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The newly-imposed eligibility criteria under the amended Representation of the People Order 1972, both for registration of political parties with the Election Commission and for candidates to be able to contest parliamentary elections, could not have been more inconsistent with our constitution or contradictory to democratic ideals and values. As such, instead of helping to create a level electoral playing field, the conditions, we believe, will further complicate the political and electoral processes and act as further obstacles to the peaceful holding of participatory and credible elections to the ninth parliament.
   First, some of the eligibility criteria for political parties being able to register with the commission – which includes being able to show a certain level of support in previous elections or having active units in a minimum number of districts – are not only absurd but are in contravention of Article 152 (1) of our country’s constitution which does not require a party to have any minimum level of popularity or infrastructure in order for the state to recognise its legitimacy. Also, it is incongruous that candidates can contest independently without having to show a certain amount of support in previous elections or any minimum infrastructure but cannot do so as part of a political party unless the party satisfies the criteria.
   Second, under the amended RPO, a person will have to be enlisted in the electoral roll to be able to contest elections even though the country’s constitution does not make a person’s right to contest a parliamentary seat conditional upon his or her being registered as a voter. The only eligibility requirements, according to Article 66 of the constitution, are that a person is a citizen of Bangladesh and has attained the age of 25.
   In addition, there are certain conditions under Article 66 which disqualify a person from being able to run, for instance, if the person is of unsound mind or is a citizen of a foreign state, but non-registration as a voter is not included in the list of disqualifying factors either. Hence, the Election Commission has acted in further contravention of the constitution in including this additional and arbitrary condition.
   Third, as a result of the Election Commission’s delay in amending the RPO – this was supposed to have been done much earlier and the parties were supposed to have from April to June of this year to register according to the commission’s own roadmap – even the major political parties will have great difficulty in satisfying some of the eligibility conditions for registration in the short time that is now available before elections. These conditions will necessitate the amending of party constitutions as well as the formation of elected committees from the centre to the union council level. Moreover, forcing the political parties to rush through internal reforms and to hold national council meetings under the state of emergency is not only unreasonable but contradicts the very spirit of democracy. However, the commission must not even think about delaying elections in order to allow the parties to satisfy its conditions. The Election Commission has no right to punish the political parties or hold the entire political process hostage for its own failures.
   Hence, we hope that common sense will prevail at the Election Commission and that it will withdraw the unconstitutional, arbitrary and restrictive conditions which are contradictory to a participatory electoral process and a pluralistic democratic system. Instead of further complicating the political process, the commission should devote all its energy towards the holding of participatory and credible parliamentary elections at the earliest.

Govt can no longer remain
bystander in prices tumult

Over a year and a half since the military-controlled interim government came to power with upbeat rhetoric on how to tackle the rising prices of essentials, the situation has worsened manifold, visiting economic misery on a larger and larger section of the population. Average prices of essentials rose by a staggering 45.5 per cent in the 2007-08 fiscal year, with July seeing a further increase of 5.41 per cent in average price levels, New Age reported on Saturday. The implications are simple enough: those with fixed earnings have seen their real income decline by roughly half. What is worse, the average price rise of 45.5 per cent corresponds to a whole basket of essential goods and services, meaning that there was little scope of respite even if middle and lower income families practiced a great degree of austerity.
   To the extent that this rise in prices was caused by the tumultuous state of the global food and oil markets, causing economic hardships in many parts of the world, this regime may escape blame. It is a damning indictment of the policies and priorities of this regime, however, that it has largely played the role of a helpless bystander as peoples’ hardship has continued to worsen. It is difficult to ignore that the government failed to foresee that the twin floods of 2007 and the onslaught of cyclone Sidr would cause massive food shortages, failing to make timely procurements of rice, causing panic and a crisis by the time the shortage was felt in the market. It is also difficult to ignore that the government has effectively kept its channels of communication with the ordinary people largely closed through an oppressive state of emergency intended to silence any sort of protest or dissent. While the government did launch its open market sales of rice, it was already a case of too little too late, and though millions may have benefited, there were millions who had to go hungry because the OMS allocations were limited.
   It is against this backdrop that the latest information emerges. We believe it is time for the government to recognise the import of this statistic and immediately launch a nationwide ‘rations’ programme that will sell limited quantities of a basket of essential foods at subsidised rates. Since there is no way to raise incomes across the board, the government must step in before under-nutrition and malnutrition take their toll on an already feeble population.

Apparently, there is nothing so unusual about the capitulation of another military dictator in Pakistan, to ‘the will of the people’. However, unlike the departure of Ayub, Yahya and Zia, Musharraf’s exit was dramatic, significant and most humiliating for himself. As one Pakistani analyst elucidates, ‘he took this decision not because it was the graceful and generous thing to do but because political necessity dictated it after he lost the support of America and the army.’
   His projection of himself as the antidote to Taliban and al-Qaeda terror, sacking of non-compliant judges, and above all, not having any qualms about violating the constitution once again (after 1999’s takeover) last year by getting himself ‘elected’ as the president without doffing off the general’s uniform did not rhyme with his dramatic surrender to the civilian authorities.
   What is unprecedented is the overthrow of the quasi-military ruler (although tamed and contained during the last six months of his tenure) by the concerted efforts of two of his former victims-cum-adversaries — Sharif and Zardari — jailed, persecuted and exiled by the dictator. In short, his antagonising almost every section of the population — rural-urban, rich-poor, religious-secular — for excessive interventions or for not doing much in eradicating poverty, terrorism and lawlessness became his nemesis.
   It is tragic that despite his taking over the country to the detriment of democracy (which never existed in Pakistan), his economic achievements up to early 2007, his reserving 30 per cent seats for women in the national and regional assemblies and doing away with the ‘separate electorate system’ that divided the voters on religious grounds, failed to alleviate poverty, contain inflation and create more jobs. His ‘enlightened moderation’ and promised transition to civilian rule remained ever elusive and phoney; the military remained preponderant almost at every level of the polity. In view of these contradictions one may cite an analyst who considers him ‘an enigma’, posing the questions: ‘Was he a hawk disguised in a liberal cloak, or a moderate and progressive man whose military training had in the past turned him into a trigger-happy leader? Was he really sincere about the progress of this country, or were his policies only targeted at perpetuating his rule?’
   One does not have the answers to these questions as one is not sure as to what led to the proposed impeachment process which led to his resignation. It is too early to comment on the ‘conspiracy theory’ propounded by a Western analyst that ‘fundamentalist military elements — always strong in the ISI —together with fundamentalist opposition members of parliament, forced the prime minister and the rest of the civilian political establishment to make the move.’ Neither can we buttress the hypothesis that army chief General Kayani ‘launched a plan to return Pakistan to democracy’.
   On the other hand, it is too trite an assumption that Musharraf’s ‘granting’ freedom to the media, except during the short span of the emergency, led to his ultimate departure. We think prime minister Gilani’s success in convincing US president Bush about Musharraf’s uselessness as an ally during their last meeting in July was the catalyst. Ambassador Haqqani, an old beneficiary and confidante of Benazir Bhutto, is said to have played a very important role in this regard.
   One needs to understand why despite Musharraf’s laudable role in accelerating the growth and development engine, empowering women, containing Islamist terror by taking great risks to his own life, he remained so unpopular among the vast majority of his people.
   Most Pakistanis, excepting businessmen, demanded his resignation and more than 65 per cent are now demanding his public trial for his ‘misdeeds’, especially for fighting ‘America’s war’ against fellow Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan, killing hundreds at the Red Mosque in Islamabad, killing Nawab Akbar Bugti in Baluchistan and not being able to save Benazir Bhutto from suicide bombers. There has been some finger-pointing at him, implicating him in the killing of Bhutto.
   Finally, he lost credibility by humiliating leaders of the two major political parties — Bhutto’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League — and not being able to float a viable alternative to them after the transition to his semi-civilian rule. A military ruler rules with the military; and a civilian ruler needs a strong political party and mass support for sustenance. Musharraf had none. Meanwhile, the spate of suicide bombings in major cities and in and around garrisons resulting in hundreds of civilian and military casualties also alienated the armed forces from him. The withdrawal of the military’s support from Musharraf and his unpopular ‘war on terror’ was the last straw.
   Where do we go from here? Questions regarding the impact that Musharraf’s departure is going have on Pakistan’s role in the ‘war on terror’, the nature and extent of Islamist terror both within and in the adjoining border regions in Afghanistan, India and Kashmir, need to be answered.
   As expected, globally analysts, experts and laymen have come up with their appraisals, after-thoughts and even doomsday predictions about Pakistan in general and about its ‘bound to deteriorate’ relations with the US vis-à-vis the long-drawn ‘war on terror’ in particular soon after the not-so-unexpected resignation of Pervez Musharraf. The New York Times in its headlines on August 19, ‘In Musharraf’s Wake, US Faces Political Disarray’, has predicted that the ruling coalition in Pakistan, which is ‘unwilling’ to fight the Taliban and ally with the US will be creating problems for the latter.
   Musharraf’s exit definitely signals changes in Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies, but one is not sure if these changes will be for the better, or if the country will be further divided on sectarian and ideological lines. Unfortunately, the prognoses are not that promising in regards to controlling rising inflation, bridging the widening gap between the rich and poor, bringing the feuding parties to a peaceful resolution, and most importantly, eliminating Islamist terror, sectarianism and separatism in the near future. The future of US-Pakistan relations does not seem to be that encouraging either, let alone the prospect for further collaboration in the arena of ‘war on terror’ between the two countries. Both Sharif and Zardari are least enthusiastic about supporting the US in its ‘war on terror’. There are ominous signs of Pakistan’s renewal of support for insurgents in Indian occupied Kashmir, and possibly in Afghanistan. Unlike Musharraf, the new government is least interested in normalising relationship with India.
   Meanwhile, there have been signs of mutual acrimony, mistrust and rivalry within the ruling coalition, which is just a marriage of convenience between ‘Islam-loving’, and pro-Saudi Nawaz Sharif, and Asif Zardari - Bhutto’s inexperienced widower, also accused of corruption. Sharif and Zardari have already publicly disagreed over the restoration of the sacked judges and the selection of the next president.
   Consequently, the combination of disorganised and corrupt political parties, faltering economy and the ever-present terrorists does not bode well for the country. Accordingly, it does not matter who becomes the next president; Fehmida Mirza, the speaker of the National Assembly, Asif Zardari, his sister Faryal Talpur, or someone else from Baluchistan or the Frontier, stability in Pakistan will depend on the continuation of democracy, accountability and the preponderance of the civil administration.
   Prime Minister Gilani’s attempt to bring the powerful ISI under civilian control has already been a failure; he managed to keep ISI under civil administration just for a day. If there is any credence in the allegation that the ISI has surreptitious links with the Taliban and al-Qaeda — if not for ideological but strategic considerations — Pakistan is not likely to become a haven of peace in the near future.
   Nevertheless, since the US has started backing the elected government of Pakistan; and as it has learnt from its Iraq experience that the ‘war on terror’ cannot be won simply by military means, there is likely to be an improvement in the Pak-US relationship, in the long run. As Pakistanis know it quite well from their own experience, it is one thing to use the Islamists for geo-political reasons; it is well-nigh impossible to contain them once they start calling the shots. Since Musharraf’s self-serving opportunism almost destroyed democratic institutions, unwittingly making the Islamists a formidable force to reckon with, his departure, let us hope, will signal a new beginning for democracy, peace and stability in the region. Then again, we must not expect miracles and overnight transformation of the country in the wake of Musharraf’s resignation.
   Taj Hashmi, is a professor of security studies at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in the US