It is in the wake of this sordid state of affairs in political governance that the outgoing US ambassador issued the warning of the emergence of a third force which would not be good for Bangladesh. Traditionally, the third force is interpreted as military intervention in politics. Speculations are also rife that the international community of donors may impose a settlement formula

AMM Shawkat Ali

There has been a phenomenal rise in the number of civil society organisations (CSOs). In the prevailing definition of the state, the organs are not limited to the classical concept that encompasses the parliament, the judiciary and the executive. It is now being increasingly advocated that civil society is as much a legitimate organ of the state as are the three classical organs. However, they are not formally recognised as such in the constitution although the CSOs are required to be established under different laws of the country in which they operate. The structure and composition of CSOs vary, depending on the laws under which these are registered. Those CSOs which obtain funds from abroad need also to be registered under the law administered by the NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB).

   The concept of integrated governance

   The concept of integrated governance has now caught the attention of researchers. Monash University in Australia has, in recent times, shown interest in this concept. The concept basically implies optimising the complex web of interrelationship among government, business and civil society and using the same for maximising public weal.

   Bangladesh context

   Following the emergence of a good number of CSOs in different fields, the issue of integrated governance has now assumed increasing significance. Our scholars and social thinkers are very vocal on the primacy of the role of CSOs in governance. CSOs too are doing their bit by advocacy, campaigning and in social mobilisation. There are success stories also in some areas such as environmental protection and in the field of criminal justice. However, the concept of integrated governance to maximise public weal, especially the disadvantaged and the poor, and in bringing about a change in political culture is yet to be fully operationalised, let alone sustained.

   What are CSOs?

   Prior to the mid-nineties, the CSOs are perceived to be non-government organisations (NGOs). During the mid-nineties, a report on governance prepared by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) asserted that if some attention was paid to the CSOs, the cause of governance could be better served than at present. Implicit in this statement is the view that there are organisations other than the NGOs which need support and attention which then are the organisations?

   These may include, in the field of business, formally constituted trade bodies. In the field of environment, citizens’ groups for protection of environment. Other areas include women’s rights groups, human rights groups, legal aid societies, etc. Included in such organisations are also formally established professional associations such as bar associations, engineers’ doctors’ and agriculturists’ associations. The list can go on. All or most of the above associations are basically urban-based. The vast majority of the population living in rural areas remain outside the pale of such organisations although some of them may benefit from the activities of CSOs based in urban areas. In the definition of CSO are also included the media which act as effective channels of information dissemination. The media are also organised into a set of distinct associations. The media play an important role in enhancing the cause of governance. However, their interrelationship with the government is not quite clear and needs to be investigated. There are allegations that some of the CSOs are politically aligned. Such alignment is the result of conscious attempts by political parties to politicise in order to enlist their support. Others have narrow interests that do not cut across the boundaries of politics and society except when they wish to gain some favour.

   In this context, it may well be mentioned that to an uninitiated student of politics, the line of demarcation between interest groups and CSOs with specific sphere of activity remains somewhat hazy. Leaving aside this academic issue, it can definitely be said that some of the CSOs, such as those in environment, human or women’s rights, have nothing but public good in their view. They do not have any inclination towards interest group politics. It is felt that these are the groups that can better address the continuing problem of poor governance.

   Both at home and abroad, increasing concerns have been voiced by foreign governments, the media and the donors over the continuing state of poor governance in Bangladesh. Specific elements that contribute to this state of affairs include (a) dysfunctional parliament, (b) perceived inability or unwillingness of the executive to contain a rising incidence of political terrorism, religious extremism and (c) increase in inequality of income that widens the gap between the poor and the rich. All of the above are generally attributed to the nature of confrontational policies that has become the order of the day with no visible signs of positive change.

   It is in the wake of this sordid state of affairs in political governance that the outgoing US ambassador issued the warning of the emergence of a third force which would not be good for Bangladesh. Traditionally, the third force is interpreted as military intervention in politics. Speculations are also rife that the international community of donors may impose a settlement formula. Leaving aside such forms of speculation, it may be worthwhile to look at the promise and performance of civil society to act as a catalyst for change for better governance.

   Rehman Sobhan’s view

   Sobhan has dwelt at length with the risks and gains associated with mobilising civil society for achieving the objectives of political and economic governance. He is of the view that the list issue-based mobilisations of the CSOs ‘remain a feasible option, political activism by civil society remains much more problematic’. He is no starry-eyed idealist when he says this. “The real task”, he says, ‘of political reconstruction of Bangladesh is to see that the good more often prevails over the bad in influencing the course of politics’.

   This point is well-taken. However, the key issue is if the good does not prevail upon the bad more often than is the case, what should be the next step? Bangladesh’s major political parties have not so far accepted the concept of mid-term polls. Elections after a regular interval of five years lead to political impasse as the experience since 1991 has proved. The prosecution now is with electoral reforms, including reforms of the non-party caretaker government. These may be necessary but not a sufficient condition to ensure governance. The prevailing political culture of confrontational politics needs to uprooted once and for all. Who are going to bell the cat? CSOs?

   The need for caution

   Some recent studies (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2003) have drawn attention to the need for caution with regard to the dangers associated with mobilising support for governance. The grounds cited are (a) the fear of domination by powerful groups and interests, (b) the threats by those not likely to benefit from governance or those who are likely to lose when governance is legitimised, for example military dictators, (c) many self-appointed bodies now claim a right to have a role in the governance of the country. Some non-government organisations (NGOs) might even represent not internal but external interest parties, and (d) tension between and among stakeholders, for example politicians and civil servants, state and citizens.

   Of the above factors, the last three appear to have relevance for Bangladesh. In fact, the last and second of the above listed grounds may be taken up together. The emergence of a two-party system after 1991 is interpreted by Sobhan as a political asset on which to build on. The rise of Islamic based parties has now added a new dimension so that it is now more or less a multi-party framework of politics. However, experience has proved that hanging on to power by fair means or foul dominates the political psyche. The reasons include (a) security and (b) access to resources of the state for use to advance narrow partisan interests. The political psyche of hanging on to power has led to the culture of criminalisation of politics. Then there is also the question of CSO/NGO dependence on external resources and serving not internal but external interests. The rising influence of religious extremism is often cited as an example of this kind. Finally, self-seeking politicians and to an extent self-serving civil servants may also see governance as a threat to the monopoly of state power. Sobhan’s argument for political activism by CSOs may have to be seen in this light also.

   This is not to say that CSOs cannot be an appropriate vehicle for shaping and influencing public policy in so far as the protection of the interests of citizens is concerned. Some of the CSOs have and continue to do work that benefits citizens in terms of raising their awareness. The issue-based activities need to be coalesced into a third force to bring about a desirable outcome of political and economic governance. There is a limit to which such CSOs can stretch themselves, especially on issues relating to political governance. All that is happening now is that CSOs interested in human, women’s and cultural rights are doing their work. So are those involved in electoral issues. But these are largely confined to seminars and workshops without having much impact on public policy. Viewed from this perspective, it is too early to predict if the present state of affairs in political and economic governance will change for the better. The process, however, needs to be carried on and further intensified.

The civil services of Bangladesh, Pakistan and India have a common colonial legacy. The colonial services were formed as a tool for subjugation, exploitation and maintenance of imperial law and order for the colonised populace, allowing Great Britain to plunder its resources with impunity

Nabil Hossain

If someone approached you and asked you how you would you being considered as the successor of Robert Clive of Plassey, what would be your response? Would you feel humiliated? Disgraced? Crestfallen? Or proud and honoured? In all honesty, such a person should feel embarrassed, but in reality he might feel proud and honoured. Robert Clive, of East India Company fame, or notoriety, is a forebear and role model for today’s bureaucrats, and if you thought peacocks are vain, then you haven’t yet met a secretary of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, preferably of the erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) variety. There are, of course, a few exceptions, but that only proves the rule.

   The civil services of Bangladesh, Pakistan and India have a common colonial legacy. The colonial services were formed as a tool for subjugation, exploitation and maintenance of imperial law and order for the colonised populace, allowing Great Britain to plunder its resources with impunity. The Civil Service of Pakistan, as far as East Pakistan was concerned, operated on similar principles catering to the need of their martial masters. In India astute political leadership coupled with necessary pro-development amendments to existing rules and regulations compelled the civil service to engage in pro-people development endeavours, whereas in Pakistan, with Ayub Khan and his military junta at the helm, the civil service was employed to undermine civil society and suffocate people’s participation in development, thus creating an administrative class that remained aloof from the development needs of the common people and only aggravated the political vacuum existing in the country. Though there are instances of individual bravery on the part of certain Bengali civil servants who took isolated moral stances, the majority complied, as magistrates and police officials, as tools of oppression.

   In 1971, with the arrival of freedom, Bangladesh inherited a bureaucracy that had never been trained to serve the people. The new group of political leaders in power, novices in the art of governance, were compelled to be dependent on the bureaucracy, which carried on its business as if nothing had changed. Post-independence recruits to the bureaucracy followed in the footsteps of there predecessors. The incompetence of the political leadership, its inability to re-orient the bureaucracy towards pro-people development efforts, et al, allowed the bureaucracy to remain as a self-serving interest group catering to individual ambitions.

   The civil service previously attracted the meritorious section of the nation. The simple reason was a lack of options. With the exception of universities and professions like medicine, engineering and the law, there were few careers that were as promising as the civil service. The private sector was owner-managed, and even as recently as 15-20 years ago, Motijheel, the commercial hub of the capital, was a shady place consisting of indenters and manpower agents and businesses that were predominately dependent on dealing with the government. Therefore, the tragedy is that despite the best brains being engaged in administration, day-by-day we were sinking into an abyss of poverty, underdevelopment and maladministration. In the 70s and 80s, when Asian economies like Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were going through a bureaucracy-managed spree of heightened growth and development, our bureaucracy was busy carving out privileges from donor assisted projects, hankering after prime residential plots at subsidised rates or, to be brutally honest, taking bribes or plundering state owned enterprises. Well, there are exceptions but that also just proves the rule.

   In the mid-80s, the usually arrogant bureaucracy underwent a gradual change in its demeanour, with the advent of a military ruler as overlord of the country. Bureaucrats donned the attire of courtiers and the pretence of abiding rules and regulations was quickly replaced by actions of compliance more appropriate in a monarchy. The motto ‘imperious to the common, subservient to the powerful’ was reinforced as the guiding principle for the bureaucracy. Corruption as an act of shame became an obsolete moral state of mind, and to become rich in the shortest possible time, by hook or by crook became the smartest thing to do. Corruption in the power lobbies of Bangladesh gained respectability. The tradition continues with increased vigour.

   Today corruption is so endemic in our public service that to describe it is to resort to boring platitudes. Not a single citizen of Bangladesh (except probably the Prime Minister, Opposition Leader and their families) is immune to official corruption, be it for utility services, filing tax returns, facing customs officials, registering property, attending the courts, or, God forbid, having the misfortune to have an encounter with the police. Hospitals, educational institutions, even graveyard authorities indulge in corruption. There is not a single facet of official intervention which is corruption free. No wonder a former cabinet secretary respected for his wisdom has expressed the opinion that all government institutions are corrupt.

   Therefore, in nation building and development, what role can the bureaucracy play? As it stands now, nothing except impeding the development process by creating obstacles and harassing the common people on whose shoulders our growth and development depend. Then what do we do?

   The first step is to clean the bureaucracy of rampant corruption. Impossible as it may sound, that is the only remedy. According to a UNDP report, “From an institutional perspective corruption arises when public officials have wide authority, little accountability and perverse incentives, or when their accountability responds to informal rather than formal regulations”. This definition is self-explanatory. Let us examine it from a Bangladeshi perspective. In Bangladesh, officials can exercise wide authority, taking advantage of outdated rules and regulations inherited from a colonial era when secrecy was of the utmost importance. Lack of transparency in the decision-making process allows officials to bend rules to their own convenience. Article 19 of the Government Servants (conduct) Rules, 1979 is cited as an excuse of not divulging information on government business. As for accountability, if the whole chain, including the political head, is involved, the only person who will be in trouble will be any honest official in the loop. He will be treated with suspicion and if necessary discredited by being punished on trumped-up charges. In a society which has been gradually conditioned to be tolerant of bribe-takers, perverse incentives often acquire respectability, and are even construed as a measure of one’s power and influence. Now we come to the most important point of the UNDP definition – corruption flourishes “when accountability responds to informal rather than formal regulation”. In the Bangladeshi context, I leave this interpretation to the reader, who nowadays observes a multiple centre of power and authority threatening to act as a parallel administration. The Bangladesh administrative environment fulfils all the conditionalities to be blatantly corrupted.

   In recent times the structure of the bureaucracy has been severely battered. Hierarchies have been seriously violated. Remember the story of a certain assistant private secretary and a principal secretary, and how the principal secretary had to back off? The recent promotion rules hastily drawn up to cater to the interests of junior officers close to the ruling party have created a large number of superseded disgruntled officers who will wrongfully never be promoted. There is no honourable exit mechanism for these officers as there are in the armed forces. Now if these officers, with no hope of respect, resort to reckless corruption and mischief in an existing corrupt environment, who is going to blame them? The civil service by nature is hierarchical and structured. For juniors to supervise seniors who supervised them previously is to create chaos, disorder and inefficiency. The bureaucracy is a staid organisation. Therefore, rules regulating it should not have been tampered with in such a cavalier manner. Senior secretaries who frame these rules should have been more circumspect.

   To restore sanity in the bureaucracy, proper guidance, monitoring and checks and balances are required from the two other organs of the state –the legislature and the judiciary. But that is another long story.

   Lee Kwan Yew, the founder of modern Singapore, believes that, ‘the business of the state is the best business. Therefore it needs the best people. And for the best people you have to pay the best perks and salary’. That is how he recruited Goh Tok Chong as a bureaucrat and subsequently groomed him as his successor as prime minister of Singapore. In Bangladesh, a senior civil servant draws a salary less than that of a management trainee of a multinational. With a growing private sector, a vibrant media and other institutions promising more challenging careers, the civil service is no longer the premier career choice, except for studious but misguided young men who believe that a civil service position is a license to mint money (it amazes me to see bright young men opting for civil service positions that have low social significance except for the opportunity to take hefty bribes). Therefore, in the years to come, the civil service will fail to draw good and intelligent people to it. If you pay peanuts, you get monkeys. But the administration of the state is too precious to be left in the hands of monkeys. This is one decision the nation must take irrespective of the finance ministry’s bizarre rationalisation. To keep civil servants impoverished and incapable of meeting basic necessities salary-wise, and then give them access and the responsibility to oversee activities involving millions is a recipe for temptation, an open invitation to be corrupt.

   Traditionally, especially in emerging economies, the bureaucracy has a lead role to play in activities concerning the development and growth of a nation. However optimistic one may be, it is hard to envisage positive inputs for the development of the nation from this dysfunctional, corpulent and inept bureaucracy. In accounting principles, there is a term called ‘writing off’. This bureaucracy should be written off and measures should be taken to gradually replace it with a new civil service untainted by existing administrative structures of impeding rules and informal channels of authority (some honest officers who still exist in the civil service and who are in the minority will be affected, but that is one sacrifice that needs to be made for the greater good of the nation). This civil service should have the necessary career plan and remuneration to attract not only the brightest but also the most honourable and honest young men this nation has to offer. They will serve their nation with dignity and honour and take pride in their achievements, and not in their hypocrisy. They will be accountable for their deeds, amply rewarded for their achievements and severely punished for any transgression. They will be compelled to abide by the doctrine enshrined in our constitution that “Every person in the service of the Republic has a duty to strive at all times to serve the people”(Article 21(2)).

   Robert Clive, the East India company writer, plundered Bengal, and in his time became the richest person in England. However, he was eventually tried for his crimes and paid his penalty. Robert Clive’s successors have become rich like-wise, but they are yet to pay their penalty. This is the sad tale of our bureaucracy, today as also yesterday. We have to change it for tomorrow.

Those who question the state’s inactions against repression of the religious minority communities are being accused of tarnishing the image of the nation. But it’s time to turn the tables, and find out who is levelling such accusations. And also to ask which particular image they see as being tarnished, and how that image has been constructed in the first place. And perhaps, most importantly, why?

Sara Hossain

These days almost any criticism, comment or even passing question which involves doubting that we live in a state of peace and harmony, ruled by incorruptible leaders of unimpeachable integrity, risks constituting the heinous act of ‘tarnishing the image of the nation’, according to the powers that be. And if the comment concerns persons who are members of (Muslim or non-Muslim) ‘minorities’, the likelihood of the commentator being deemed to be a ‘tarnishing type’ is that much greater.

   But perhaps it’s time to turn the tables and find out who is levelling such accusations. And also to ask which particular image they see as being tarnished, and how that image has been constructed in the first place. And perhaps, most importantly, why?

   A closer look at the recent pattern of attacks by religious bigots on the Ahmadi community may help to clarify some of these apparently abstract questions.

   As any random scanning of the newspapers will show, the past few years have seen an increasingly intensifying spate of attacks on the lives and property of Ahmadis, a minority Muslim sect who have lived on the territories that now comprise Bangladesh for almost 100 years. Many of these attacks have been spearheaded and indeed openly claimed by an organisation called the Khatme Nabuat Andolan, whose vocal political supporters include Fazlul Huq Amini and Obaidul Haque of the Islami Oikko Jote, and which enjoys positive spin from leading newspapers of the religious right. It also includes a significant number of foreign ‘moulanas’ from India, Pakistan, England and other countries who travel back and forth from Bangladesh spewing their messages of hatred. (Intriguingly, many of these figures share a political background of having opposed the liberation of Bangladesh, but are now united in their demands for the characterisation and re-constitution of (full) citizenship of the independent state of Bangladesh as being based on (their version of) Muslim identity, not on multi-religious identity as originally envisaged.)

   The Khatme Nabuat’s main demand is for the Ahmadis to be defined as non-Muslims and treated as religious minorities on the ground that some of their beliefs are repugnant to other Muslims. This demand has been part of an ongoing and relentless campaign spewing hatred and inciting violence against Ahmadi men and women, and denouncing as ‘murtads’ those who continue to call for the Ahmadi’s rights to equality and protection under the law. Alongside this campaign, acts of violence and terror – by the Khatme Nabuat and others — continue to intensify, with social boycotts of Ahmadi individuals and communities, serial bomb explosions at their mosques, resulting in the deaths of scores of worshippers, and the murder of an Imam.

   Such actions have provoked increasing horror, indignation and disbelief countrywide and forced us as a nation to confront the grotesque outcome of bigotry run riot. How can faith justify social boycotts of believers? How can people who call themselves Muslims justify the serial bombing of congregations during Jumma prayers – as has happened in Dhaka, Khulna and, just last week, in Brahmanbaria? And how can it be said that religious freedom is recognized when mobs in the presence of police cohorts pull down the signboards from Ahmadiya mosques not once but four times in the course of a year?

   As is widely reported, such incidents have been condemned by a cross-section of international human rights organisations, foreign governments and the United Nations. This sense of horror and outrage has also been shared by many ordinary citizens across the country who have stood in solidarity with the Ahmadi community. Fearless journalists continue to document the activities of the Khatme Nabuat and others and their hate crimes. Others, including lawyers, social activists, human rights and women’s rights organisations and students have attempted through investigation, documentation and campaigning to seek and demand justice for the Ahmadis who have been subjected to brutal violence, and to demand enforcement of their rights to life, personal security and freedom of expression and religion.

   In this context you would imagine that the state would choose to take immediate measures to secure the rights of the Ahmadis. But instead, the Government has announced a ‘ban’ on certain Ahmadi publications for allegedly containing “objectionable materials which hurt or might hurt the sentiments of the majority Muslim population of Bangladesh”. (This ban is now under constitutional challenge in the High Court, so is not discussed further here).

   Again, you might think the international and national calls would precipitate state action to bring to justice those perpetrating violence and systematically inciting hatred against fellow citizens who happen to be Ahmadis. But far from doing so, the Government appears to have granted virtually total impunity to those responsible for such acts, and instead …. yes you guessed it…. has resorted to accusing those demanding justice and accountability of ‘image-tarnishing’!

   So we are faced with a peculiar set of contradictions. Individuals who have gone on record, over and over, for having threatened fellow citizens (not just Ahmadiyas but those they call ‘murtads’) are not even questioned about their statements or actions. Similarly, despite increasing ramping up of security operations (the much touted ‘successes’ of RAB for example), it seems that it is impossible to investigate any such attacks or – in over a decade of violence – bring to book even one individual for any act of violence.

   The Government through such action and inaction appears to be reinforcing the particular image of Bangladesh being constructed by the Khatme Nabuat and its fellow travellers. This is an image of exclusion and intolerance. It is an image of a homogenised society where there is little space for difference of opinion or expression, and in which a certain narrow orthodoxy arrogates to itself the right to speak for the majority and to define the parameters of their belief and practice. In this image, if these self-defined arbiters of religiosity and morality decide that certain publications are hurtful to their sentiments, then that is sufficient to establish that these are hurtful to the religious sentiment of all Muslims. And they are entitled to do what they wish – including criminal acts – to protect such sentiments.

   Why – in the face of mounting national and international concern – does the Government continue to foster this image of Bangladesh? Perhaps the prospect of short-term electoral gains outweighs the more long-term dangers involved. Perhaps it calculates that a few lives lost, a few properties destroyed and even the destruction of a relatively tiny community are a small price to pay for reaping political rewards from an alliance with religious extremists.

   But – even putting principle to one side – it would seem that these calculations have failed to take into account longer-term political risks. On the international plane, the Government risks the loss of its much-treasured recognition as a ‘moderate Muslim nation’ if it continues to fail to act swiftly and firmly to punish those responsible for acts of terror along with their patrons. Nationally, it risks unsettling a constitutional and political balance which –despite the promulgation of Islam as the state religion – still formally recognises the rights of all communities to freedom of expression and to practice, propagate and profess their religion. And as is clear from the experience of for example Pakistan in this regard, once such a balance is skewed, and power is handed over, on a plate, to a band of bigots, it is difficult if not impossible to return to the status quo ante.

   So let’s stop talking about images and start talking about the harsh reality that faces us, of the struggle to ensure that the constitutional promises of equality and protection under the law bear meaning and content for all our fellow citizens, including women and men of the Ahmadi community. And if we are to continue our obsession with images, let’s get straight which image reflects the kind of society in which we wish to live. Is it an image of diversity and tolerance, of a multi-religious, multi-faith nation in which the lives and beliefs of all citizens are equally protected? Or one in which bigots run riot, and decide the limits of our existence?

Constitutional attitude to
women must change

There have been many achievements since 1972 in the sphere of women’s rights. But those achievements were attained through women’s movements and not because of the implementation of the constitutional provisions. Without the presence of a strong women’s movement, the constitutional provisions could not have guaranteed women’s rights

Farida Akhter

The demand for direct election to the reserved seats for women in the parliament is the latest political struggle in the history of the women’s rights movement in Bangladesh. It is not only a movement for being politically active and a part of the legislative body of the country, but also a question of evaluating the constitutional provision for women’s rights. Women in Bangladesh have the right to vote for choosing the members of the parliament, but people (particularly women) do not have the right to elect their representatives to the parliamentary seats which are reserved for women.

   Women in Bangladesh are lucky that they have the right to vote and to stand for election since 1972. Women got voting rights since the 1940s and are allowed to stand for election to the general seats in the parliament. There is no bar on it. But unfortunately women were not there in the parliament unless special provisions were made for them.

   In the 1972 constitution of Bangladesh, women’s rights are protected under the broad and universal principles of equality and participation. These principles are found in the following articles in the constitution:

   Article 10 of the constitution provides that steps shall be taken to ensure participation of women in all spheres of national life.

   Article 19 (1) provides that the state shall endeavour to ensure equality of opportunity to all citizens. Article 27 specifies that all citizens are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the law. Moreover, article 28 (1) provides that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 28 (2) more directly and categorically says that women shall have rights equal to those of men in all spheres of the state and of public life. This latter provision means that all rights mentioned in the constitution, such as the right to life, personal liberty, property, freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom to exercise a profession or occupation are equally applicable to women in Bangladesh.

   Undoubtedly these are very positive provisions in favour of women and therefore are appreciated, and the constitution is considered to be progressive. However, these provisions are good only from the point of view of social and institutional attitudes towards women. We have seen in the last 30 years that such attitudes have not changed much and women’s rights could not be ensured. The constitutional provisions helped women’s movements which have been relentlessly demanding their rights. It must be accepted that there are many achievements since 1972 in the sphere of women’s rights. But it is also true that those achievements were attained through women’s movements and not because of the implementation of the constitutional provisions. Without the presence of a strong women’s movement, the constitutional provisions could not have guaranteed women’s rights.

   The constitutional provision for women’s rights became more complicated when women were given a special provision to become members of parliament under article 65.3, through the provision of ‘reserved seats exclusively for women’ in the parliament, which was originally thought to be a positive step towards women’s empowerment. In the constitution of 1972, women were considered to be ‘unable’ to participate in the political process as they belonged to the ‘backward section’ of the society. Therefore, the constitutional provision introduced a ‘quota system’ in the 1972 constitution, originally providing for 15 reserved seats for women, out of 315 seats, for a period of 10 years. In 1978 a presidential proclamation increased the number of reserved seats to 30 and extended the period of reservation to 15 years from the date of promulgation of the constitution in December 1972. The women members for these seats were to be elected by the parliament’s members. That means, from the beginning, no effort was made to make women active in the politics, but rather to be dependent on elected members of the parliament, at least 95% of whom are male.

   When it comes to the question of reserved seats for women, even now women are seen as ‘backward’ as identified by the constitution of 1972. This is in the interest of the mainstream political parties which gained by this process. The practice of electing women members by the elected members of parliament has benefited the ruling party with majority seats in the parliament. The victorious party’s strength in the parliament could be increased very easily with women members. So the parties retained the system even though it lapsed twice, once in 1987 and again in 2001. The constitutional provision which lapsed in 1987 was re-incorporated into the constitution by an amendment in 1990, to be effective for 10 years from the first meeting of the legislature next elected. This provision again lapsed in 2001. Since 1987, women’s rights activists have clearly realised that the method of indirect election to the parliament was creating a perpetual image of ‘backwardness’ of women and they were not being given the opportunity to be equal in the political sphere. So they started opposing the system. Although women’s groups still wanted a temporary provision of ‘reserved seats’ in the parliament and in local bodies, they simply rejected the provision of ‘indirect’ election, which is nothing but ‘selection’.

   The eighth parliament elected in October 2001 still does not have reserved seats for women. It is mainly because the women’s groups have been demanding that there should be direct election to these seats and that the number of reserved seats should be increased. The first success of the women’s movement for direct election is that they could make the major political parties in 2001 promise, in their respective election manifestoes, direct election to the reserved seats. But the political parties, mainly BNP which now has absolute majority in the parliament with its alliances, shamelessly broke its promise. After three years of the eighth parliament, on 16 May, 2004 the ruling party placed and passed in the Jatiya Sangsad the 14th constitutional amendment to re-introduce reserved seats for women in parliament, but of course through indirect election. The number of seats in parliament is to be raised to 345, 45 (13%) of which will be reserved for women in the next parliament. The seats will be allocated to parties in proportion to their overall share of the seats. On November 29, 2004 the parliament enacted the law for holding indirect election and gazetted it on December 8, 2004. Until 2001, in the system of reserved seats for women, 30 seats out of 330 were reserved for women (chosen by indirect election by the 300 directly elected MPs). According to the new bill, 45 reserved seats for women will be allotted among the political parties and alliances on the basis of their proportional representation in the parliament. Moreover, the number of the members of the parliament, according to the bill, has increased from 300 to 345. Of those 45 seats, the ruling BNP will get 29, its coalition partner Jamaat 3, Awami League 9 and Jatiya Party 2, on the basis of the calculation of the so-called proportion.

   The women’s groups went to the court by filing writ petitions — two against the 14th amendment and the other against the Jatiya Sangsad (Reserved Seats for Women) Election Act 2004, challenging the constitutional provision for indirect election to the reserved seats for women. The court issued show cause notices to the government. This was an immediate positive response from the court. It had a positive impact on our civil society. The public support for direct election started growing. Despite the passing of the law, the government could not hold the process of ‘election’ (or selection) of the party-women in the parliament because of the ruling and stay by the court. This was the second level of victory of the women’s movement in their demand for direct election.

   However, the court on May 30 rejected writ petitions and upheld the 14th amendment to the constitution, providing for 45 seats for women in the parliament and approving the law for their indirect election. The High Court’s judgement actually upheld the 14th amendment as not being against the basic structure of the constitution. Among the four very important points on which the writ petitions were rejected, there were references to the constitution in two ways — the 1972 constitution did not have any provision for direct election to reserved seats, and the constitution of the country has never incorporated the provision of any territorial constituency for lawmakers elected to the reserved seats. However, the two other provisions in the new law, proportional representation and the system of single transferable votes, were not there in the 1972 constitution, yet these two provisions were regarded as ‘improvements’. On the contrary, from the point of view of the women’s movement, these new provisions have led to further discrimination against women, because representation in the reserved seats of parliament has been made dependent on political parties having seats in the parliament. The constitution must be reviewed if it wants to retain its ‘progressive’ image. The arguments of 1972 are not valid in the changed situation in 2005.

   In local government, however, women can be elected directly. Article 9 under Fundamental Principles of State Policy of the Constitution of Bangladesh stipulates the representation of women in local government institutions. In 1993 direct election to reserved seats for women in the union parishads (union councils) was provided by parliamentary legislation. The first elections to the union parishads, under the new provision, was held in 1997. This is a significant victory and the rural women are showing tremendous capacity as members of the local government bodies. Similarly, women are also directly elected to the reserved seats of city and municipal corporations.

   Why, then, are the constitutional provisions for women restricted in the case of highest decision-making body, the Parliament? This raises the need to evaluate the constitutional provisions for women’s rights. Were they really positive for women? Aren’t they making women less equal than men?

   Women in Bangladesh have to first amend the constitution to not be seen as the ‘backward’ section of the society. Women are oppressed, discriminated, victimised, but they are not backward. So the basic amendment needed is to change the constitutional attitude to women. On the other hand, the constitution should acknowledge the need to reduce discrimination and violence against women, and since the government has signed many international conventions in favour of women’s rights, it must act accordingly. The 14th amendment and the law on reserved seats for women are definitely reinforcing the discrimination and violence against women. Women cannot be law-makers in a place where they themselves are seen as ‘dependent’ parliament members. These are violations of other articles such as article 28 of the constitution which protects women’s rights against discrimination. This also shows the typical ‘quota’ mentality which is generous at the lower level but becomes conservative at the upper level. We have seen the effects of the quota system in the case of women’s employment, where more women fourth-class employees are found, but not at the level of senior bureaucrats. Women in the local bodies are directly elected but in the parliament they are ‘selected’. This is a contradiction which is obstructing women’s advancement in the political sphere.

   If the constitution continues to regard women as ‘backward’, then I do not think we can ever achieve equality in the real sense. Equality is not an issue of the lower level only; it must come also from the top. If it fails at the top level, the positive achievements at the lower levels will be lost, ignored, revoked or overruled. So the struggle for direct election to the reserved seats in the parliament is not just a matter of winning or losing in the court, it is a serious question of constitutional provisions and women’s equality. If the provision of reserved seats is seen to be against the principles of equality, we will accept removal of such provisions but we will not accept selection of women in the Parliament. We have no alternative but to fight relentlessly for direct election. It is a life and death question for women’s equality, respect and dignity.