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The Election Commission’s 18-month roadmap to parliamentary election is the latest political fad in the country. Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed and Chief of Army Staff General Moeen U Ahmed never miss an opportunity to reiterate the government’s commitment to implement the election programme. The chief adviser has broadcast this globally. In his address to the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly on September 27, he said: ‘The Election Commission, on its own accord, has announced a timeline for holding the next parliamentary election by the end of 2008. Our administration is committed to ensuring that this timeframe is achieved.’ The donor community has bestowed its blessings on the so-called electoral roadmap. This has also been welcomed by the political parties; after all, they have now an opportunity, however much limited it may be under the stifling emergency rule, to regroup themselves.
   There is an irony in the situation. The Election Commission is a constitutional body and is obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the country. There is no provision of any roadmap for parliamentary election in the constitution. The constitution is rather specific about the timeframe of holding such elections: ‘A general election of members of Parliament shall be held within ninety days after Parliament is dissolved, whether by reason of the expiration of its term or otherwise than by reason of such expiration.’ [Article 123(3)]
   The term of the eighth parliament expired on October 27, 2006 and the election to the ninth parliament was accordingly due in January last. The elections, scheduled for January 22, became problematic because of the mishandling of the election-related political disputes by the caretaker government headed by President Iajuddin Ahmed. In the aftermath of the proclamation of emergency and the reconstitution of the caretaker government, with Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed as chief adviser, the Election Commission cancelled the election
   schedule.
   Constitutional malfeasance: The constitution is silent about the holding of any election to parliament beyond the mandated timeframe. So following the cancellation of the elections, scheduled for January 22, there is no constitutional guideline for holding the aborted elections to the ninth parliament.
   This is a constitutional issue which could be constitutionally addressed only by invoking the ‘Advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court.’ Article 106 says: ‘If at any time it appears to the President that question of law has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question to the Appellate Division for consideration and the division may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report its opinion thereon to the President.’
   No such reference regarding the holding of the aborted elections to the ninth parliament, beyond the constitutionally mandated time frame of ‘ninety days’ from date of the expiry of the term of the eighth parliament, has yet been made.
   Going by the constitution, the Election Commission has no legal or constitutional authority to undertake the task of holding the aborted elections to the ninth parliament. The electoral roadmap of the Election Commission, to put it simply, is extra-constitutional.
   This constitutional malfeasance does not, however, diminish the significance of the electoral roadmap. In the given context of the malfunctioning of constitutional rule, it is apparently a practical formula to somehow return the country back to elected
   governance.
   A gimmick and its critique: The case-specific relevance of the electoral roadmap does not, though, preclude the necessity of undertaking the academic scrutiny of this gimmick of the Election Commission. Such a critique lays bare the unorthodox role the Election Commission has been playing as a tool of the ruling coterie in fashioning politics and conducting the power game.
   Such an academic exercise also presents a realistic view of the electoral roadmap. The roadmap is not essentially about election. It is rather a part of a political roadmap –– a tentative exit formula of the ruling coterie or, alternately, a move to expose the irreconcilability of the interest, goals and politics of the power contenders –– both from the traditional political parties and the forces outside the orbit of organised politics –– through the civil, peaceable means of elections.
   The electoral roadmap is a tantalisingly appealing gesture from the ruling coterie to the political parties but does not necessarily guarantee the holding of ‘the general election of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.’ [Article 58D(2)]
   The present Election Commission is an extraordinary body. It was not constituted in the normal course in accordance with the letter and spirit of Article 118 of the constitution. It is a product of the emergency of January 11. The whole weight of the emergency was employed to oblige the acting chief election commissioner and the other election commissioners, who manned the Election Commission during the Iajuddin caretaker government, to go home. And the present chief election commissioner and the two other election commissioners were recruited under the open-ended reform programme of the ruling coterie.
   The soul-mates: The present Election Commission, like the present caretaker government, has the façade of being a constitutional body. But for all practical purposes it is a tool of the emergency rule. Hence, the chief election commissioner, Dr ATM Shamsul Huda, said in a press briefing on April 5: ‘The government has taken initiatives to free politics of criminalisation and arrested a number of persons on charges of corruption. We will have to discuss with the government when they will be able to create a congenial atmosphere for election after trials of corrupt persons and criminals.’ He also ‘questioned how polls would be free and fair if corrupt persons staged a comeback due to haste in holding the polls.’
   In the same vein, Dr Fakhruddin mentioned a proviso when posited in his UN address that ‘Our task, first and foremost, is to ensure a free and fair election, and we are fully committed to that responsibility’. He said: ‘While Bangladesh has held three elections in the past two decades, our democracy has been brutally undermined by ruinous corruption…If our democratic spirit is to emerge unscathed from this downward spiral and if we are to deliver a free, fair and meaningful election, we must first free our politics from the clutches of corruption and violence.’
   General Moeen expressed his anguish at the pre-emergency political failures and, simultaneously, his hope for the future in his keynote address at a seminar on Democratic Accountability and Way to Curb Corruption, organised jointly by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies and the American Centre on July 10. He said: ‘While we believe in the representative democracy as an indispensable condition for stability, peace and development of our country, the current process is irreversible and contributes to that process. The change of January 11 was therefore inevitable, unavoidable and formed a part of “reinvention” of the nation. The people accepted it, and the international community has seen its logic and provided us with support in this arduous endeavour. My personal position was that I could not stand by while the nation stood on “brink” with impending uncertainties and violence. I believe that the present condition has provided us with a historic opportunity to serve the nation – a lifetime chance for every patriotic citizen of Bangladesh.’
   So the chief adviser, chief election commissioner and the chief of army staff do not talk about elections in the ordinary sense as ‘the constitutional arrangements and voting systems which convert the vote into a determination of which individuals and political parties are elected to positions of power.’ They talk about elections as ‘a part of the “reinvention” of the nation’. To further quote General Moeen: ‘I believe the aspiring democratic process of Bangladesh and the current transition period allow us an opportunity to develop a new concept.’[Keynote speech at a seminar on The challenging interface of democracy and security, April 2, 2007]
   A strategic retreat: But one thing is certain: with the unveiling of the electoral roadmap, the countdown of the Fakhruddin government, which is the constitutional, civil face of the ruling coterie, has started. Either the ruling coterie and the political parties will succeed in striking a deal regarding the future governance of the country and the promised parliamentary elections will take place leading to the formation of an elected, political government, or a political deal will fail to materialise and there will be no election, creating a situation fraught with imponderable consequences. An intermediate position may also develop: the ruling coterie may find the continuation of an unelected government, ad infinitum, next to impossible and may then decide to stage an election to produce a Karzai or Maliki type of so-called elected government.
   The dialogue of the Election Commission with the political parties, stretching over three months from September 12 to November 22, will allow the political parties a relatively relaxed time but the Sword of Damocles will continue to hang over their heads, with the ruling coterie pursuing their programmes of cleansing of the political parties and of ‘reinvention of the nation.’
   The electoral roadmap, in a sense, is a strategic retreat of the ruling coterie to gain time to decide on the course of their political roadmap in the aftermath of the hodgepodge they made with their ill-conceived ‘minus-two’ formula and anti-corruption drive targeting the political leadership. The roadmap is the punching bag on which the ruling coterie and the political parties will carry on shadow boxing in an undefined tournament of power struggle.
   NM Harun is contributing editor of New Age. He can be reached at: badrun123@dhaka.netThe Election Commission’s 18-month roadmap to parliamentary election is the latest political fad in the country. Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed and Chief of Army Staff General Moeen U Ahmed never miss an opportunity to reiterate the government’s commitment to implement the election programme. The chief adviser has broadcast this globally. In his address to the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly on September 27, he said: ‘The Election Commission, on its own accord, has announced a timeline for holding the next parliamentary election by the end of 2008. Our administration is committed to ensuring that this timeframe is achieved.’ The donor community has bestowed its blessings on the so-called electoral roadmap. This has also been welcomed by the political parties; after all, they have now an opportunity, however much limited it may be under the stifling emergency rule, to regroup themselves.
   There is an irony in the situation. The Election Commission is a constitutional body and is obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the country. There is no provision of any roadmap for parliamentary election in the constitution. The constitution is rather specific about the timeframe of holding such elections: ‘A general election of members of Parliament shall be held within ninety days after Parliament is dissolved, whether by reason of the expiration of its term or otherwise than by reason of such expiration.’ [Article 123(3)]
   The term of the eighth parliament expired on October 27, 2006 and the election to the ninth parliament was accordingly due in January last. The elections, scheduled for January 22, became problematic because of the mishandling of the election-related political disputes by the caretaker government headed by President Iajuddin Ahmed. In the aftermath of the proclamation of emergency and the reconstitution of the caretaker government, with Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed as chief adviser, the Election Commission cancelled the election
   schedule.
   Constitutional malfeasance: The constitution is silent about the holding of any election to parliament beyond the mandated timeframe. So following the cancellation of the elections, scheduled for January 22, there is no constitutional guideline for holding the aborted elections to the ninth parliament.
   This is a constitutional issue which could be constitutionally addressed only by invoking the ‘Advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court.’ Article 106 says: ‘If at any time it appears to the President that question of law has arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court upon it, he may refer the question to the Appellate Division for consideration and the division may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, report its opinion thereon to the President.’
   No such reference regarding the holding of the aborted elections to the ninth parliament, beyond the constitutionally mandated time frame of ‘ninety days’ from date of the expiry of the term of the eighth parliament, has yet been made.
   Going by the constitution, the Election Commission has no legal or constitutional authority to undertake the task of holding the aborted elections to the ninth parliament. The electoral roadmap of the Election Commission, to put it simply, is extra-constitutional.
   This constitutional malfeasance does not, however, diminish the significance of the electoral roadmap. In the given context of the malfunctioning of constitutional rule, it is apparently a practical formula to somehow return the country back to elected
   governance.
   A gimmick and its critique: The case-specific relevance of the electoral roadmap does not, though, preclude the necessity of undertaking the academic scrutiny of this gimmick of the Election Commission. Such a critique lays bare the unorthodox role the Election Commission has been playing as a tool of the ruling coterie in fashioning politics and conducting the power game.
   Such an academic exercise also presents a realistic view of the electoral roadmap. The roadmap is not essentially about election. It is rather a part of a political roadmap –– a tentative exit formula of the ruling coterie or, alternately, a move to expose the irreconcilability of the interest, goals and politics of the power contenders –– both from the traditional political parties and the forces outside the orbit of organised politics –– through the civil, peaceable means of elections.
   The electoral roadmap is a tantalisingly appealing gesture from the ruling coterie to the political parties but does not necessarily guarantee the holding of ‘the general election of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.’ [Article 58D(2)]
   The present Election Commission is an extraordinary body. It was not constituted in the normal course in accordance with the letter and spirit of Article 118 of the constitution. It is a product of the emergency of January 11. The whole weight of the emergency was employed to oblige the acting chief election commissioner and the other election commissioners, who manned the Election Commission during the Iajuddin caretaker government, to go home. And the present chief election commissioner and the two other election commissioners were recruited under the open-ended reform programme of the ruling coterie.
   The soul-mates: The present Election Commission, like the present caretaker government, has the façade of being a constitutional body. But for all practical purposes it is a tool of the emergency rule. Hence, the chief election commissioner, Dr ATM Shamsul Huda, said in a press briefing on April 5: ‘The government has taken initiatives to free politics of criminalisation and arrested a number of persons on charges of corruption. We will have to discuss with the government when they will be able to create a congenial atmosphere for election after trials of corrupt persons and criminals.’ He also ‘questioned how polls would be free and fair if corrupt persons staged a comeback due to haste in holding the polls.’
   In the same vein, Dr Fakhruddin mentioned a proviso when posited in his UN address that ‘Our task, first and foremost, is to ensure a free and fair election, and we are fully committed to that responsibility’. He said: ‘While Bangladesh has held three elections in the past two decades, our democracy has been brutally undermined by ruinous corruption…If our democratic spirit is to emerge unscathed from this downward spiral and if we are to deliver a free, fair and meaningful election, we must first free our politics from the clutches of corruption and violence.’
   General Moeen expressed his anguish at the pre-emergency political failures and, simultaneously, his hope for the future in his keynote address at a seminar on Democratic Accountability and Way to Curb Corruption, organised jointly by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies and the American Centre on July 10. He said: ‘While we believe in the representative democracy as an indispensable condition for stability, peace and development of our country, the current process is irreversible and contributes to that process. The change of January 11 was therefore inevitable, unavoidable and formed a part of “reinvention” of the nation. The people accepted it, and the international community has seen its logic and provided us with support in this arduous endeavour. My personal position was that I could not stand by while the nation stood on “brink” with impending uncertainties and violence. I believe that the present condition has provided us with a historic opportunity to serve the nation – a lifetime chance for every patriotic citizen of Bangladesh.’
   So the chief adviser, chief election commissioner and the chief of army staff do not talk about elections in the ordinary sense as ‘the constitutional arrangements and voting systems which convert the vote into a determination of which individuals and political parties are elected to positions of power.’ They talk about elections as ‘a part of the “reinvention” of the nation’. To further quote General Moeen: ‘I believe the aspiring democratic process of Bangladesh and the current transition period allow us an opportunity to develop a new concept.’[Keynote speech at a seminar on The challenging interface of democracy and security, April 2, 2007]
   A strategic retreat: But one thing is certain: with the unveiling of the electoral roadmap, the countdown of the Fakhruddin government, which is the constitutional, civil face of the ruling coterie, has started. Either the ruling coterie and the political parties will succeed in striking a deal regarding the future governance of the country and the promised parliamentary elections will take place leading to the formation of an elected, political government, or a political deal will fail to materialise and there will be no election, creating a situation fraught with imponderable consequences. An intermediate position may also develop: the ruling coterie may find the continuation of an unelected government, ad infinitum, next to impossible and may then decide to stage an election to produce a Karzai or Maliki type of so-called elected government.
   The dialogue of the Election Commission with the political parties, stretching over three months from September 12 to November 22, will allow the political parties a relatively relaxed time but the Sword of Damocles will continue to hang over their heads, with the ruling coterie pursuing their programmes of cleansing of the political parties and of ‘reinvention of the nation.’
   The electoral roadmap, in a sense, is a strategic retreat of the ruling coterie to gain time to decide on the course of their political roadmap in the aftermath of the hodgepodge they made with their ill-conceived ‘minus-two’ formula and anti-corruption drive targeting the political leadership. The roadmap is the punching bag on which the ruling coterie and the political parties will carry on shadow boxing in an undefined tournament of power struggle.
   NM Harun is contributing editor of New Age. He can be reached at: badrun123@dhaka.net

Last month, we saw protests inside Burma. Dozens of people were killed. On September 25, 2007 President Bush announced ‘new’ sanctions against the military government of Burma, symbolically joining hands with tens of thousands of protesters in the streets of Yangon and challenging the United Nations to join him in a broader ‘mission of liberation.’
   However, as I see it, the older sanctions imposed by the USA and some western countries did not really bite deep into the skin of the SPDC regime that is ruling Burma. There is also crass hypocrisy in how the sanctions have thus far been imposed by the Bush administration. A multi-national oil company like Chevron was apparently exempted from adhering to the sanction rule book and is allowed to do business as usual in the oil and gas exploration sector with the SPDC.
   Why this selective application for an oil company? Well, we don’t have to be reminded that oil is important to the trio –– Bush, Cheney & Rice – all linked with the oil industry before joining the administration. As is also obvious now, it was not the WMD but the control of the oil fields in Iraq that was the primary motivation for why they invaded Iraq. [And of course, there are other reasons too, namely, making the region ‘secure’ for the rogue state –– Israel.] I doubt that the Bush administration is unaware that the Chevron-money goes directly to the pockets of the SPDC regime, providing the necessary blood infusion that it needs to function. [But then again, we are continuously reminded by our Wall Street pundits that if Chevron does not do business, there are many other non-American companies willing to close the deal with the Myanmar regime! They argue: why should a US company suffer the brunt of unfair trading or business practices?] So, if the Bush administration wants it to be taken seriously, it must go beyond the hollow rhetoric to imposing biting sanctions to isolate the hated regime.
   As we also know, in spite of unrest and demonstrations inside Burma, two major trading partners –– China and India –– continue to doing business with the SPDC regime. Thailand, Russia and Japan are also doing business as usual with the regime, as are many other countries including Sri Lanka and Singapore. So, unless the sanctions are universally imposed and fully embraced, stopping all sorts of trade, explorations, and flow of goods and currency to and from Burma by land, sea and air with all other countries, something that were done for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq under the tutelage of the UN, I see little chance in disciplining the brutal regime. The clearest case for a win-win strategy, without requiring a devastating war from outside, is that of mimicking the measures taken two decades earlier against the apartheid regime of South Africa that forced it to collapse under massive pressure of sanctions.
   In those days, the USA and Israel were the biggest trading partners of the hated regime in South Africa. But with world-wide condemnation from outside, and struggle for freedom and equality within under the able and time-tested leadership of the ANC and people like Bishop Desmond Tutu, all the big foreign companies and institutions (including my own alma mater –– the University of Southern California. Los Angeles) were forced to withdraw their massive investment money and stop all dealings, thus nailing the beast of Botha’s apartheid rule and dawning the age of democracy, liberty and equality in Mandela’s South Africa.
   But I don’t see anything remotely similar happening for Burma. The oppressive SPDC regime has two veto-wielding backers inside the UNSC –– China and Russia. Unless they change their attitude, I doubt anything positive would emerge from the UNSC. As much it is true for most countries in this age of moral bankruptcy, cheap trade with Burma is more important to these two countries. That is why, we are not surprised either to see how Gandhi’s India has no moral qualms to emerge as the second largest trading partner of the SPDC regime.
   All these ground realities do sound really hopeless and depressing. Is there a light at the end of the tunnel in Myanmar? I believe, there is. The clue to toppling the SPDC regime probably lies in replicating the South African experiment of disengagement. In the 1980s, the apartheid regime also had its powerful backers in the UN. They were the United States of America and Israel (and Marcos’s Philippines). When the entire UN voted in one way, recommending sanctions against and condemning the apartheid regime, the USA and Israel continued to cast their votes in the opposite way, even wielding the veto power (by the USA) in the UNSC. [The two countries had remarkable similarities with South Africa in that the more powerful settlers from Europe had dispossessed the less powerful indigenous, native communities.] It was truly an uphill battle in the UN to pass any punitive measure or incriminating resolution against the racist regime. However, in the mid-1980s, even the diehard supporters had to say that the days of apartheid rule in South Africa were over. Yes, with nationwide demonstrations inside the USA and some European countries that had heavily engaged in business with the apartheid regime, the governments and powerful corporations in these countries caved in. They stopped all future business dealings with the regime, and pulled out money. The ‘Old Crocodile’ President Botha relented to intense domestic and external pressure and implemented a series of gradual race reforms, telling his white Afrikaners that they must ‘adapt or die.’ Botha was ousted as National Party leader by FW de Klerk in September 1989, who released Mandela the next year.
   So, for a desired change in Burma, all the conscientious human beings must demand that their respective governments stop all forms of business dealings with the SPDC regime. The UNSC must steer head the global demand for an end to tyranny in Burma. If the regime’s ethnic cleansing against the minority Rohingyas and Karens, and overbearing repression against its citizens are not appropriate subjects for the UNSC, what is? Why should this organisation even exist if it cannot redress people’s legitimate grievances against a despised, unelected, usurping power that had dishonoured people’s verdict and tyrannised everyone –– from the Muslim and Christian minorities to majority Buddhists for more than four decades? Should the UNSC resolution be only reserved for a (now hanged) brute like Saddam Hussein, and launching unjust and immoral wars against civilians in the Middle East, let alone conspiring to attack Iran under false pretext at the behest of powerful ‘Amen Corner’?
   The UNSC must do the right thing. It has more proofs than it requires to isolating the SPDC regime 100 per cent. Through its biting resolutions, it can let every government within the UN know that if it were to conduct any business deal with the regime, it will lose its membership in the world body, and will feel the pinch from losing bilateral ‘favoured nation’ trading status with other developed nations. The UNSC must also stop all multi-national companies from doing any business with the regime. Let ‘real’ sanctions hurt the regime! Let it find out that it has no friend to lean on to.
   The most important factor for a change in Burma is, however, its own people. It is they who must desire change wholeheartedly and should be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice necessary to bring about a positive change in their lives. If they are afraid to sacrifice for a noble cause, nothing will happen for them. No outside intervention or goodwill will help. So far, I have not seen that kind of sacrifice made inside Burma. There has not been a repeat of the 8-8-88 event. The junta-defying demonstrations in September were neither big enough nor well organised to shake the SPDC boat.
   Leadership is very crucial for the success or failure of any movement. The events of the past weeks have demonstrated that the Burmese people are radar-less without an effective leadership that gravitates everyone for a common, noble cause. The people of Burma must develop genuine leadership the same way the Black South Africans had done when their charismatic leaders Mandela and Mbeki were serving long prison times. Most of the opposition leaders in Burma are grossly incompetent and selfish. They live in their feudal past. They look at things from their chauvinistic, foggy, ethnic prism that is not wide enough to understand other communities. Their inherent xenophobia, racism and feudalistic behaviour do not encourage other groups to take them seriously as better alternatives to the current regime. They often talk about democracy, but have no clue about what it takes to make a democratic society. They talk about liberty but approve the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law that effectively denies basic citizenship rights to millions of minority Muslims and Christians. They talk of human rights, but to them the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a non-binding leaflet from a distant planet that they can be oblivious about or show selective amnesia. They display no understanding about pluralism and integration, and respect for others.
   These are, in my analysis, the sad realities of today’s Burma. And yet the march for democracy, freedom and human rights must go on –– both inside and outside Burma. In the absence of imprisoned political leaders, Burma must find its genuine leadership that integrates and empowers people of various races, ethnicities and religious persuasions for a common, higher goal so that it can develop true democratic spirits under a federal framework. As for those of us who are outside, we must do our part to pressure our respective governments and the world bodies to bring about measures that force the repressive junta towards a democratic transition with minority rights protected.
   Dr Habib Siddiqui is director of the Arakan-Burma Research Institute, USA.

Because it did not come amidst a sex scandal and because the outgoing leader was not one of the architects of the Iraq War, the surprise June resignation of the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, Rodrigo de Rato, did not garner the gleeful, gossipy headlines surrounding Paul Wolfowitz’s disgraceful exit from the World Bank.
   Last week, the IMF announced the selection of a new leader, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a former French finance minister, with the world again barely taking notice.
   But that doesn’t mean there isn’t scandal at the Fund, or that the Fund’s policies are any less important than those of the Bank.
   For decades, in various names, the IMF, along with the Bank, has imposed ‘structural adjustment’ on developing countries – a set of corporate-oriented, market fundamentalist policies including slashing of government budgets, sale of government assets to local elites and foreign corporations (‘privatisation’), deregulation of the economy, and promoting exports and trade at the expense of local needs.
   IMF policies have left shattered economies around the world, consigned untold millions to poverty, and directly and indirectly destroyed social welfare systems, including healthcare and education systems, throughout much of the developing world.
   In the last few years, the IMF has seen a remarkable, quiet revolt against its power, influence and policies. Middle-income countries in Asia and Latin America have paid off their debts to the Fund, and announced they won’t borrow from the Fund any more. That move follows a string of high-profile Fund failures –– interventions in economic crises (caused in no small part by IMF recommendations for countries to deregulate their financial systems) made drastically worse by Fund advice.
   But most African countries don’t have the resources to pay off their debts to the IMF and other international lenders. They remain stuck in the debt trap, meaning they need new money from the IMF to pay off old loans, or at least the IMF stamp of approval to access capital from other sources. Which means they remain subject to IMF dictates.
   Among other barbaric consequences, the IMF’s obsession with conservative financial prescriptions have left the nations worst hit by the HIV/AIDS pandemic unable to mobilize resources –– or even to use donated monies –– to address the pandemic or other excruciating health needs.
   In March, the IMF’s Internal Evaluation Office (IEO) issued a report far more scandalous than anything connected to the Wolfowitz drama at the Bank.
   The IEO found that IMF policy was preventing African countries from spending increased foreign aid on its intended purposes. Instead, the IMF was forcing countries to use increases in foreign aid to pay down debts or build currency reserves. Thanks to the IMF, more than 70 percent in increased foreign aid was being diverted, according to the IEO.
   Alongside this refusal to let countries spend aid for intended purposes, the IMF has capped countries’ ability to spend more money on healthcare, including to hire more healthcare workers and pay them more. These are the key steps needed to address the healthcare infrastructure problem that almost everyone agrees is now the main impediment to further scaling up treating for people with HIV/AIDS and resuscitating countries’ ability to deliver basic health services to all.
   Underlying these restrictions on countries’ ability to spend money to address pressing health needs is an IMF fixation on what it terms macroeconomic stability, by which it means very low inflation rates and no or limited deficit spending. Dressed up in the guise of technocratic economic advice, they are really policy decisions that restrain economic expansion, preventing countries from generating more resources for their own needs.
   They are also policies that take no account of the special circumstances of countries facing the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
   “The IMF doesn’t know what the hell it’s talking about,” says former UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa Stephen Lewis in his trademark direct manner. “It never sufficiently takes into account the damage that is done to a country when you strip the social sectors.”
   In other words, failing to invest in healthcare and education not only is immoral, it actually weakens economies. The costs are particularly high when a deadly but treatable disease is ravaging people in the prime of their working years.
   Urging an abandonment of these failed policies, more than 100 health and development organizations in a letter today called on Strauss-Kahn to change course. (My organization, Essential Action, was an initiator of the letter sent by the groups to Strauss-Kahn.)
   The civil society organizations called on Strauss-Kahn, in his first 100 days after assuming office November 1, to ensure that the IMF:
   * Changes policies on foreign aid spending, so that the IMF does not stand in the way of increased spending on health, HIV/AIDS and education.
   * Abandons low inflation and deficit-reduction targets, so that the IMF does not stand in the way of policymakers in developing countries exploring and adopting more expansive fiscal and monetary policy options.
   * Publicly states that it will cease and desist with its demands for wage bill ceilings that prevent the hiring of more healthcare workers.
   * Provide immediate debt cancellation for all impoverished nations without harmful and unnecessarily restrictive policy conditions attached.
   The odds of Strauss-Kahn adopting this agenda, on this timeframe, are, of course, slim.
   But there is a reasonable chance that a concerted push from civil society –– especially if joined by developing country governments –– can make a difference.
   The decision by middle-income countries to end their dependence on the Fund has left the IMF with a crisis of legitimacy, not to mention its own fiscal crisis (the interest payments on loans from middle-income countries were a key source of revenue).
   Strauss-Kahn, who comes from the left side of the French political spectrum, takes office as a self-proclaimed reformer with a special interest in low-income countries. Most of his talk about reform has focused on giving developing countries a greater say in the governing process, not on the substance of Fund policy, however.
   It is too much to hold out hope that Strauss-Kahn may assist with the transformation of the IMF –– he won’t have the power, even on the off chance that he secretly harbors the desire –– but he might lessen the harm caused by the institution, and give the world’s poorest countries more policy space.
   Whether that happens will depend in no small part on whether the world pays attention and demands change. Can some fraction of the attention devoted to whether Paul Wolfowitz improperly helped deliver a big paycheck to his partner be devoted in the months and years ahead to how IMF policies impact the lives and well-being of hundreds of millions of people?
   Robert Weissman is editor of the Washington, DC-based Multinational Monitor and director of Essential Action.