of arms and ammos, has drawn the usual, though unfortunate, blank at the peril of the nation’s security at home and the country’s image abroad, the latest February 28, 2005 bomb attack on an AL meeting in Habiganj targeting and killing former AL finance minister and lawmaker in the current parliament, SAMS Kibria, took the lid off the vortex of the campaign. It brought some of the European Union countries’ representatives in Bangladesh into the diplomatically forbidden domain of internal political issues, darkened all the more by the subsequent Indian jettisoning of the rescheduled SAARC Summit on March 6 and 7 after an earlier postponement on account of tsunami devastation in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and south India, in that order. While the motive of the Indian move was seen to vindicate the AL’s position on internal security and its cradle-to-grave avowal to unseat the Khaleda government even by means ‘most foul’, the hedonistic government of Khaleda Zia, particularly the members of the unwieldy BNP, relapsed into the usual comfort of reactive nationalism and some overt law and order activism against the Islamic vigilantes of Bangla Bhai and some of his mentors. It was welcome, though late. And the inordinate delay in action between a prime ministerial order on late May 2004, to restrain Bangla Bhai and his forces could not be explained away as easily as the complicity of some people in government, both at the central and at the local level, with Bangla Bhai vigilante terror would have it.

   The problem with Bangladesh’s profile is that it is half dark and half light. While the AL and its Internet propaganda network, suitably fed and sustained by Indian intelligence disinformation across the globe, singularly served Sheikh Hasina’s paranoia of painting the country black for her biting the dust in the 2001 polls, the governmental omissions in dealing with a series of outbreaks of political terror, at least on the face of it, created a serious confidence-gap between the government and some development partners, particularly those from the European Union, and no less the United States. The US administration, however, continues to stay divided on a somewhat opaque view of what it calls a moderate Muslim democracy.

   The half truths, churned out by the propaganda juggernaut of the AL, continued to sink into the international media and forums, and went deep with Oxford Analytica’s prognosis of a failed state, that, according to the dark horse think-tank, calls for three drastic ways out of its current ‘governance crisis’. It seemed that the Oxford Analytica appearing out of the blue, the Indian media campaign consistently in step with the AL’s denunciations, the burst of reports in the international media, and some fictive accounts in a Bangla daily (August 2004) of ‘Islamic militancy’ and ‘arms training’ in Chittagong’s uplands, stretching to the Myanmar border, were made to click almost all at a time and produce the same strain and orchestration as on a common keyboard: Bangladesh, the next breeding ground for political Islam. India never had it so good.

   Meanwhile, with the AL having won the battle in its vicious propaganda offensive against the BNP-led regime and having successfully taken its battle to the broader war front, the government seemed to act blind under the comfy weight of a vast parliamentary majority in parliament. The latter was, apparently, hell-bent to prove to the constituents at home and the world that it could get away with its see-no-evil, do-no-evil and hear-no-evil monkey-business, and get on with accumulation and a dynastic succession without the batting of an eye. The people may be damned; but the international forums relating to Bangladesh’s development were getting increasingly bolder in putting Bangladesh’s governance on the dock, along with its slide toward religious bigotry and sectarian intolerance — a concern that we publicly share.

   In the course, the World Bank (WB) was obliged to call an informal seminar in Washington to discuss the Bangladesh development agenda to the exclusion of governmental representation at the insistence of two European Union countries. The seminar, somehow, strongly overruled the extreme outpourings of the two EU countries’ representatives in Bangladesh, and decided to do business as usual, though not without stoking the ego of Finance Minister Saifur Rahman. His primary indignation was seen to be a knee-jerk response, as the ‘informal seminar’ was more than half won in spite of him. But then the reactive ‘diplomacy’ on the part of a Western ambassador taking the electoral reforms issue to the Bangladesh media and, coinciding as it did with the AL’s ultimatum for reforms of the Caretaker Government, finally brought the prime minister into the picture sharply rebuking the countries in question for their unorthodoxy and for what she called their interference with the internal political process. The prime ministerial rebuke has calmed the waters since, but the questions on the spook of political Islam have not really gone away.

   What started as a brief note has by now turned out to be the beginning of an unfolding discourse, so to speak. I still hope to find the silver linings from the distant clime of Canada. Ahead of that the clouds first, the clouds second and the clouds last: we live under the constant darkening of the clouds, more than metaphorically speaking.

   Jamaat has to do little…

   Fundamentalism, though inherently scriptural and rigid in the context of the religions of the Book, beginning with Christianity first in a puritanical movement of the 19th century, has since come to denote a political project. In so far as Political Islam is concerned - an aberration that the majority of practitioners of the faith or those who are born into it would rather not touch - it aims at establishing a theocratic state based on medieval legal and social practices and the jurisprudence of Islam of yore.

   As politics and statecraft are rooted in the Faith and invoked in the name of the Creator or the revealed Book, there is no room for dissent in a theocracy. Being an Islamic state and a republic at once is hence a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron, because the people’s voices and their pluralities, as in a republic, are superseded by the singular diktat from the Book that has as many interpretations as there are sects, including the unreconstructed mullahs or bigots of as many stripes as there are madrassahs and pirs in Bangladesh, for instance.

   Hence fundamentalism as a political project, which is still being upheld as the party credo by the most organised segment of the Islamists, the Jamaat-e-Islami, is antithetical to pluralist and democratic practices in a representative political order. Structured after the fashion of a communist party, late-lamented that is, the Jamaat is an unrepentant legatee of Maulana Maudoodi, its ideologue, who had led an anti-Ahmadiyya killer riot in Punjab in 1952 and had been condemned to death by a military court, only to escape it. The Jamaat is also the legatee of genocide in the then occupied Bangladesh of 1971 in which period it carried out a pogrom of intellectual killing by its blackshirt wings of the al-Badr and al-Shams independent of the killer Pakistan army, though using logistical support from the military in its torture and decapitation chambers in Rayer Bazar.

   While the public memory may be proverbially short, the Jamaat-e-Islami, like the many orphaned and hence fractured communist parties in Bangladesh, barring the underground bands gone lumpen as in the south-western region of the country, has chosen to go constitutional and work within the system to Islamise the polity, aiming more at the institutions of the superstructure — academic, cultural and social — than militating against the broad secular structure of governance, law and jurisprudence as handed down by the British. And not so much by design but by simple default, the Jamaat is also the beneficiary of the erosion in the moral authority of the mainstream parties like the BNP and the Awami League, and the emotive backlash against the ascendancy of the never-say-die Christian Right in the West, particularly in the US, in the wake of the 9/11 madness of Osama bin-Laden, the consequential Twin Tower tragedy and the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq — two candidates widely apart in their variance of authoritarianism. Afghanistan was primitive and Iraq was a modern rogue state run and ravaged by Saddam and Sons pending US conquest.

   The Jamaat, in its mainstreaming stratagem, used both the major contenders of power to reclaim its legitimacy from the dark depths of killer collaboration with the occupation forces in 1971.

   Credit is due to Jamaat that rose from the dungeons of a pariah to the mainstream plank of an anti-BNP movement in 1994-96 hand in hand with its principal detractor, the Awami League, and then used the arithmetic of votes in its alliance with the BNP to enter the sanctum of state power in one Great Leap, so to speak. The ex-Soviet comrades in the post-independence troika, representing the Awami League, the Communist Party of Bangladesh and the now-bygone National Awami Party (Muzaffar), had tried the same tactic under what was then an Indo-Soviet axis in an era of superpower contention. While they had served their external masters well, they had little success apart from ending up in what had been Sheikh Mujib’s nemesis of one-man, one-party Baksal (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League) that had ‘lighted its way to dusty death’ in August, 1975.

   The comparison is odious, though in Jamaat’s case it has been eminently enlightening. Having only 4-plus percentage of popular votes in the 2001 polls, which could have been stretched to about 8 or 9 per cent had it fielded candidates country-wide, it now occupies full ministerial offices in two major portfolios. And unlike the BNP that has to shoulder the liabilities of power, if any, as well, it has none of them except the dividends of state power in anonymously enlarging its sphere of influence in the critical sectors of administration and superstructure. Secondly, it has scrupulously and perceptibly gained a moral high ground vis-a-vis its cabinet colleagues and the co-legislators from the BNP and the boycotting Awami League (AL) on the calculus of perceived corruption, blatant unearned accumulation and what is publicly seen to be abuse of public office during the successive tenures including the current one. The wages of votes, transferable en bloc, in critical marginal seats in favour of the BNP ally in the polls, are the convertible currency for Jamaat. And it has sufficient political sense in using the currency of transferable votes for advancing its political strategy both in the short and in the long run.

   Hence, Jamaat today finds itself in the most enviable situation, with the BNP becoming more and more dependent on its support in a power-sharing electoral contract, and the Awami League desperately trying to break up the BNP-Jamaat concordat. Ironically, the other madrassah-based Islamists like the Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ) or the Islami Shashantantanta Andolan of the pir of Char Monai or some such outfits, whether on the right or the wrong side of the BNP-Jamaat establishment, cannot even deliver more than one per cent of popular votes in any election since Pakistan time to date. The strategic underpinnings, as referred to in the earlier chapter, of a centre-far-right alliance between BNP and Jamaat weigh heavily and disproportionately in favour of the Jamaat in moral and administrative terms.

   The reason is very simple: the melting pot of the BNP is preoccupied with the greed and the glitz of the lifestyle part of globalisation without much of moral scruples, particularly on the part of the second generation inheritors of political and representative authority in the BNP hierarchy. The Jamaat, on the other hand, in its perceived moderation behind a mainstream facade, is having a moral ascendancy over the ruling classes on either side of the broad political divide. Thus a minority of popular vote percentage, say to the maximum extent of 10 to 12 per cent across the country, if taken together with other non-Jamaat and non-inimical Islamic platforms, can hold the BNP a hostage to an alliance with Jamaat in view of the 30 keenly contested seats and the 16 seats won by a hair’s breadth in the 2001 elections.

   The Jamaat has to do little. It simply sits pretty while both the AL and now the ruling BNP go on appropriating religious symbols and idioms in order to get what they mistake as the religion-driven votes as in the case of the BJP of India, and a sham non-communal All India Congress. Religiosity among the masses of Bangladesh is not synonymous with fundamentalist beliefs and bigotry. It is to the contrary. But somehow Bangladesh has beaten Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in overt Islamic symbolism to the exclusion of the minority community comprising the Hindus, the Christians, the Buddhists and the nature-worshippers among the tribals.

   This is a cloud that does not promise a silver lining yet, which I am desperately trying to see.

   

   Overt Islamicism vs secularism with covert communal bias

   But then secularism, too, as enshrined in the un-amended constitution, was sham. Because in all its preaching and simulated practice by the political elite of newly-independent Bangladesh, secularism was essentially an expression of the bygone Babu culture of Kolkata with the topping of upper-caste Hindu communal and cultural symbolisms and idioms. They largely excluded the traditions and the sensitivities of the majority Muslim peasant society in the then East Bengal in which Bangladesh’s rising middle class is deeply rooted. The emergence of Bangladesh represents an armed and militant renaissance of the sons and the daughters of the East Bengal peasantry, who were repressed both under the class domination of the Hindu community and the internal colonialism of Pakistan’s feudal-military and bureaucratic combine, following the bourgeois path of exploitation of the then East Bengal’s economic resources and cultural heritage.

   It is against this backdrop that while Pakistan was out biting dust after its army’s genocidal occupation of the country for nine long months in 1971, the opening of the floodgate of returnees from across the border, other than the pre-dominantly Hindu refugees numbering close to a crore in 1971, created a new tension with an old face in the newly independent Bangladeshi society and polity. These returnees, the dominant Hindu migrants of yore, started demanding their pound of flesh even without having to play the Merchant of Venice.

   The erstwhile landed and professional Hindu gentry, as it turned out to be, who had left the hinterland of the then East Bengal and transferred their resources to the metropolitan hub of Calcutta, now Kolkata, way before the partition of Bengal in 1947, but for their nostalgic and token remains of their hearths and homes, came back in droves. They were, it seemed, bidding to reclaim a lost dominion. But then there were also those average Hindus who were forced to leave under the duress of the politically-driven communal riots of 1950 and 1964 and the brief six-day Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, besides the bloodily hounded mass of Hindu refugees of 1971.

   This rush for properties and privileges, some genuine and most others, as metaphorically likened before, being the pound of flesh of the early Hindu migrants to India, mainly Kolkata, opened the old wounds of the communal divide almost instantly after December 16, 1971 when Bangladesh emerged as an independent state. It was stoked all the more by the effigies of Razakars on the Puja Mandaps in the autumn of 1972, which bore the universal image of the Bengali peasant in his familiar cloth-made toupee and goatee. The first such stir, as was reported in Holiday in 1972, occurred in a Narsingdi Puja celebration, but did not quite reverberate across the country, thanks to the general mood of well-being and national attainment.

   It does not need researched references or footnotes to posit the above thesis, if it is a thesis at all. But it was a reality that had obtained in the early years of independence even to the chagrin of the patriarch Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League. The communal divide was essentially mostly behavioural, not necessarily portending violence in which the minority is always the victim. It became more evident when the more than 99 per cent of the fighting forces within the country and across the border in the Bangladesh Defence Forces (BDF), who were almost exclusively Muslims of both urban and rural origin, valued liberation as something won with the wages of blood. But to the minority community of mostly persecuted refugees, who had been targeted by the Pakistan military for selective killing after the initial holocaust of genocide, it was a given victory of the order of an Indian benison. Such a communal response, coupled with the failed cultural and the economic aggression of Kolkata’s political, cultural, journalistic and literary purveyors claiming the dividend of East Bengal origin, started causing a slow but discernible backlash among the majority Muslims, particularly the armed freedom-fighters, that lent the phenomenon an anti-Indian face, among other very identifiable reasons.

   While the Indian military and humanitarian support is not discounted, the India-centric minority refugee psyche, on the one hand, and the autonomous spirit of the overwhelming number of regulars, guerrillas and freedom-fighters belonging to the predominantly Muslim peasant society of the then East Bengal, or its second generation urban middle class progeny, on the other, seldom met on a common ground. The Hindus remained, apparently, forever ‘trapped in an alien land’, in the words of the Indophile Australian scholar Denis Walker, who contributed several articles to Holiday in the seventies and the eighties. They were to be given freedom from it by Indian intervention only.

   This dependency-syndrome on the part of the minority Hindu community, even if the existence of communal repression is granted for argument’s sake, was further reinforced by the economic and the first- or the second-generation blood links of the Hindus across the border. They mostly belonged to the upper castes and mid-to-high economic strata in the then East Bengal, subsequently East Pakistan and eventually Bangladesh. Only in the recent decades, the residual Hindu community in non-Pakistan and non-Indian Bangladesh are getting increasingly integrated with the national polity. For they are by now thrice- or many-more-times-removed from the economic and the blood linkages across the border, particularly in Kolkata, that, alas, is no longer a city of the Bengalis, but for the frog-in-the-well Babu culture in the peripheries of what was once the capital of the British Raj, to begin with, and what is now otherwise politically dominated by the long-ruling Babu communists of the CPI (M) variant.

   But notwithstanding this development, that is likely to reshape its political profile otherwise painted as the vote-bank of a particular political party, or more as the surrogate of Indian dictates, the minority question remains a sore issue both nationally and internationally. Overt communal repression and divide, as in India under BJP’s Hindutva or the Congress’s sham secularism, which oftener find barbaric and sanguinary expressions in riots as in Gujarat in recent times, or centring on the Babri mosque madness of the saffron brigade, may not be ascribed to Bangladesh. But with the mainstream political parties, the BNP and the Awami League, ceding the middle ground to the creeping incursion of the obscurantists and the fundamentalists, the alienation of the minority communities is understandable. The BNP is indulging the fundamentalists by way of omissions and for what it deems as the multiplier factor for it in the polls, as was the case in the 2001 polls. The Awami League is opposing the Islamists in Jamaat and the ragtag Islami Oikyo Jote not from any principled position, but only to create a breach in their alliance with the BNP, with the objective of taking away BNP’s edge in Jamaat’s block-vote transference in the polls ahead, if it at all participates in it after weighing its prospects. The votes, as yet, do not seem to be swinging in AL’s favour, for which it has already kept handy in its bag of tricks the caretaker reforms issue, a constitutional absurdity.

   Returning to the subject of alienation of the minorities, the natural acculturation factors apart in Bangladesh’s predominantly Muslim society, the importation of Arabic signpost for the ZIA airport, or the long recital of the Quranic scriptures on the aircraft, as if sounding like the supplications as in what is known as chillah, is alien to even Bengali Muslim sensibilities, not to speak of the minorities. And Bangladesh is not a mono-community country like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan and even to an extent Pakistan — which has a sprinkling of minority population of very insignificant proportions — which are the dispensers of an essentially Shariah-based and medieval social, political, economic and jurisprudential Islamic systems of multiple brands. Though Bangladesh is homogenous ethnically and linguistically by and large, it has a large minority practising other faiths; and such importations from the lands of the rich and the bigots are repugnant to the Bengali ethos, of which the Pahela Baisakh is the most representative universal celebration. Even the Eid-ul-Fitr and the Puja of the unlamented Pakistani days tended to be quite universal, though no more, alas, in Bangladesh.

   I have drifted quite a bit from where I started, but not quite far afield I hope. What emerge in the course of this free run of writing are our own contradictions with overt Islamicism and with the opposite pole of secularism with the covert communal bias of the Babu culture of Kolkata at once. There has to be a middle ground somewhere, away from both the extremes. Ziaur Rahman sought to give us an identity with the Bangladeshi badge of honour as different from the state of Bangla in India, though I think he is rather harshly judged for what some among us call the de-secularisation of the Bangladeshi constitution. Secularism is not a function of literal words. It is a stage of social and economic development in the natural course of bourgeois developmental dynamics in this era of market celebrations or what used to be a diktat of a socialist political and economic order, since bygone except in slogans.

   From here on, however, I will attempt to point out the Achilles’ heel of the BNP, the thorn in its side being the unrepentant Jamaat, getting bolder by the day, and of course the so-called Young Turks, who are neither young enough to be idealists nor Turk enough to be the agents of change.

   

   The unfolding scheme of things from now till the next polls

   Several hypotheses can be arrived at from the previous chapters, which are as good as logical inferences. One, the disproportionate presence of the Jamaat-e-Islami in the very locus of state power has given it an undue sanction to preach and assert its fundamentalist political credo of an Islamic theocratic state, based on medieval religious doctrines and Islamic jurisprudence.

   Two, the Jamaat, in its partnership with the BNP cabinet, has advanced its tactical and strategic lines to penetrate the state apparatus and the superstructure, like that of a communist party programmatically infiltrating a mass political front.

   Three, the Jamaat has succeeded consciously and conspicuously in gaining a high moral ground vis-a-vis the BNP and also the erstwhile ruling party of the Awami League in a comparison that is no longer odious.

   Four, with Jamaat actively pursuing its partisan credo from within the state machine and the ragtag 11-party component of the mullahs of the madarassah-based Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ) shouting blue murder over such issues as women’s sports and Bangla Bhai and getting away with it in ribald hurrah, the BNP-led alliance government has knowingly or unknowingly added more than sufficient fuel to the unrelenting Awami League and Indian propaganda aimed at depicting Bangladesh as a Taliban state of sorts with shadowy bin-Laden connections. It hurts.

   On the BNP’s side, the omissions in governance and the commissions of material accumulation of a century, so to speak, across the board and in a hierarchical and kinship order, have not only equalled but also exceeded the record of the cultist and expropriatory AL regime of 1996-2001. This has increasingly and almost to the last shred buried Ziaur Rahman’s legacy of Mr Clean, with Ziaur Rahman himself literally turning in his grave.

   The stark pursuit of the greed and glitz of the lifestyle and pleasure part of globalisation within and without the country by the so-called Young Turks of dubious distinction, on the one hand, and the unabashed acquiescence of the party seniors including ministers, some of whom have their own wards to mind and promote, to a most unorthodox enactment of a succession scheme, on the other, are taking the country for a ride and the people for what they are not to be — deaf, dumb and moronic. The country and the people deserve neither the label of a failing state infested by ‘Talibans’ and ‘bin-Ladens’, nor the denigration that the Bangladesh electorate is comprised of only idiots or the resultant condescension.

   It is in the above context and in view of the BNP-AL never-say-die contention for power, prerogative and material accumulation by means fair or foul in Bangladesh’s illiberal democracy, that we may attempt to arrive at several prognoses on the unfolding scheme of things from now till the next polls. Unlike some alarmists or sceptics, we, however, grant the government a full term despite the AL crying wolf and the unlikely imponderables of the on-again, off-again AL ultimatums and threatened blitzkriegs. We also dismiss the question marks on the stability of the government that is often said to buckle under the very weight of an unwieldy and hence an unresponsive, unseeing and unheeding parliamentary majority.

   The prognoses start with a disclaimer of the conventional as well as statistical wisdom that the Awami League has an edge in popular votes over the BNP. While the demographic distribution and the delimitation of the constituencies can certainly impact on the arithmetic of votes in the respective seats, the weighted average of popular votes in all 300 constituencies may not be absolute in terms of percentage points. For instance, in a survey of an equal number of seats (32) traditionally belonging to the BNP and the AL, the BNP seats showed an average of 62 to 64 per cent of voter turnout. But 11 Gopalganj hinterland seats out of 32 traditional Awami League strongholds under the survey posted a record average of 95 per cent voter turnout. This absurdity of vote-casting percentage, though in only 11 seats, distorts the popular vote count. (The survey was published in Holiday after the results of the votes of the 2001 polls were gazetted.)

   Counting in the keenly-contested and the marginally won 30 and 16 seats — in that order — on the part of the BNP, the lowest enumeration of seats for BNP stands at 116 in 1996 when it bit the dust, and 60 to 70 for the AL taking the 2001 polls, and one before in the eighties. The best of the AL times since the 1970 avalanche of votes and the 1973 purloined polls in some constituencies was 1996 (146 seats) when the going could never be as good for the AL — from a bureaucratic coup in 1995 to a military putsch during the caretaker tenure in favour of it.

   The Jamaat seats in 1991 and 2001 remained at 18 and 17 respectively, with a drastic drop to 3 in 1996 under the duress of a simulated AL supremacy in all manners and matters of politics and the state machine at the time. The Jamaat’s popular vote percentage can be assessed between 4.28 per cent in 2001 when it did not field candidates in all the seats and at around 8 per cent overall. In other words, the empirical count of seats, as above, beats the rationality of psephology — the practiced craft of predicting votes by the trends of the exit polls and other means, including the statistical tables.

   One thing is, however, very interesting. Even if one discounts the ragtag IOJ, the alliance with Jamaat had a multiplier effect on the BNP’s number of seats — 195 in the 2001 polls, whereas the Jamaat’s seats stayed stagnant at par with 1991. But will this alliance, which the contending AL is desperate to sunder, remain arithmetically as potent as in 2001 when getting rid of the incumbent AL was on the top of the public’s and the voters’ agenda for reasons one does not have to recount? Or conversely, given the lowest seat count of the BNP and the Awami League, as enumerated above, does the BNP minus Jamaat position give any edge to the AL over the BNP as a single party entity? While the answer to the first question is subject to a number of variables, the answer to the second is plainly in the negative. The AL singly will continue to trail far behind the BNP, the comforting statistics of AL’s so-called popular vote percentage, including the minority vote bank of 10 to 12 per cent, notwithstanding.

   Having thus posited that BNP stays fairly ahead of the AL given the lowest seat counts on the part of both in the three general elections over the last decade and a half, the question will arise what then happens to the other one hundred plus seats. Of them, about 46 that are marginal can be equally divided between the mainstream contenders, and the rest will depend on what kind of alliance and on what basis, including that of power-sharing or the lack of it, the respective power-seekers forge to ensure a majority government, and not necessarily a two-thirds majority government. After all, multiplier arithmetic does not recur all the time, and it may not do so this time in BNP’s case; nor does the lowest common denominator of seats won by both the parties vary widely even after a sea change in voter preference, particularly when a third option is yet to come into play. That, alas, is not the case with Bangladesh politics, nor is it with Dr Badruzddoza Chowdhury’s narcissistic Bikalpadhara or Dr Kamal Hossain’s latest and often wobbly and palpably cobbled up enterprise of the Jatiya Oikya Mancha. The less said of the left the better.

   Other things remaining constant, meaning that the constitutional motion to the Caretaker Government will run its full course, the battle-lines in the next polls will not be drawn as distinctly as it is seen to be now. Sheikh Hasina, short of toppling the government which she cannot, or throwing a spanner in the works of constitutional continuity by her tantrum of caretaker reforms, which she can by, maybe going against the AL’s grain, choosing to make seat- and power-sharing arrangements with its allies like some of the left parties looking for some parliamentary lease of life, and even going out of the way to accommodate Dr Badruddoza Chowdhury and Dr Kamal Hossain. The big names with nominal platforms, including the left parties, may not matter much in the numbers game, but they will help draw, in favour of a hypothetical AL-led alliance, a large section of uncommitted voters, particularly in the urban areas, as also the liberal middle-class non-AL votes which would otherwise keep away from the polls in disgust. An AL-led alliance’s edge, though slim, is only foreseen then. On the other hand, the AL will sharpen its claws to cut into the schism within the alliance, particularly among the mullahs of the IOJ and the faction of the BJP as yet apparently led by a highly disaffected Naziur Rahman Manzur, who matters in Bhola district’s politics and elections.

   Nevertheless, the BNP, with the Jamaat in tow, stays safe though neck and neck, unless the younger cadres of the Jamaat force the leadership’s hands on the question of alliance with the BNP. That is yet not likely in BNP’s most unpropitious hours of a succession term.

   The Jamaat’s leaders in the cabinet are now openly talking of establishing an Islamic state in their own good time to the discomfiture of the BNP, their benefactor. And the Jamaat, unrepentant for its 1971 war crimes even to date, is going round asserting its autonomy in bigotry in the various campuses, Chittagong and Rajshahi now being their exclusive strongholds. The Shibir-JCD clashes in Aliya Madrassah are only the tip of the iceberg of the Jamaat’s contradictions with the mainstream right-of-the-centre BNP. Given the moral bankruptcy of both the Chhatra Dal and the Chhatra League, it is not unlikely that Shibir demonstrate their cadre-power in the premier campus of the University of Dhaka late this year or early next year to assert their politics and with it their bargaining power in the alliance, or just about paint their ideological position of theocracy first and theocracy last, red and loud.

   And now comes the Achilles’s heel.

   

   Fundamentalist politics & succession spectre

   Jamaat hence poses a double jeopardy for the BNP. While the BNP cannot swallow everything that Jamaat does or has done at the BNP’s expense in the critical sectors of the administration and the superstructure (some suspect their penetration of the military as well), it needs Jamaat to stay in the alliance for the value of its transferable votes in the critical and marginal constituencies. In this transaction, Jamaat may ask for more seats or see that the more-the-merrier like-minded people in the melting pot of BNP, now leaning on the far-right margin of its own spread, get nomination. And as Jamaat consolidates its factional power within the state apparatus and the institutions of the superstructure, the BNP, in all its material shine and blissful forgetfulness plays the flute of power, like Nero, without having the slightest hint that it is burning within like Rome did.

   And hence the Achilles’ heel: it is not only Jamaat, but also the succession spectre of an enemy within. Good luck to dynasty — not to be confused with the Hollywood soap.

   Incumbency has its liabilities. But it can be politically fatal if the Achilles’ heel shows too much for the enemy’s arrow to hit. Jamaat is one such heel, and the other more potentially self-destructive is the BNP’s bad eggs of so-called Young Turks itching to get to the top, politically as well as materially. The politics of the Wild West, without, however, the risks, the daring and the adventures of the kind and the time, have come to roost in BNP. And this may turn out to be very divisive for the BNP itself, when elections and nominations approach, and the current sheltering of the Young Turks by the state machine ceases upon the automatic vacation of power by the BNP-led alliance government on October 21, 2006.

   What the BNP does with its leadership succession is its own business, if not its festival or funeral. But never before in the history of parliamentary democracy has the entire state machine been put at the service of the anointed successor to the not-too-distant state power so openly and so brazenly. The Hawa Bhaban, otherwise designated as the BNP chairperson’s ‘alter-office’, is the informal centre for exercise of state power without any accountability, or any formal state assignment. The writ of the centre extends directly to several ministries, and perhaps by now covers the entire paraphernalia of the power centre vertically and laterally. How much of this usurped power is sustainable under a non-party, neutral Caretaker Government, even if under former Chief Justice KM Hasan, who is suspect in the eyes of the opposition, as the Chief Advisor of the 90-day Caretaker Government entering office on October 21, 20006, upon the expiry of the tenure of the 8th parliament, is anybody’s guess, mostly to the contrary.

   Sheikh Hasina’s own instance of a carefully administrative support structure, staffed by party apparatchiks, including her political and partisan appointee of a press secretary, was demolished by the stroke of a pen of Chief Advisor Latifur Rahman in 2001. The irony is that Sheikh Hasina had thought of the chief advisor to be pliant, and the CEC, including member Safiur Rahman, her own men, which they were by linkages. Then she was also mindful of having the military leadership, particularly after the retirement of her twice-retired kin Mustafizur Rahman as the Chief of the Army Staff, guarded by her own preferred and loyalty-proven appointees in the command-posts of the Ninth Division, Comilla and Mymensingh, among other strategic stations. It did not help her, even though in her delusion she had telephoned an advisor to government just before the closing of the 2001 polls to the effect that the polls had been extremely free and fair. Then came the deluge, and Sheikh Hasina was off her rockers. Worst of all, a military putsch was rumoured from the stations mentioned above following the AL speaker’s delay in administering oath to the members of the 8th parliament on excuses galore. But it did not quite materialise, given the wholesome polls and the approval of the results both nationally and internationally.

   It has been a long time since then, and the January 2007 poll is on the cards. And yet there is the darkening of the clouds, not so much because the AL may boycott it to create a crisis of legitimacy. It is more due to the revival of fundamentalist and obscurantist politics that have already blackened my motherland’s face in the eyes of the world. It just cannot be the result of jaundiced propaganda. There is some truth in it, thanks to the indulgence by the BNP and the downhill slide in its democratic and nationalist political agenda set by Ziaur Rahman, and in the first term carried forward by Khaleda Zia.

   The Zia legacy is different from Khaleda Zia’s in that she had braved and hazarded a populist path of movement against the authoritarianism of former president HM Ershad. While the Zia image, still persisting, has been an asset for her, her own carriage, single-mindedness and uncompromising attitude lent her a different, autonomous profile. But the succession of Tarique Rahman, cushioned and programmed by tons of unearned money and state power, does not seem secure at all, because Tarique neither represents the broad ranks of the party, nor the legacies of the late freedom-fighter hero and his father Ziaur Rahman whom he is trying to mimic without much theatrical avail, or the home-grown and street-hardened credentials of his mother Khaleda Zia.

   The Achilles’ heel is showing, and perhaps there is still time for the BNP to mend its ways and also to shun its dependency on forces like the Jamaat and the IOJ. It is also critical that these issues are talked about openly. And we do it, for the good of politics. Amen.

Bangladesh is not in any extraordinary political impasse or ‘crisis’ more than what we are observing and experiencing globally: ‘reconfiguration’ of the states – all states – by global Capital. Such reconfigurations have been blatantly dismantling various state functions related to economy, politics, law, etc., traditionally known as belonging to the so called sovereign sphere of the state or simply ‘sovereignty’

Farhad Mazhar

Propagandist assessment on Bangladesh runs like this: a corrupt and badly run country full of Islamic jihadis and on the verge of collapse. It is irrelevant whether it is true or false; propaganda by definition is always an act of politicised use and misuse of information with hidden or explicit political intention. In contrast, living in Bangladesh, is a real experience and cannot be reduced to facts, numbers or an array of news items. Talking from current real life experiences, we do have some serious problems indeed. Nevertheless, we need to distinguish between the propagandist character of such assessment and our difficulties in dealing with real problems of our lives.

   Northern countries and agencies are ceaselessly showing and telling in their media how bad and corrupt the countries are in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Again, the issue is not to deny or accept a particular way of scanning and screening of facts. The issue is the grand hypocrisy of such representations that either fogs corruptions and failure in governance of the so called ‘rich’ countries or a denial of their own role in making countries corrupt and ungovernable. For example, the connection between failures in law and order situations and the imposition of multilateral and bilateral economic policies and structural reforms is systematically ignored, as if social and political realities are independent of the policies dictated by World Bank, IMF or WTO regimes. Blaming the victims is the rule of the game.

   Such hypocrisies are now fairly clear. Politically sensitive communities do not wish to be fooled any more by the blame-game; more so since such propaganda is loaded with political intention of immediate or future intervention, as we noted in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bangladesh being a country with a majority Muslim population is not outside the strategic configuration of the so called war against terrorism. To put facts in order, Bangladesh is no more corrupt than the USA or European countries and religiously no more ‘fundamentalist’ than other so called ‘secular’ countries like India, the USA, France, or for that matter most of Europe. But Bangladesh will have to pay dearly if she slips from the dictated ‘norms’ of the civilised countries.

   Once we are able to make this link we could understand that Bangladesh is not in any extraordinary political impasse or ‘crisis’ more than what we are observing and experiencing globally: ‘reconfiguration’ of the states — all states — by global Capital. Such reconfigurations have been blatantly dismantling various state functions related to economy, politics, law, etc., traditionally known as belonging to the so called sovereign sphere of the state or simply ‘sovereignty’. While states and system of states are undergoing reconfiguration in the present imperial world, it does not imply that the state has no role to play. In fact the role of the state has become more interesting and it demands ingenuity on our part to decipher how we can reconstitute the state and secure a strong position within the present global order.

   We are not claiming that all our problems are globally generated; there is no denial of the fact that problems have their peculiar local and national character. Our ingenuity lies in our capacity to link these peculiarities in the context of global economic, social, cultural and political dynamics. However, it is obscene to see the ambassadors of the USA and European countries independently or in ‘union’ blatantly making statements against Bangladesh and meeting the media to make statements that are a direct interference of the internal affairs of a country. But these are definitely possible from the helm of power. The code of diplomacy and diplomatic norms are systematically violated. Given the fact that Bangladesh so far has failed to produce a political leadership with spine and self-esteem, such interference will continue.

   But we cannot deny that we have serious problems. Today (June 26, 2005), when I am writing this article, there are two news items published in the national dailies. One is the arrival of Nicholas R Burns, US under-secretary of state for political affairs, in Dhaka. The other news is terrible, the bombing and setting fires to the mosques of Ahmadiyyas. The attack came six days after a European Human Rights Conference on ‘extremism, intolerance and violence’, asked the Bangladesh government to ensure the safety of Ahmadiyyas and to restore their mosques now occupied by anti-Ahmadiyya operatives. Mr Nicholas R Burns’ arrival coinciding with this horrendous act of violence and intimidation against Ahmadiyyas has very serious political implication for Bangladesh.

   We must condemn such attacks as well as the government’s failure to protect Ahmadiyyas. These are issues that must be grounded on our sense of social and state responsibilities and our commitments to defend human rights. I am linking these two events since the Ahmadiyya event will make Bangladesh vulnerable in the strategic configuration of the USA’s war against terrorism. Ahmadiyyas could be minorities in Bangladesh but enjoys significant political status in the USA, and in the European Union, more than Bangladeshis, particularly for their pacifist stance with regard to the Islamic concept of ‘Jihad’. They would like to project them as ‘peaceful Muslims’ who will never take up arms against US imperialism and Israeli occupation of Palestine despite the massacre and killings caused by the US military in Afghanistan and Iraq and Israel in the Middle East.

   In terms of their religious fanaticism and conservative interpretation of Islam, Ahmadiyyas are no different than any so called ‘fundamentalist’ religious organisation. But to prove that they are ‘true Muslims’ is a very crucial strategic interest to America, Israel and India. Ahmadiyyas must be projected as ‘true Muslims’ who refuse to engage in militant Jihad against US imperialism, Zionist Israeli State and their Middle East policy and against Indian hegemony in the region. Ahmadiyyas are persistently projecting their ‘Muslim identity’ in this line as evident from various audio-visual campaign materials they have produced or are produced by their supporters. They definitely have the right to do so. It is crucial that we must clearly distinguish our role to defend Ahmadiyyas with our life as our moral and ethical duty and responsibility; on the other hand, it is also our task to make clear that conflict with Ahmadiyyas is a serious strategic issue that cannot be ignored and must be dealt politically. Locally Ahmadiyyas are minorities and the Bangladeshi state must take full responsibility in protecting their life, liberty and right to practice their religion. Politically it is an issue structured by the imperial strategy of war against ‘terrorism’ or, in other words, war against the poor Muslim countries in order to plunder oil and other natural resources. While Ahmadiyyas are ally of the USA, Israel and the Indian ruling class, the rest of the people of Bangladesh are potential enemies.

   The link between the arrival of Nicholas R Burns and the burning of Ahmadiyya houses and mosques is interesting in the timing of the attack. The purpose is clearly to make the Ahmadiyya issue central to the discussion Mr Burns will have with the government of Bangladesh. If we carefully note the timing of the attack, it clearly demonstrates that the leaders of this attack have been prompted to pick the dates that coincides with the arrival of the US under-secretary of state. It is hard to believe that there is no internal connection between the two events. It is the task of agencies to find how the timing could coincide so conveniently. This example demonstrates the vulnerability of Bangladesh and forces us to relocate our political priorities in the context of the global configuration of war and interventions. National security and the peoples’ ability to remain alert and defend the country is the most central concern that overrides other issues.

   I am against all forms of national oppression but I am not a ‘nationalist’, so I need to clarify certain points and will conclude picking up some critical points to be discussed in the future.

   The first point I like to make is that there may be a historical connection between religion, culture and language in the formation of the state, but the state as a political institution does not have language or a particular culture as such or religion. There is no logical or conceptual inevitability in such connection. Therefore privileging a particular language, a culture or a religion is contradictory to the political nature of the state. This is where the grave vulnerability of Bangladesh could be located; it has its root in the very framing of the constitution and its consequent degradation and decadence. There is a serious lack in this regard in our political discourse as well. We need to review the concepts of both the so-called ‘nation-state’ and ‘Islamic-state’.

   Our ability to think ourselves as a political community in terms of the state that could reasonably represent collective will as political citizens is the most fundamental issue for our survival in the global arena. In the eyes of the state, Ahmadiyyas are citizens, no matter what their global political and strategic significance; the same is true about each and every person or communities with distinct language, culture and religion — who wilfully and demonstratively belong to the political community that we call Bangladesh. The state is a complex institution, but from an instrumental point of view it is the means by which citizens relate to each other and other states and citizens of other countries. With the mediation of the state, citizens protect their life, property the right to religion, language and culture. In summary, despite the fact that we have a state and recognised by United Nations, we have still a long way to go to become a political community as an independent state as well as within the system of states in the world.

   However, Bangladesh is fatally divided along religious and cultural lines, as if religion is not part of culture or there could be any culture without the religion appropriated by the culture effacing the margin between theology and imagination. We still have a long way to go in resolving these matters.

   My second point is that Capital or the capitalist world order since its origin has a universalising and globalising character; it dissolves all natural relations based on locality, blood, communal relations and national bonds. Nevertheless the claim that (capitalist) ‘development’ or ‘modernisation’ could deal with ethnic, cultural or religious identities, communalism, racism, xenophobia, etc, is not credible anymore. The case of the Ahmadiyyas is a fascinating example; the global concerns for Ahmadiyyas indeed reinforces and justifies communalism, religious fundamentalism and all the narrowness of spirit in the name of defending the rights of the minorities. These are seen as virtues, while in the case of other Muslim communities the same are seen as vice. In fact, theologically or as a religious community, the Ahmadiyyas are no way better than the group of Fazlul Huq Amini of the Pir of Char Monai, who are leading the violent campaign against them. So it is not the communalism or religious fundamentalism that is the issue to the North. It is the political challenge against imperialism, war and violence and the injustices committed by Northern countries under the leadership of the USA.

   Our task could therefore be twofold: (1) creating conditions for the emergence of a political state free from religion and privileging any particular language or culture so that the state could play an instrumental role in the people’s struggle against imperialism. It implies that we must accomplish the task of a radical democratic revolution and reconstitute the state. It will have some added characteristic. We must ponder a strong

   cultural and ethical movement or in a short ‘educational’ movement to emancipate our free spirits from all localised and natural bonds in order to become political citizens reflecting and internalising the global concerns of rights, responsibility and enhancing our ability to participate in the global sphere of economic activities.

   I believe we could do it. Yes, I do.

It is a fact that the majority of the people of Bangladesh are Muslims, but they do have secular views, and are, for all intents and purposes, moderate Muslims who reject obscurantism and fundamentalism. This idea, this presumption, this objective needs to be ruthlessly pursued

Enam Ahmed Chaudhury

In today’s fast moving world, the economic situation, the level of advancement, the political scenario and the strategic interests, inter alia, change so quickly that events easily overtake nations that do not keep pace.

   Bangladesh emerged as an independent entity in the South Asian subcontinent with a lot of hope and aspirations, based on immense painful sacrifices. But the philosophical premise of the nationhood had not been clearly pre-determined except for the fact that it was a nation based on a common language. However, there were two serious limitations. Bengali was the predominant language, but not universal, as the inhabitants of the Chittagong Hill Tracts soon pointed out, and the leader of the Chakmas, Raja Tridiv Roy, never accepted the new country. Secondly, it was a country of the Bengali-speaking people living in the geographical limits of erstwhile East Pakistan. The Bengalees living across the border in Bongaon or Bashirhat, in Karimgonj or in Silchar (where also there was a Bengali language movement leading to police firing and more deaths than in Dhaka ‘52) did not qualify.

   Bangladesh was, of course, the outcome of a process over which the people had hardly any control. The geographical limits of Bangladesh had to be like this, and we started our journey as an independent nation in 1971 within the given parameters. But soon after, and somewhere along the line, we fumbled and tumbled.

   The first necessity for us was to identify our place in the subcontinent in particular and the world at large, and to determine the way that we should follow. The truth of the matter was that the emergence of Bangladesh proved the theory of a multiplicity of nations in the subcontinent in place of the two nation theory. But the greater truth was that these multiple nations, sub-nations and communities were all bound by a common history, tradition, and culture, governed by common economic forces to a great extent and also by the overriding interests of the peoples. Their well-being. Their vision. The togetherness of their future arising out of their inseparable geographical contiguity and multifarious nature of closeness.

   On the economic front, the State, under the force of circumstances and as a part of socialist policy, assumed all ownership of all means of production, land-holding ceilings were reduced, and ultimately under BAKSAL, one party government, with strict state control, was enforced. These are, however, things of the past and the time has come when we should unambiguously determine our course of action, broad state policies and objectives, and the nature of our identity.

   Fortunately, over the course of time a few very significant issues have been determined and have found general acceptability. All people living within the geographical limits of present day Bangladesh are Bangladeshis. For Bangalees living in Bangladesh. President Ziaur Rahman reintroduced the multi-party system which has now, thanks to Begum Khaleda Zia’s decision in the early nineties, taken the shape of multi-party parliamentary democracy. Three successful transitions of government, as an outcome of peaceful and well conducted elections, have taken place, and this is not a mean achievement.

   It is a fact that the majority of the people of Bangladesh are Muslims, but they do have secular views, and are, for all intents and purposes, moderate Muslims who reject obscurantism and fundamentalism. All religionists and communities are equal in the eyes of the law, no one is superior to the other on the basis of belief, and no one view, religious or otherwise, can be imposed upon others. This idea, this presumption, this objective needs to be ruthlessly pursued. It is true that due to many international causes and national happenings, the evil forces of fundamentalism, prejudices and obscurantism try to raise their ugly heads. Fortunately, the two major political parties and most others, and I will not be wrong if I say, people in general, would like these tendencies and freakish outbreaks to be suppressed and eradicated.

   On the economic front, there is indeed unanimity of purpose. The major political parties believe in a free market economy, privatisation, the role of both private and public sectors, and even see eye to eye on most major issues involving trade, communication and transit, investment, multinationals and NGOs, UN-WB-IMF-WTO issues. Except on points of emphasis, one would not detect much of a difference in foreign policy and defense issues as well.

   Such being the prevalent state of affairs, the unfortunate thing is that at home and abroad, it appears that both major political parties are at loggerheads on every issue, and indeed they do assume extreme confrontationist posture, even at the cost of national or state interests. We have heard of opposition political leaders visiting abroad and maligning the party in power and enlisting foreign sympathy or support through spreading news against the national interest. I recall that once when Mr. Jyoti Bosu visited Bangladesh, a reporter asked him about the alleged non-cooperative attitude of the Indian central government towards the CPI(M) led left government of West Bengal. Mr. Basu said, “I am not here to discuss internal matters of India”. Recently, before Mr. Advani went to Pakistan, he met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh perhaps to establish the point of unanimity of purpose through consultations. There is no reason why we in this country should not be able to evolve a consensus on broad national issues.

   The mud-slinging of one party against the other and even holding of so-called international conferences and conventions decrying happenings in Bangladesh and projecting events in an angular and prejudicial manner really do not help any one but only harm our national interests and destroy the national image. Many of these conferences and meets are held under the auspices of and with financial support from sources harbouring anti-state ulterior motives. We even approach foreign embassies and media asking for their support against our adversaries at home; and when a foreign ambassador or government speaks out, and if it goes against our own interest, we shout and protest. This is not fair. In this context, I would like to refer to the caution uttered by the outgoing US Ambassador Harry K. Thomas Jr. I think it is out of goodwill and a genuine appreciation of the prevalent situation that he said that unless the two major political parties believe in peaceful coexistence, unless they avoid destructive policies and practices, and cease to continue the habit of non-participation in the proceedings of Parliament when the adversary is in power, then “the third force may emerge”. Subsequently, in an interview with NEW AGE, he said, “We are blessed to be living in a democracy (in Bangladesh). The alternatives are clearly much worse”. Ambassador Thomas Jr. reiterated his observations and explained that Bangladesh has had this sort of experience before and it would be indeed sad if the lessons had not been learnt. His message has been loud and clear- there is no room for complacency on the part of the political parties. They have to come to grips with the reality that democracy has to be practiced —- both within and without —- and there has to be a sense of adjustment, understanding and tolerance. Political parties have to work in Parliament and in the constituencies, not in visits and meetings abroad, not in violent street agitations, not in enforced hartals and not in ruthless suppression of dissent.

   A solution to the present impasse in Bangladesh’s political front would perhaps lie in the efforts of the major political parties in that direction. First, there should be no confusion about our identity and belief. This should be the commonly accepted position that we are a part of the mainstream of the subcontinent. We fought against the imposition of the British Raj (Nawab Seraj-ud-daula and the Mughals) in the subcontinent, and we opposed and fought together with the rest of the subcontinent against imperial domination. The entire struggle for independence from the British Raj is star-studded by heroes from Bengal (of which present-day Bangladesh is the major part) - the first war of independence (Sepoy Mutiny started from here (in fact a few martyrs were hanged in Dhaka’s Bahadur Shah Park in Sadarghat). Tipu Sultan was our hero in no way less than others’. The philosophical basis of the SAARC dream lay in this idea. Unfortunately, in 1997, when all the world over, the Indians and the Pakistanis celebrated the golden jubilee of Independence from colonial rule Bangladesh abstained. How can we deny that like the rest of the subcontinent, we also became independent of the British colonial rule in August 1947 after a long struggle, a struggle involving great and occasionally bloody sacrifices? How can we overlook the fact that Sylhet (the area that I belong to) voted in a referendum to join Pakistan in the wake of independence and subsequently became a part of East Pakistan, eventually of Bangladesh. In the war of independence of Bangladesh, religious communalism became non-existent. Syed Anwar Hussain, in his well—researched New Age article captioned “Pejoratives revisited”, quoted Amalendu De and Jayanti Maitra who found the epicenter of separatism in Bengal. Jayanti Maitra was quoted: “the seeds of separatist movement in India germinated in Bengal. The diverse reactions of the Hindus and the Muslims of the province to English rule and the consequent imbalance in their development, culminating in a conflict over material interests, gave birth to a Hindu-Muslim problem manifested in the clash of their respective religions and cultures”. Similar to this line of thinking but apparently more enterprising is the three—volume work by Bimal Prasad titled, Pathway to India’s Partition (New Delhi, Manohar 1999). Now that the former Bengal (comprising Bangladesh, a product of secular ideas on one side, and leftist-idea dominated West Bengal on the other), has been able to cast aside narrow religious separatism, we can indeed look towards the future without prejudice like the rest of the subcontinent. In 1947 Jinnah even approved (the Suhrawardy-Sarat Gupta proposal of) creation of an independent undivided Bengal. This proposal was, however, opposed by the Congress and eventually dropped. Jinnah also envisaged a secular, democratic Pakistan in no uncertain terms as evident in his famous declaration of August 11, 1947 (recently quoted by BJP leader Advani) where he outlined the emergence of a secular egalitarian society and a democratic political framework in Pakistan. In recent times, Jinnah’s vision has been rediscovered and Pakistan and India are now seriously considering evolving a “soft border” not just along the LOC in Kashmir, but also all along the international border, with the eventual idea of coming “as close as possible in all areas of national existence”. In Bangladesh, we should also realise that we share the same legacy, same tradition, same culture and the same civilisation, albeit with a little varying emphasis on different contours. We are a part and product of the great Indus Valley civilisation, the civilisation created by Buddha and Asoka, Kanishka and Chandragupta, the Khiljees, the Palas and the Senas, Shershah and Razia, the Pathans and the Moghuls. Tipu Sultan is also our common hero. Harappa and Mohenjodaro, Taxila, Nalanda and Paharpur, the Taj and the Kutub, Ajanta and Ellora, Shalimar and Fatehpur are all our common achievements. Our dress, cuisine, music and literature are as common as these are between Pakistan and India. If the major political parties can admit and declare this truth unambiguously then we will not feel that the people of Bangladesh are themselves divided into different camps—belonging to different cultures and civilisations. This will act as a great unifying force.

   We can easily find other points of unanimity among our two major political parties. We believe in tolerance, and so we could jointly raise our voice against the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation or Bangla Bhai or obscurantist movements of this nature. This will also help in creating a favourable image of the country. At different times, both the political parties have spoken out against hartals. It has also been proved that politically the hartals are of no help. Rather these have adverse effects on the acceptability of a political party. Hartal, as an instrument of political agitation, should be shunned. Corruption, politicisation of administration and mis-governance are common enemies, and the political parties have to suffer in varying degrees, perhaps in turn, on account of these delinquencies. The people, of course, are the worst victims. Couldn’t a commonly accepted course of action be taken by the major political parties in these areas so that ultimately people’s wrath will make such deficiencies totally unacceptable? The parties can also declare their policies on modernisation and investment, where there may not be much of a difference, so that the world will know where Bangladesh stands.

   Unless this realisation is there, and unless such steps are taken, the tolerance of the people may be exhausted. People may not like to stand by and watch the game of power grabbing. The reality is that in order to avoid the emergence of the alternative as indicated by Ambassador Thomas Jr., positive steps need to be taken immediately. The people of Bangladesh have fought for democracy. They would like to breathe in their cherished form of government, and the political parties have to make it possible. In this process, a link-up with the rest of the subcontinent is not only desirable and helpful but also essential.

The grip of the religions fundamentalist forces on the state of Bangladesh has come to such a pass that nobody can now ignore it. The character of the state of Bangladesh has changed to such an extent as to find similarities with the structure that existed in the Pakistani days

Rashed Khan Menon

The Bangladesh state drifted away from its founding principles long ago. The country which was established on the basis of a long drawn non-communal and democratic struggle and enshrined into its constitution the principle of ‘secularism’ is now known to the world as a moderate Muslim state. Successive governments in the country have acquiesced to this nomenclature, fondly given by the donor countries, to distinguish it from other Muslim countries which profess to run themselves on the basis of strict Islamic principles. This is also a way to keep Bangladesh and its people in good humour. But of late the donors have also not concealed their anxiety about an upswing in activities by Islamic militant organisations. As newspaper reports go, the intelligence department of the government has identified twenty nine such organisations active in the country. They are mutually connected with one another and change their names and areas of work when the situation becomes hot. Some of these organisations have links with international Islamic militant organisations. But the government in its public pronouncements denies the existence of such organisations in the country and rather accuses the opposition and other liberal and progressive forces of demeaning the image of the country in the outside world. But the government action against the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bahini (Bahini of Bangla Bhai) and Jamiatul Mujahideen proves the fact otherwise. The government, at least to please the donor countries and to subdue the hue and cry inside the country, could not but take action against these organisations. But the actions against these organisations were so half-hearted that nine arrested cadres of theirs got out of jail easily and started to regroup themselves. The deteriorating law and order situation in areas of Rajshahi where Bangla Bhai unleashed his reign of terror shows how things are moving. The defence offered by the government, especially the IG police, shows the stand of the alliance government on this issue.

   Actually the grip of the religions fundamentalist forces on the state of Bangladesh has come to such a pass that nobody can now ignore it. The character of the state of Bangladesh has changed to such an extent as to find similarities with the structure that existed in the Pakistani days. Some would rather say that it is more than that because Pakistan was established on its professed two-nation theory – and Bangladesh came into being by rejecting that theory. The deviation from that theory made the Bangladesh struggle untenable in the eyes of people uncomfortable with the Bengali struggle. And thus a conspiracy was hatched immediately after liberation. Bhutto, one of the prime conspirators against the Bengali people, wanted to recognise Bangladesh as Muslim Bangla and there was a strong campaign inside the country towards that end as well.

   The political change-over of 1975 changed the whole situation. The military ruler Ziaur Rahman, by a martial law decree, brought about an amendment to the constitution, the result being that the fundamental principle of ‘secularism’ was done away with. The Zia regime did not stop there. By the same martial law firman the religion-based parties, outlawed after liberation, were given legal status. And even the principal collaborator of the Pakistani military junta and active partner in their war crimes, Golam Azam, chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami, was not only given safe return to the country but also a safe stay. His Bangladesh citizenship had in 1972 been taken away for his role during the liberation struggle, of which Zia was a part. The next military ruler Ershad accelerated the backward march of the Bangladesh state and made Islam the state religion. By that single act he pushed all other religious groups into a secondary position.

   Despite everything, however, freedom of religion has been secured as the fundamental right of a citizen. The constitution, through article 41, ensures this right by such provisions as (1) subject to law, public order and morality, (a) every citizen has the right to profess, practise or propagate any religion. (b) every religious community or denomination has the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions and (c) no person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religions instructions or take part in or to attend any religious ceremony or worship if that ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.”

   But no sooner had the BNP-Jamaat alliance won an overwhelming election victory in October 2001 than this provision of the constitution was practically thrown away. Communal violence, which was forced to disappear because of the heroic riot-resistance movement of 1964 and because of the liberation struggle which brought together people of all religions as well as small nationalities in the cause of the independence of the country and could not be rekindled even by Ershad in the aftermath of the first attack on the Babri mosque by Hindu fundamentalist elements in India, came back in full force. One will perhaps remember how the political parties, including the BNP and the Awami League, together stood against this conspiracy of Ershad by observing hartal and initiating mass mobilisation against the designs of his regime.

   But unfortunately the game of religion reintroduced in Bangladesh by such acts made the situation vulnerable for the minorities and they started to feel alienated both politically and socially. And when the BNP in association with the Jamaat and IOJ came to power in the wake of a vicious communal campaign, the whole edifice of religious tolerance fell apart and the goons of these parties had their heyday in attacking Hindu and Christian villages, looting their properties, raping their women and forcing them out of their hearths and homes. Unfortunately, the caretaker government of Justice Latifur Rahman, still in charge of the state, did not respond to the situation and the BNP leadership and their intellectuals and reporters described such incidents as mere post-election violence. However, the facts came to light due to the efforts of the left parties, intellectuals and journalists. Strangely, the government of the day described such initiatives as anti-state activities, put some of the activists behind bars and even let torture loose on them.

   Such communal violence caused deep mental alienation on the part of the religious minorities. Many of them left Bangladesh and those who stayed back felt like aliens in their own land. The government took some measures to bring back confidence in the minorities. Even the ministers from the Jamaat-e-Islami visited the Durga Mandap to prove their innocence about these communal acts. But discrimination against the minorities continued in the fields of jobs, education, social welfare and all other fields. Though, as quoted earlier, the constitution provides for the right of individuals not to receive any religious instruction or education relating to religion other than one’s own, students from minority communities were asked to answer compulsory questions on Islam and its tenets in public examination. The Public Service Commission, a constitutional body empowered to select people for government administration, were found doing a similar thing at the written and viva examinations of the candidates.

   These communal acts did not stop in the case of other religious communities. It has been observed that members of the same religion are now being made victims of communal violence, desecration of their places of worship, and prevented from pursuing their day to day activities. The religious persecution of the Ahmadiyya Jamaat is now known nationally and internationally. Ahmadiyya mosques have been threatened with occupation in the presence of the police and signboards declaring Ahmadiyyas as non-Muslims have been put up with the active help of the law enforcers. The government has gone so far as to ban Ahmadiyya publications and despite the stay order by the High Court has continued harassing anyone possessing such books.

   The small Shia community has not been openly practising its faith. The hundred year old ‘urs’ ceremony of the Shia community at Prithimpasha Sylhet was bomb charged and the culprit was found to be a student of a ‘madrassah’ run and controlled by Islamic fundamentalist forces. The story of Bangla Bhai and his Jihad is well known and the administration of the BNP-Jamaat alliance government is known for its support to this gang. Though the government. was forced to take action against the outfit, it has re-emerged. The deteriorating situation in Rajshahi tells the Bangla Bhai story in detail.

   The rise of communal violence, religious intolerance and Islamic militant activities are only symptoms of the eroding foundations of the Bangladesh state. The elevation of religious obscurantist elements to state power has significantly changed the whole scene and Bangladesh has seen a rapid expansion in the economic and social power of these elements. The Jamaat-e-Islami and its late leader Maudoodi never concealed their political intentions, which verge on fascism. Now emboldened by a share of power in the state the Jamaatis have become a contender for control of the state itself. And with the economic power created so far (according to economist Dr. Barakat the net returns from the Jamaat’s economic enterprises amount to Tk. 1300 crore), they can influence politics. They have also established their grip in the education and health sectors and have significant influence among the police and the military. The military which still maintains the ideological orientation of the Pakistani days has become their easy prey.

   In the political field, the Jamaat has already absorbed the BNP, a party of the center right, so much so that the latter now speaks of Islamic nationalism as the cornerstone of its state policy in place of Bangladeshi nationalism introduced by its founder Zia. The strongest wing of the BNP, its student front, has either been marginalised by the Islami Chhatra Shibir of the Jamaat or can continue its activities with the consent of the Shibir. It is now quite possible, as claimed sometimes by the followers of the Jamaat, to seize the country from within.

   Besides these developments, the drift from the foundations of the Bangladesh state has brought back the crisis of identity for the country and its people. Now when the country is described as a moderate Muslim country, the village becomes different in and outside the country. While inside the country the fundamentalist and religious extremist forces get their leeway in society and politics, in the outside world. Bangladesh is regarded with suspicion. This also makes the country vulnerable to outside intervention, particularly from the US imperialists, who in the name of fighting terrorism are trying to tighten their grip in the Third World for economic exploitation and also for use as pawns in their war games. Such vulnerabilities will push the country to the verge of trouble and ruin, of the kind we see in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other states, especially in central Asia.

   The Bangladesh state must go back to its original moorings - the identity that defines it as a non-communal democratic state. The whole polity has to be brought round to this idea and the ill designs of the reactionary forces must be thwarted in all fields --political, economic, social and cultural. And that is how they can be isolated and the people of the country afforded an opportunity to look into their economic, social and political problems in the proper perspective the perspective on which Bangladesh was born and on the basis of which it can go forth as a modern state.

‘Ouster of alliance govt only
remedy to political crisis’

‘The speaker is a liar. Please write, he is a liar. He runs the business of the house on the basis of the signals that he receives from the leader of the house. A man, who does not have integrity, can never speak the truth’

Khadimul Islam

Abdul Jalil, general secretary of the Awami League, the largest party in the opposition in the parliament, stirred a storm in the political arena in 2004 by setting the April 30 deadline for the BNP-led four-party alliance government to either step down or be removed.

   In an interview with New Age, the AL lawmaker insisted that the national politics, as it stands now, would not be crisis-free until and unless the BNP-led government stepped down.

   He also talked about his party’s view about the state of the parliament, the provision of caretaker government and the nomination of black money holders for general elections among other issues. Excerpts:

   

   Is there any political crisis in the country at this moment?

   There is, of course, a political crisis. And there is only one way to overcome the crisis… to oust the alliance government.

   

   What is the crisis?

   The collapse in the total social system…isn’t it a crisis?...Insecurity, looting of the public exchequer, interference with the functioning of the judiciary, making the parliament dysfunctional, unbridled corruption, violence, extra-judicial killings…this has happened because of the government. There will be no crisis if the government is ousted…. Look, there is also repression on the minority community...

   

   Do you think it was ‘minority repression’ or was it merely a political attack?

   This was a political attack. It was done to serve a political purpose. Because they think the minority community supports the Awami League. So, it was a pressure to subdue them politically, to belittle their political existence. Many, who could not fight the pressure, left the country.

   They attacked on the temples, killed priests, killed Muhuri (principal of

   the Nazirhat Degree College)… this is not personal or otherwise. This is because they (the repressors) want to put pressure

   on them.

   

   It has become a tradition that whenever a political party loses in the general elections it rejects the results and boycotts the parliament, creating a crisis. What are the ways, you think, to overcome such a crisis?

   Partisan activities of the administration, election officials and a proper investigation into the results of the October 1, 2001 general elections will determine whether our allegation is true.

   Several organisations have now started saying what we said immediately after the elections.

   

   We are not talking only about you….

   Those who baselessly rejected the poll results in the past were eventually proved wrong. The comments, instantly made, do not always prove right….Yes, they (BNP) boycotted the parliament and so did we now. But we have a justification.

   Despite non-cooperation from the treasury bench, we repeatedly joined the parliament. But we were refused to speak at the house.

   Now why should we join the parliament? We wanted to speak about the price spiral of essential commodities, deterioration of law and order, misdeeds of the government.

   We submitted adjournment motions for discussion, but those were not accepted nor were discussed.

   Moreover, the speaker asked the opposition leader to submit notice if she wanted to speak.

   The leader of the house and the leader of the opposition…they can speak on the floor at any moment on any point. They do not need permission.

   He or she will stand up and the speaker will bound (is bound) to give them the floor. But the opposition leader is often barred from speaking in the parliament.

   We need to overcome the constraints. For this, it requires, we think, a healthy and sound political environment.

   

   But the speaker claimed that he gave more time to the Awami League’s lawmakers than to the ruling party’s.

   He [speaker] is a liar. Please write, he is a liar. He runs the business of the house on the basis of the signals that he receives from the leader of the house.

   A man, who does not have integrity, can never speak the truth.

   

   We are not talking particularly about the present parliament? What are the ways to overcome such trends?

   This is obviously a crisis. We think it is necessary to restore a sound political environment to overcome such a crisis.

   

   How?

   If the four-party alliance government remains in power, it is not possible.

   Of course, there is a way. A free, fair and a meaningful election can restore a peaceful and stable political environment.

   A government will come and another will go. There should be continuity of governance.

   There will be no development if I adopt a project and, then, another government comes to power and rejects my project.

   There must be continuity in implementing development projects …whoever comes to power.

   But has this government maintained continuity? This

   government has cancelled all

   the projects that the Awami League government adopted. Look, this is what the condition is. This will never bring good to the country.

   

   It was the Awami League that fought for the caretaker government system. Even you won a general election under the caretaker government system and came to power. Why does your party demand amendment to the provision now?

   Because of the defect in the system. When we accepted it, we said the provision would reach perfection through some general elections. On its journey to perfection through three general elections, we have identified some defects in the system. We want to remove the defects. Under the present system, the president of the republic is elected by a political party. The majority in the parliament elect the president, but he has no executive power. He works as per the advice of the prime minister. But after the dissolution of the parliament, the president is empowered with the executive authority and the chief adviser of the caretaker government, who is supposed to be the replacement of the prime minister, is accountable to the president. Now, as the president is elected by a political party, he/she has to have some loyalty to the party during the parliamentary elections.

   

   Suppose the present government does not bow to your demand and resigns in due time. Then the caretaker government comes to power as per the constitution, and announces parliamentary polls. Will your party participate in the elections?

   We will not participate in the elections, nor will we allow anyone to hold the elections.

   

   Will it not contribute to a constitutional crisis?

   How will there be a constitutional crisis? We have found it in the light of our experience that if all the parties come up with an open mind, there is a good solution.

   

   Do you think that in this context when the leaders of the rival political parties stop even exchange of social greetings, it is possible to reach a consensus over such a sensitive issue?

   I am hopeful. If any party intentionally tries to create a crisis, it is difficult, but if they come up with an open mind….

   

   You want to amend the caretaker government provision to improve the quality of elections. But your party, like many others, did not submit returns of election expenses…

   We have a proposal in this regard. If we give you the draft of our final proposal, you can see it.

   

   Do you have anything to say about your party’s failure to meet the legal obligation to submit returns of the organisation’s electoral expenses? Many of your lawmakers also did not submit the returns.

   It is the failure of the Election Commission. So, we want an independent election commission so that it can go for action. Let’s make it a rule that if anyone fails to submit the return on his or her election expenses, his or her election result will be cancelled.

   

   Many candidates spend much more than the limit set by the electoral law, much more than Tk 5 lakh, what is fixed by the law in the parliamentary elections.

   Is it possible for one to contest a parliamentary election by spending only Tk 5 lakh? It is a mockery with the nation. But we are out to stop an election that will be contested by the black money holders.

   

   Will you nominate the black money holders in the next general elections?

   We will try not to nominate such persons.

   

   From the beginning of the tenure of the present government, your party has been engaged in anti-government movement. But why couldn’t you involve people, even the party leaders and activists in the expected number, which could put the movement on a strong footing?

   You are not right. People are now inspired against the government. How did they become so inspired? If there were no political activities of the Awami League, how did the people become so inspired? People are never inspired without the activities of a political party. You have to show people that what the government is doing is wrong. The misdeeds and failures of the government have to be highlighted. We are yet to attain the final victory, but what we have been able to do is mobilise people’s support. Tell the government to announce an election schedule; it will prove how many people are with us.

   

   Do you want to say the presence of party leaders and activists in the street demonstrations and other programmes is enough, at least at a satisfactory level?

   Of course, the number of party leaders and activists who joined the ongoing movement is at a satisfactory level.

   

   Many an insider of your party claims that there was no party decision on the April 30 deadline to overthrow the

   government…

   Could I set such a deadline without the party’s consent?

   

   But your presidium members, I must not disclose their name, said they were not at all aware of it.

   No. They did not speak the truth. This was discussed in the presidium and the [central] working committee. Listen, victory has many fathers but defeat has none. If the April 30 deadline had succeeded, many would have come to be the claimers of it. As it did not succeed, many now said they knew nothing about it.

   Listen, we failed to harvest the final crop of the April 30 deadline. But the government has gone mad, hasn’t it? Khaleda Zia had to make an emergency address in the parliament. It left an impact, didn’t it? If we had held it together, the government would have had to step down. But we could not hold it together.

   

   You took several initiatives to form a broad-based unity, but you are yet to attain any remarkable success. Why?

   You need to keep one thing in mind that there are many political parties with different ideologies, and the ideological difference is great. We are making efforts to synchronise the differences. They have now come closer, and agree that the situation is not good at all.

   

   It seems to be taking time. Is it because there is no clear direction about forging an electoral alliance…

   Political unity is required first, then electoral alliance. First it should be decided whether I want to oust the government or not. There are some basic principles, which all have to follow. Anyway, with the party consent, I said three years ago that the unity would be maintained during the oust-the-government movement, general elections and the formation of the government. If anyone does not understand the message, what can I do?

   

   If it is the Jatiya Party led by autocrat Ershad…

   Yes. It is the Jatiya Party or Bikalpadhara, too; if they come.

   

   Political experts think that if the Awami League wants to win the next general elections, a split in the four-party alliance is a must. If, by chance, the four-party alliance is torn apart, is there any possibility on the Awami League’s part to establish any political or electoral alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami?

   No. It was not done in the past, nor will it ever be in future…

   

   But the Awami League waged the oust-the-government movement with Jamaat during…

   We never waged any movement with Jamaat. What happened was we threw programme against the then BNP government and Jamaat followed us…If anyone follows you, you cannot say ‘no’ to them.

‘AL boycott of parliament
not a crisis for govt’

‘In a parliamentary democracy, the parliament is the centre of all political activities. All national issues and problems should be discussed in the house and decisions should also be taken there. The opposition parties can also use the parliament as a platform for anti-government movement, if they want to’

Shahidul Islam Chowdhury

Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan, the local government, rural development and cooperatives minister and secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the major component in the four-party ruling alliance, is privy to policymaking both at the government and the party levels. In an interview with New Age, Bhuiyan insisted that the BNP continues to be a centrist party despite its alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami Oikya Jote. He also talked in details about the political impasse, electoral system, intra-party democracy and ‘interferency’ by foreign missions in the country’s internal affairs. Excerpts:

   

   What is the major political crisis at the moment? How does the crisis affect the government?

   There is a political crisis in the country, caused by the absence of the main opposition party in the parliament. It is, however, not a crisis for the government. Poverty is the core crisis in the country. We cannot overcome poverty unless we can arrange job for unemployed millions. And we cannot overcome the political crisis unless the political leaders work together to get rid of poverty as soon as possible.

   

   The main opposition parties boycotting the parliament has become a common phenomenon since 1991. How can the country get rid of it?

   In a parliamentary democracy, the parliament is the centre of all political activities. All national issues and problems should be discussed in the house and decisions should also be taken there. The opposition parties can also use the parliament as a platform for anti-government movement, if they want to.

   

   The Awami League alleges that they are not allowed to criticise the government in the house.

   It is not true. If anybody scrutinises the records of the parliament, he or she will find that the Awami League lawmakers got more time, in comparison with the BNP members, to express their views whenever they participated in the proceedings of the house.

   

   Previously, the ruling parties took initiatives to get the opposition parties back in the house. However, the BNP is yet to take any substantial initiative to get the Awami League back in the parliament. Does it mean that the ruling four-party alliance government feels comfortable in running the parliament with the main opposition party outside?

   We have taken several initiatives to ensure the Awami League’s presence in the house. I have talked with the Awami League general secretary over the issue. The speaker [of the house] also had discussions with them. The Awami League members are attending the meetings of the parliamentary committees. What can we do if they are adamant to remain absent in the house?

   

   Will you request them to discuss the issue again?

   Yes, we, the two parties, can discuss the issue wherever they wish, in and outside the house. I believe that the two major parties should reach a consensus about upholding the parliamentary democracy.

   

   The Awami League and its allies have demanded reforms in the caretaker system of government. In response, the BNP leaders have said they will work with the opposition party to strengthen the Election Commission and reforms the legal instruments relating to elections. However, none of the two leading parties have shown the willingness to keep election expenses within a rational limit which is a prerequisite for a ‘quality election’. What is your comment?

   The previous BNP government introduced the caretaker system of government in the constitution in line with the demand of the Awami League and its allies then. The caretaker system of government should be kept intact for several years as it has gained people’s confidence by conducting three free and fair general elections. We, the two parties, should work together to keep the elections free from black money and violence. We are also interested in reforming the Election Commission to make it stronger and more acceptable. We can incorporate good suggestions, if there are any, of the Awami League. The two parties can also work together to strengthen the parliament.

   

   Many contestants of the two parties did not submit ‘accurate’ statement of their election expenses after the last general elections. Even the political parties did not submit statements of their election expenditures although it was a legal obligation. What would you do in future?

   Many contestants did submit their statements after elections. But the Election Commission did not take effective measures to keep election expenses within a rational limit. Steps are yet to be taken to scrutinise the statements and returns of the candidates.

   

   What can the Election Commission do?

   The Election Commission should collect proper statement from the candidates prior to the elections. The winners should be asked to submit wealth statements after five years.

   What do you think about the initiatives of some foreign missions in Dhaka aiming to improve the political climate?

   It is not wise to frequently invite foreigners to interfere in domestic politics. Moreover, it is uncertain if all parties will accept their suggestions. The Awami League did not accept such suggestions during the previous BNP government. The political parties should work together to discourage false voting and rigging. The BNP will be benefited if false vote and rigging can be checked.

   

   The two major political parties nominate black money holders in place of dedicated leaders in elections. Will the BNP discard the trend in future?

   Dedicated leaders should be nominated for elections. We [the BNP] try to practise it. In the absence of a competent candidate in the party, we take on people from outside. But we do not want to nominate black money holders. The Awami League nominates black money holders.

   

   The BNP was known as a centrist party with secular political tradition. But nowadays it has been branded as a right-leaning party at home and abroad. Do you have any plan to find a way to get rid of such a branding?

   Even now the BNP is a centrist party. It follows a political ideology that can accommodate both the right- and left-leaning people. But a vested quarter has launched a campaign against the BNP at home and abroad. It will not misguide the mass people as propaganda cannot sustain for long.

   

   The Awami League is trying to form a secular-democratic alliance against the four-party alliance led by the BNP. How will the BNP tackle the situation keeping Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami Oikya Jote in the alliance?

   Forming a political alliance is not a new phenomenon. The Awami League’s attempt to form an alliance will not harm the BNP, which follows its own ideology and programmes. The four-party alliance was formed on the basis of minimum common programmes. We can even broaden the alliance to work on such programmes.

   

   It is known to all that the political parties hardly exercise democracy in intra-party activities. Will there be any positive change in the near future?

   We try to practise democracy in accordance with the party constitution. The leadership at the grassroots, from the union level to the district level, has been elected by party councillors. Yes, we did not hold election to the

   post of the party chairperson as nobody

   contests for the post. And, according to the party constitution, the chairperson is empowered to select the members of the [central] executive committee. It is an old practice exercised by several parties, including the Indian Congress, to allow the top leader of the party to choose his or her team, at home and abroad.

   

   The BNP has not held any national council meeting since 1993. When will you hold the next nation council meeting?

   Yes, we could not hold the national council of the party as we were in a struggle against the Awami League rule. But we

   would hold the council in October or November this year.

   

   The BNP leaders labelled Jatiya Party chairman HM Ershad as an ‘autocrat’. Has the BNP any plan to form an alliance with the party led by Ershad?

   We struggled against the Ershad regime for nine years. Even now the party leaders label him as an autocrat as we are yet to change our attitude about him. It does not mean that the Jatiya Party will not work with the BNP in future.

   

   What will the BNP do if the Ershad-led Jatiya Party joins in the alliance planned by the Awami League?

   We cannot interfere even if he joins the Awami League. We are not afraid of his activities as our concern is to institutionalise democracy as it is the core political crisis here. Institutionalising democracy will not be possible by holding elections only under a caretaker system of government. Yes, we are to continue with the system for several years. But, we, the political parties, must work together to strengthen the Election Commission, the Public Service Commission and the judiciary.

   

   But the BNP government is yet to make the judiciary independent from the administration although it was among one of its important election pledges.

   We will make the judiciary independent.

With a few exceptions of non-party lawmakers, all members of parliament go by the decision of their respective parties, even if the decisions go against the interests of the electorate. But the lawmakers in a parliamentary democracy are expected to speak and act for the benefit of their constituencies

Nazrul Islam

The ouster of military dictator HM Ershad from power in the wake of public agitation in 1990 and subsequent switching over to the parliamentary system of governance from the presidential one following consensus between conflicting political camps led by the BNP and the Awami League in 1991 generated an ocean of expectation among the people of a truly representative democracy, with the parliament at the centre of all national activities. However, it did not really happen, thanks to the flaws inherent to the 12th amendment to the constitution that allowed almost no freedom to the elected representatives in the transactions of business in the one hand and concentrated all executive powers to the office of the prime minister on the other.

   None of the four parliaments since 1991 could prove to be functional in real sense. The treasury and opposition benches have never been able to come to consensus on any matter of national interest. Besides, individual MPs cannot speak in the house at the dictates of their conscious, as the constitution bars voting against the party a legislator on whose ticket he or she is elected.

   In fact, with a few exceptions of non-party lawmakers, all members of parliament go by the decision of their respective parties, even if the decisions go against the interests of the electorate. But the lawmakers in a parliamentary democracy are expected to speak and act for the benefit of their constituencies.

   A section of the lawmakers has been asking for the repeal of Article 70 of the constitution that stipulates, ‘A person elected as a member of Parliament at an election at which he was nominated as a candidate by a political party shall vacate his seat if he resigns from that party or votes in parliament against that party.’

   The explanatory clause of the article says if a member of parliament a) being present in parliament abstains from voting, or b) absents himself from any sitting of parliament, ignoring the direction of the party which nominated him at the election as a candidate not to do so, he shall be deemed to have voted against that party.

   Even a private member’s bill was piloted in parliament seeking constitutional amendment, including scrapping of the much-talked-about Article 70. The bill has remained shelved at the parliamentary committee on private members’ bills and resolutions for long. There is hardly any chance that the government will entertain such a bill.

   Major (Retd) Akhteruzzaman, an outspoken backbencher of the seventh parliament, lost his membership from the parliament for joining the parliamentary proceedings defying his party, the BNP. Akhter’s case was the first ever in Bangladesh, and perhaps in the world, that a lawmaker lost his seat for joining the proceedings. The BNP, then in opposition, had been boycotting the parliament for indefinite period, and Akhtar joined it violating the party’s decision. Although he argued that his constituents elected him to represent them, and it was his responsibility to speak on their behalf, it could not save him, as the party disowned his actions.

   Apart from the constitutional impediment to the lawmakers to act independently, there are certain other matters that make Jatiya Sangsad dysfunctional.

   Boycotting the parliament sessions has become a common phenomenon for the opposition. In the last three parliaments (1991-1996, 1996-2001 and 2001 till date) the oppositions chose to boycott parliamentary proceedings. Two major political forces — the Awami League and the BNP — have always been at loggerheads. They have blamed each other for a dysfunctional parliament.

   There have been accusations that the oppositions are denied the right to speak in the house that makes them feel useless and hence they find it pointless to attend the parliamentary proceedings. As a result, the ruling party, whoever it may be, feels comfortable to be in the parliament with little accountability, if any at all. Thus the parliament misses major issues in need for serious discussion and debate by the policymakers. These naturally include matters of public importance.

   Parliamentary democracy is defined as ‘a political system in which the supreme power lies in a body of citizens who can elect people to represent them’. But the parliamentary system in Bangladesh is still paper work. The 300 elected members of Jatiya Sangsad hardly represent their people in the parliament. It is often found that the lawmakers fail to keep their pledges made during their pre-election campaigns.

   The politicians claim that Bangladesh has got a parliamentary democracy and they try to do everything to make the parliament the centre of all activities, but it has never been a reality in Bangladesh.

   The people elect their lawmakers but have no say in their performance or lack of it. The common people’s perception is that they need to cast their vote every five years and they do vote the party they are politically loyal to, knowing well that the victorious candidates will serve their personal interests and not those of the electorates.

   After getting elected the parties start fighting. The opposition never accepts the treasury as legitimate because it has become a culture for the main opposition to reject the elections outright. The treasury, on other hand, never fail to react crudely to the already wounded opposition sentiments.

   As political scientist Ataur Rahman puts it, ‘Bangladesh’s Parliament has become almost irrelevant as a forum for political discourse and decision-making. The high level of partisanship means that the opposition party carries almost no weight and so the parliament serves as little more than a rubber stamp for the decisions of the ruling party. The opposition does not add to the parliament’s effectiveness by walking out and disrupting normal processes, and continuous boycott.’

   He says the signs are very clear that the parliamentary government is not working in Bangladesh but contributing to the practice of taking politics out on to the streets to resolve the power struggle.

   Lacking an effective voice in the parliament, the opposition organises agitation programmed to bring down the government. Hartals and strikes disrupt commerce, and as street agitation increases, the government responds by trying to break the strikes. Party activists and the police attack pro-opposition processions and meetings.

   The opposition responds with more agitation and mobilisation of workers. Left unchecked, this can result in a severe governing crisis and economic costs, predicts Ataur.

   Then there is the business transacted in the parliament, where most of the parliamentary decisions come from the high offices of party leaders, not from the floor of parliament. The parliamentary businesses are set up mostly by the high offices of the government. The executive prepares the bills, sends them to the parliament, the ministers place them. In most cases the parliament passes the government bills after brief discussions. There is hardly any example of accommodating amendments proposed by the opposition. If any opposition lawmaker proposes an amendment, the treasury rejects it by voice vote, by the strength of sheer majority.

   In terms of the parliament’s oversight functions, the parliament cannot deliver rightly. The parliamentary committees were formed 18 months after the parliament had been formed on October 28, 2001. Then the opposition’s slot for membership in the committee remained vacant for one more year. The committees received allegations of corruptions and irregularities by ministers and bureaucrats, and even investigated some of the cases. But the investigation process halted midway for unknown reasons.

   In an ideal situation, a parliamentary democracy makes endeavour to ensure rule of law, accountability of the government, equal rights for all, tolerance for dissident views, etc. But the one we have in Bangladesh is far from being ideal. Here, the legislative body is more dependent on the executive, with the former mostly going by the prescriptions of the latter. The situation is the same, notwithstanding which of the two main political parties – the BNP and Awami League – is in power.

   The parties, irrespective of their positions in the parliament, need to act now. There should be no complacency on the government’s part that it has done a lot and the same on the part of the opposition parties. The politicians need to keep in mind that they have still a long way to go.

   The parties need to work hand in hand to ensure good governance and establish truly a representative administration. They need to work together to remove the barriers.