Editorial
HC once again reminds govt of
its constitutional trespass
The High Court on July 24 reminded the military-controlled interim government of Fakhruddin Ahmed – for the second time in less than two weeks – that it was beyond its constitutional jurisdiction to promulgate an ordinance not related directly to the elections. In declaring illegal and cancelling the Contempt of Courts Ordinance 2008, the High Court bench of Justice ABM Khairul Haque and Justice M Abu Tariq once again highlighted a legally obvious issue that the interim administration has attempted to obfuscate since it assumed office on the wings of a state of emergency in January 2007. The judgement is similar to the one the court delivered on July 13 in the case of the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Ordinance 2008, pointing out, in no uncertain terms, that the incumbents do not have the authority to make any policy decisions as per article 58D of the constitution. The two verdicts essentially undercut the attempts the incumbents have made over the past 18 months or so to give the people the impression that the constitutional provisions for a caretaker government do not quite apply for them.
Ever since it came to power, the government has seemingly taken upon itself the right to invent and reinvent, interpret and reinterpret the constitution at its own caprice and convenience. While the constitution decrees that the interim government should limit its activities to creating a level playing field for contesting political camps in the run-up to the general elections within the 90-day timeframe and discharging the day-to-day affairs of the state, the incumbents have set themselves a flexible tenure and hardly hesitated to make decisions affecting the national interest. The High Court verdicts, therefore, tend to justify the conclusion of the thinking sections of society, whose political orientation is moulded by democratic constitutionalism, that the government may have been in breach of the constitution vis-à-vis many, if not most, of its actions, lawmaking and otherwise.
Hopefully, the High Court’s observation with regard to the interim government’s trespass beyond its constitutional jurisdiction would prompt the incumbents to gear its activities towards the twin tasks that they should have accomplished long time back, i.e. creating a level playing field for the contesting political camps in the lead-up to the general elections and assisting the Election Commission to hold all-contested and credible polls. As the court has pointed out, the ‘president and the caretaker government do not represent the people… The shorter the tenure of such an undemocratic government the better it is for all.’
Finally, to iterate what we have said in these columns previously, the consequence of the High Court’s observations will depend on the action and reaction of the political parties to these as and when the next parliament comes into existence. It will be ultimately up to the members of the ninth Jatiya Sangsad to deal with the digression of the Fakhruddin government from its constitutional mandate.
Election Commission continues
with its dithering ways
That the Election Commission on July 24 revoked its decision to replace the Representation of People Order 1972 and ordered translation of the amendment proposals into English for incorporation into the law raises a few questions about the ability, if not intent, of the commission to bring about positive changes in the country’s electoral and political process in time for elections to the ninth Jatiya Sangsad scheduled for the third week of December. First of all, the commission went beyond its jurisdiction by initiating the process of repealing the RPO 1972 in the first place. It is not that the commission was not told about the jurisdictional trespass its plan represented. The political parties have repeatedly urged the commission to not to go for the repeal of the original law. It now appears that the law ministry also raised the question when the commission sent its package of political and electoral reforms proposals for vetting. Still, the commission persisted with its plan and reasoned that there would be a number of amendments and the new law would be drafted in Bangla, and that an amended version of the old law would not be user friendly. Eventually, it had the reforms proposal approved by the council of advisers on July 13.
The commission’s obstinacy, if not audacity, has now given rise to the prospect of a further delay in the electoral laws reforms and registration of political parties. All electoral reforms, including the finalisation of the conditions for registration of the political parties and the RPO, should have been completed by February 27 according to its own electoral roadmap. The commission has already missed the June deadline for registration of the political parties and extended it up to the announcement of the election schedule, which is expected to come in October. One may very well suspect that the delay has been deliberate and part of some hidden agenda.
However it may be, now that it has been somewhat forced to revoke its decision to repeal the RPO 1972 and incorporate its proposals into the law as amendments, it could easily have struck out certain proposals that are viewed as anti-constitution, anti-people and anti-progress. For example, as we have pointed out in a previous editorial comment, while the proposed criteria for recognition and registration of the political parties runs counter to the constitution, the proposal for ban on political ideals that contradict the country’s constitution is essentially an approach to stifle diversity of ideas and political thought.
Overall, the commission’s handling of the electoral and political reforms, from the very beginning, has been lackadaisical, if not chaotic altogether, raising questions about the very content and intent of its reforms plan. The commission is already widely perceived to have been toeing the lines of a government whose constitutional validity is eminently questionable. Its refusal to be inclusive in the process of reforming the electoral and political process could only deepen such a perception.
Reconciliation with Taliban for
Afghan peace: dreary or else?
Ask ordinary Afghan citizens. They have lost trust in either the ‘liberators’ or the ‘insurgents’. They are caught between the proverbial ‘devil and the deep sea’. US congressmen came and went; their secret (not surprise) visits made no difference. Even presidential candidate Barack Obama visited Afghanistan more to improve his sagging credential as a future ‘war president’ but little to do with the future of Afghan people. The Afghans are not exactly elated, no reason to be so, writes Dr Zakir Husain
WHEN a doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ rules the world, when confrontation, and not constructive engagement, rules the roost, when ‘search and kill’ is trumpeted, a grand reconciliation might seem naïve to suggest, dialogue and accommodation with the adversary anathema. Yet, seeking and making peace with your ‘enemy’ does not have to be so dreadful.
After six years of US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ that rained death and destruction upon Afghanistan, freedom is far from enduring. On invasion of Afghanistan, the then US defence secretary had proudly claimed he was running out of targets in Afghanistan; the war destroyed all it could. Six years hence the only thing that remains to be done is to rebuild what have been destroyed. And there is plenty.
That the Taliban regime in Kabul was swiftly toppled was no great military feat by a far more superior invading force. Yet, after six years, the Taliban remain alive and well, have regrouped and seem to have returned with unprecedented vengeance. June 2008 has been the deadliest month for the overstretched coalition troops. Coalition casualties occur daily.
Afghan civilians are caught between coalition raids and Taliban insurgency. Too many innocent civilians died and are dying daily but no one is counting. It is of no comfort to the dying or dead that the coalition does not kill civilians intentionally.
Billions of aid dollars have been pledged with some of those actually delivered but only a small fraction reached the Afghan people in most need. Donors’ confidence in Afghan government is plummeting; much of aid money is siphoned back to its source. What chances are there for swift reconstruction!
Essential civilian needs like food and water, sanitation, and electricity remain scarce. Grinding poverty and unemployment drive people to the edge of utter despair and despondency. For many, joining the insurgents is the only viable option.
Ask ordinary Afghan citizens. They have lost trust in either the ‘liberators’ or the ‘insurgents’. They are caught between the proverbial ‘devil and the deep sea’. US congressmen came and went; their secret (not surprise) visits made no difference. Even presidential candidate Barack Obama visited Afghanistan more to improve his sagging credential as a future ‘war president’ but little to do with the future of Afghan people. The Afghans are not exactly elated, no reason to be so.
The Afghans have good reasons to dismiss the coalition rhetoric with utter cynicism, if not disdain. Only a few ‘Ahmed Chalabis’ (like in Iraq) reaped windfall benefits. Like the Iraqis, Afghans have no love for foreign occupying forces. Why should they? Afghans have fought and expelled foreign occupiers throughout the past centuries. The British came and departed in ignominy. The Soviets did no better. Would the NATO do anything different?
Allies are reluctant to commit more combat troops. We keep our fingers crossed.
The Afghans paid a heavy price under the Taliban rule. We know that. But they are paying even heavier price under imposed ‘democracy’ run by a puppet president.
Hamid Karzai tries to put up a brave nationalist face; he fumes and frets when too many civilians die due to the NATO bombing. He pulls a punch way above his weight when he threatens attacking Pakistan tribal areas. What else could he do? He needs the US-led NATO forces to keep him afloat and aid money to survive; survival is his topmost priority.
Clearly, the exclusive military strategy to kill native Afghan resistance — call it Taliban or al-Qaeda – is failing. Meeting banditry by insurgents with banditry (from the safety of air) by the coalition is not proving effective. Military strikes killed more innocent civilians and provoked more anger and hate. When was a guerrilla war won without support of the people? Why should this Afghan war be any different?
History tells us that Afghanistan had been at peace at home and with its neighbours only when it was internally stable, when it achieved grand reconciliation among its mosaic of tribes, ethnic groups, factions and political elements. Afghans are reputed to bargain hard and cunningly; power brokers and influence seekers are not sworn irreconcilable enemies of one another. That is what history tells us. That is not a fiction of imagination.
Foreign military occupation or naïve political lecturing to Afghans did not succeed or endure before. This ‘Enduring Freedom’ too would perish in time. Peace and security will come but not something foisted upon by military force or crafted by the NGO envoys or armchair academics.
Taliban did not fall from the sky, are not aliens from another planet. They are indigenous Afghans and an integral part of Afghan society. Orthodox the Taliban could be (and there are many other orthodox elements even in modern democracies) but they are not demons as made out by the Western media.
Taliban emerged when Afghanistan sank into anarchy after the Soviets left, imposed security and order, though harsh and cruel. They filled the vacuum left by Soviets while the Americans walked away after winning the proxy war they conducted with help of Afghan Mujahideen.
If in Iraq the US is courting the Sunni insurgents of Anbar to turn upon al-Qaeda, why is it unthinkable to talk to Taliban, to start a national process of grand reconciliation and achieve an agreed consensual ‘modus vivendi’? But that strategy has to be designed, carried out and fully owned by Afghan factions. Could that be initiated by Hamid Karzai? Could he be free or brave or credible enough?
Surely, the Afghans deserve a future – a future shaped by their own genius and compatible with their own culture and traditions. But the present course, if stayed, would plunge them into endless war and painful attrition. A broken society could withstand some stress but not a total disintegration as is happening now. Is it conceivable to move towards a courageous and calibrated strategy to nudge contesting parties driven so far apart by war and occupation?
Indeed, grand reconciliation designed and led by the Afghans first and foremost is eminently conceivable. And the single precondition is that primacy be given to negotiations and bargaining by the diverse factions and forces under essentially Afghan leadership.
If a courageous and pragmatic strategy replaces the military strategy driven by ideological superiority, Afghanistan might return to trust and reconciliation. The situation would become far worse and possibly could soon reach a dreadful point of no return.
Furthermore, a state of denial has characterised the position of the coalition political bosses not the military commanders. Like it did in Iraq, the coalition is seeking some sort of troops ‘surge’ in Afghanistan. Barack Obama called for a shift of the spotlight from Iraq to Afghanistan. What if that turns out to be too late or too little?
Gone are the days when European colonists decimated Native Americans in the South (Incas and Aztecs) or North (Red Indians) by sheer superiority of steel weapons and gunpowder over the wooden staves and spears. Today’s guerrilla war is a war of hit and run, a war pf nerves and a war for winning the hearts and minds. Winning a battle is one thing but winning a guerrilla war of native resistance by troops surge is quite another.
A troops surge at this stage could tempt Afghan president to play his Pakistan card with even greater confidence, if not finesse. He could actually prod the US to carry out ‘hot pursuit’ inside Pakistan territory – something that could kindle fresh flames.
Lest we ignore the Taliban are also indigenous to Pakistan, their kith and kin straddle across the border. During the proxy war by the US against the Soviets, the Taliban were spawned in thousands of madrassahs funded by the US allies. How could the consequences be undone by a single stroke of military convenience, never mind the so-called war on terror made the former allies to become sworn enemies?
Like it or not, exclusively military strategy clearly is not working. With the best of intentions (given past evidence by foreign occupation in Afghanistan and elsewhere best intentions are scarce) reconstruction and rehabilitation are almost impossible in the absence of countrywide peace and security. It is precisely the two commodities currently scarce, almost non-existent, in most areas. So which comes first? Peace or development?
Could peace and development come about in tandem?
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