Evaluation of our independence
from an economic perspective
Despite the unproductive politics, corrupt bureaucracy, and uncontrollable fury of nature, Bangladesh has emerged as an example of economic development for the developing countries by the late 1990s. In most of the textbooks on ‘Development Economics’ written in late 1990s, Bangladesh is cited as an example of astonishing progress in the field of economic and social development,
writes Dr Md Abul Basher
The policy of economic disparity as practised by the central government of Pakistan reinforced our struggle for a sovereign state which was triggered by the cultural hegemony of West Pakistan. The independence in 1971 paved the way for the implementation of sovereign and autonomous economic policies in our country. What have been our economic accomplishments in the past three decades or so since our independence? Are these accomplishments significant enough to justify our vehement opposition to the policy of economic disparity of the central government of Pakistan? This is one of the less discussed topics in our country. This article will try to focus on this important issue.
The analysis of the economic contribution of our independence is by nature a counter factual one. Focus on the current economic and social development of Bangladesh and Pakistan could be one way of analysing the economic benefits of our independence. But one has to remember that the initial conditions of Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971 were significantly different. It will be misleading if one compares the economic development of these two countries since 1971 as they did not start from similar economic foundations. The reason is very simple. Two runners may not be judged simply by observing who is ahead in a race if they don’t start from the same starting point. There are three reasons why Pakistan was way ahead of Bangladesh in economic growth potential in 1971.
The first reason was the economic policy of the central government of Pakistan until 1971 which simply transferred resources from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. About 54% of the total population of Pakistan used to live in East Pakistan. An equal distribution of resources would have meant that roughly 54% of the development expenditure of the country would be made in the East. But the reality was quite the opposite. The share of East Pakistan in total development expenditure of the country was 23% in 1951-51, 17% in 1959-60, and 25% in 1969-70. The central government also controlled the monetary policy and other regulatory mechanisms to divert the private investment in West Pakistan. As result, the share of private investment in East Pakistan was 13% in the beginning of the 1960s, and 25% towards the end of 1960s (Nurul Islam 2003: Making of a Nation). The main source of economic growth is investment. Therefore the gap in the per capita income between West and East Pakistan increased over time since 1947 by mirroring the unequal distribution of development expenditure and private investment in these two parts of the country. The gaps in the per capita income in West and East Pakistan were 8.33% in 1947, 38.46% in 1960 and 85.71% in 1971 (Nurul Islam 2003: Making of a Nation).
Bangladesh and Pakistan were the part of the same country until 1971. Therefore Bangladesh has a legitimate claim on the net assets of the central government of Pakistan. But Pakistan never paid this legitimate amount back to Bangladesh. One calculation suggests that Bangladesh has a claim on Pakistan of the order of US$4000 million (in 1971 price) equivalent (Nurul Islam 2003: Making of a Nation). It simply means that part of the post-1971 economic growth of Pakistan can be attributable to the Bangladeshi capital wrongly held by Pakistan.
The third reason why Pakistan had a better economic foundation than Bangladesh in 1971 was the destruction of human and physical capital during our liberation war. The war was geographically limited within Bangladesh, and therefore West Pakistan did not face any physical damage from it. Both labour and capital, two main factors of production, were destroyed in Bangladesh in 1971. The value of direct destruction of war was about US$953 million, and the value of the indirect destruction was about US$1408 million (Syed Bahser and Saud Choudhury 2001: The enduring significance of Bangladesh’s war of independence: An analysis of economic costs and consequences).
Now let us compare the economic and development performance of Bangladesh and Pakistan since 1971 despite their different initial economic foundations for the above three reasons. During 1971 to 2000, the per capita income in Bangladesh has increased by 4.6 times. At the same time period, the per capita income in Pakistan has increased by 2.8 times. As a result, the gap in the per capita income in these two countries has declined from 85.71% to 25.64% during the same time period. This is one economic benefit of our independence.
Development is a multi-dimensional concept. In terms of non-income parameters of development, Bangladesh has outperformed Pakistan by 2000. The infant mortality rate in Bangladesh in 2000 was 66 per thousands. During the same year, the infant mortality rate in Pakistan was 85 per thousands. Similarly, the overall mortality rates in 2000 were 92 and 109 in Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively. In terms of most of the health and education related indices, Bangladesh has outperformed Pakistan by 2000 (World Bank 2007). High growth rate of population is a major hindrance for economic development. Bangladesh has successfully controlled its growth of population to 2% by 2000, whereas the same growth rate in Pakistan is 2.4%. This high growth rate is one of the highest in the world and comparable only to a few African countries. Finally, according to global economic forum 2005, the ranking of Bangladesh in terms of women’s empowerment is 39, which is better than many of the East European countries. The ranking of Pakistan in the same list of 58 countries was 54.
Bangladesh was born in 1971 as a ‘test case’ for economic development, meaning that if development is possible in this war-ravaged country then development will be possible anywhere else. Despite the unproductive politics, corrupt bureaucracy, and uncontrollable fury of nature, Bangladesh has emerged as an example of economic development for the developing countries by the late 1990s. In most of the text books on ‘Development Economics’ written in late 1990s, Bangladesh is cited as an example of astonishing progress in the field of economic and social development. Our independence made this honour possible.
Dr Md Abul Basher teaches at Willamette University, United States.
Keeping the flame alive
If our destiny is the same as the one from which we broke away, then the vision of the liberation war and the lives sacrificed will be meaningless. This cannot happen. Bangladesh, we must stand up. Because if today you stand up, then a few others will follow. And slowly but surely, thousands, then millions will rise together with one voice – Bangladesh deserves better, writes Ejaj Ahmad
IT HAS been 36 years since the birth of our Bengali nation, Bangladesh. In a cruel twist of fate, our nation, formed through the democratic overthrow of a military regime in 1971, finds itself once again ruled by a regime of the armed forces – in all but the name. As Bangladesh celebrates Victory Day today, the political scene looks awfully familiar – a leader of the country’s principal party is in jail on questionable charges, some intellectuals, including respected professors, are being held by the government, and certain elements are mysteriously being left alone. This all should look very familiar. We have seen this drama before.
There is a common characteristic among all the rulers of nation-states in the Indian subcontinent – a strong contempt and disregard for people’s movements and a rather self-defeating underestimation of what such movements can achieve. This is especially true of the Bengali people. The erstwhile rulers certainly understood the dangers of such contempt towards the people’s will, as evidenced by the partition of Bengal in 1905 and the transfer of the imperial capital away from the region. Indeed, the long list of people’s movements against rulers who undermined the Bengali people’s aspirations, freedoms, and rights has played a powerful role in initiating the leaders’ ultimate doom. That is, temporary wins against the people have only made final defeats for rulers even more crushing. This is the land of Titumir, the land of Surya Sen, the land of Abdus Salam, Abdul Jabbar and Abul Barkat, the land of Shahidullah Kaiser, the land of Noor Hossain.
It is ironic that the powers that be have so often chosen the Bengali people for their autocratic experiments – only to leave black-faced. It is this culture of people’s movements that made Pakistani soldiers run for their lives in 1971. But the military people never learn. They never learn that they are trained to defend the state and not to govern the state. They never learn that outside their barracks live real people, who know too well the ‘tyranny of good intentions.’ They never learn that the power of a true leader is in the fire of his conviction and not in the strength of his ammunition. And they never learn that change can only come through hope and not through fear.
In retrospect, it is rather sad that autocratic regimes in South Asia, be it Indira Gandhi’s emergency in the Indian republic or the military coup circus in Bangladesh, have justified and defended their actions for the greater good of the people. The language they use to package their oppression is also remarkably consistent – corruption and internal security. South Asia’s autocrats tend to be very unimaginative. They are unimaginative in the way they ‘invent’ civilian leadership. This generally includes imprisoning popular leaders on dubious charges ranging from corruption to the ever useful colonial invocation – ‘disruption of public order.’ One learns to expect a constant parade of opportunistic men and women subservient to the regime of the day. Soon however, these followers too are dumped in the dustbin of history. The same old routine is being played in Bangladesh and Pakistan right now.
I find it comic to think that these rulers actually believe that people would mistake these buffoons as the new leaders of the country. Autocrats have not learnt an important lesson – that of graceful exit.
The vision of 1971, of a secular, democratic, and prosperous Bangladesh, has been systematically subverted by various actors in these 36 years. In the present chaos, with factionalism among the parties and many politicians fishing in troubled waters, the confusion of the people is heightened. Many forces are talking about democracy, but we can be sure of only one thing – politicians who receive mercy from superficially imposed regimes have no democratic ethos. It is easy to follow the trial of fabricated charges to understand who the current government truly considers ‘dangerous.’ Yes, there is the problem of corruption. But are we as a people really unable to differentiate trumped up charges from the real ones? Consider the case of Dr MK Alamgir. He is no Hawa Bhaban fixer, but rather a conscientious intellectual in his own right who every Bengali can be proud of. Dr Alamgir’s arrest, along with the arrest of university professors, highlights the underlying narrative of the present government’s blatant disregard for the laws it purports to uphold.
The democratic discourse of Bangladesh is under unprecedented assault. But I see hope. I see hope in the children of today. I see hope in our post-71 generation. I see hope in the eyes of the common people on the streets of Dhaka. I see hope in our rich history as a nation. We have been great, and we can be great once again. You see, Bangladesh was not founded on the wrong principles. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was no general. Neither was he a trained World Bank economist, great at writing wonderful reports sitting in fancy offices. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was a grassroots leader, connected to his people. He understood the pain of the common man. He was a man of principle, upright and honest, and he led us to war, for the right reasons.
My father did not fight in the liberation war so that I would have to live without rights in my own country. My father fought the war and gave me an identity so that I could give voice to those who do not have voice in Bangladesh. This government talks about budget deficit but I get a sense of serious morality deficit. And during periods of crises like this, if good men don’t stand up then the bad men will dictate.
If our destiny is the same as the one from which we broke away, then the vision of the liberation war and the lives sacrificed will be meaningless. This cannot happen. Bangladesh, we must stand up. Because if today you stand up, then a few others will follow. And slowly but surely, thousands, then millions will rise together with one voice – Bangladesh deserves better. And we can rise together once again, as we have for decades, to fight for our nation as a people, against the shackles of political oppression.
Thirty-six years have passed since our independence. We have had our ups and downs in history. And this time we must make sure that the check for justice, as Martin Luther King so famously said many years ago, does not return marked ‘insufficient funds.’
This time, we must be true to the values on which our nation was founded. We must keep the flame alive. Together, we must turn the page.
Ejaj Ahmad is a graduate student at Harvard Kennedy School and can be reached at ejaj_ahmad@ksg.harvard.edu
Bali and beyond
by RK Pachauri
THE Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC has had a major impact in creating public awareness on various aspects of climate change, and the three working group reports as part of this assessment represent a major advance in scientific knowledge. The panel was established in 1988 through a resolution of the UN General Assembly. One of its clauses was significant in having stated, ‘Noting with concern that the emerging evidence indicates that continued growth in atmospheric concentrations of “greenhouse” gases could produce global warming with an eventual rise in sea levels, the effects of which could be disastrous for mankind if timely steps are not taken at all levels.’ This means that almost two decades ago the UN was acutely conscious of the possibility of disaster consequent on climate change through increases in sea levels. Today we know much more, which provides greater substance to that concern.
This award being given to the IPCC, we believe, goes fundamentally beyond a concern for the impacts of climate change on peace. Honouring the IPCC through the grant of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 in essence can be seen as a clarion call for the protection of the earth as it faces the widespread impacts of climate change. The choice of the panel for this signal honour is, in our view, an acknowledgement of three important realities, which can be summed up as:
l The power and promise of collective scientific endeavour, which, as demonstrated by the IPCC, can reach across national boundaries and political differences in the pursuit of objectives defining the larger good of human society.
l The importance of the role of knowledge in shaping public policy and guiding global affairs for the sustainable development of human society.
l An acknowledgement of the threats to stability and human security inherent in the impacts of a changing climate and, therefore, the need for developing an effective rationale for timely and adequate action to avoid such threats in the future.
Indeed, there are many lessons in human history which provide adequate warning about the chaos and destruction that could take place if we remain guilty of myopic indifference to the progressive erosion and decline of nature’s resources. Much has been written, for instance, about the Maya civilisation, which flourished during 250–950AD, but collapsed largely as a result of serious and prolonged drought. Even earlier, some 4,000 years ago a number of well-known Bronze Age cultures also crumbled extending from the Mediterranean to the Indus Valley, including the civilisations, which had blossomed in Mesopotamia. More recent examples of societies that collapsed or faced chaos on account of depletion or degradation of natural resources include the Khmer Empire in South East Asia, Eastern Island, and several others. Changes in climate have historically determined periods of peace as well as conflict. The recent work of David Zhang has, in fact, highlighted the link between temperature fluctuations, reduced agricultural production, and the frequency of warfare in Eastern China over the last millennium.
One of the most significant aspects of the impacts of climate change, which has unfortunately not received adequate attention from scholars in the social sciences, relates to the equity implications of changes that are occurring and are likely to occur in the future. In general, the impacts of climate change on some of the poorest and the most vulnerable communities in the world could prove extremely unsettling.
And, given the inadequacy of capacity, economic strength, and institutional capabilities characterising some of these communities, they would remain extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and may, therefore, actually see a decline in their economic condition, with a loss of livelihoods and opportunities to maintain even subsistence levels of existence. Since the IPCC by its very nature is an organisation that does not provide assessments, which are policy prescriptive, it has not provided any directions on how conflicts inherent in the social implications of the impacts of climate change could be avoided or contained. Nevertheless, the Fourth Assessment Report provides scientific findings that other scholars can study and arrive at some conclusions on in relation to peace and security.
Peace can be defined as security and the secure access to resources that are essential for living. A disruption in such access could prove disruptive of peace. In this regard, climate change will have several implications, as numerous adverse impacts are expected for some populations in terms of access to clean water, access to sufficient food, stable health conditions, ecosystem resources, security of settlements.
Climate change is expected to exacerbate current stresses on water resources. On a regional scale, mountain snowpack, glaciers, and small icecaps play a crucial role in fresh water availability. Widespread mass losses from glaciers and reductions in snow cover over recent decades are projected to accelerate throughout the 21st century, reducing water availability, hydropower potential, and the changing seasonality of flows in regions supplied by meltwater from major mountain ranges (e.g. Hindu-Kush, Himalaya, Andes), where more than one-sixth of the world’s population currently lives. There is also high confidence that many semi-arid areas (e.g. the Mediterranean Basin, western United States, southern Africa, and north-eastern Brazil) will suffer a decrease in water resources due to climate change. In Africa by 2020, between 75 and 250 million people are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change.
Climate change could further adversely affect food security and exacerbate malnutrition at low latitudes, especially in seasonally dry and tropical regions, where crop productivity is projected to decrease for even small local temperature increases (1–2°C). By 2020, in some African countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50 per cent. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely compromised.
The health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for example, increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases, and injury due to extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone in urban areas related to climate change; and the altered spatial distribution of some infectious diseases.
Climate change is likely to lead to some irreversible impacts on biodiversity.
There is medium confidence that approximately 20–30 per cent of species assessed so far are likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average warming exceed 1.5–2.5ºC, relative to 1980–99. As global average temperature exceeds about 3.5ºC, model projections suggest significant extinctions (40–70 per cent of species assessed) around the globe. These changes, if they were to occur would have serious effects on the sustainability of several ecosystems and the services they provide to human society.
As far as security of human settlements is concerned, vulnerabilities to climate change are generally greater in certain high-risk locations, particularly coastal and riverine areas, and areas whose economies are closely linked with climate-sensitive resources. Where extreme weather events become more intense or more frequent with climate change, the economic and social costs of those events will increase.
Some regions are likely to be especially affected by climate change.
l The Arctic, because of the impacts of high rates of projected warming on natural systems and human communities,
l Africa, because of low adaptive capacity and projected climate change impacts,
l Small islands, where there is high exposure of population and infrastructure to projected climate change impacts
l Asian and African megadeltas, due to large populations and high exposure to sea level rise, storm surges, and river flooding.
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report concludes that non-climate stresses can increase vulnerability to climate change by reducing resilience and can also reduce adaptive capacity because of resource deployment towards competing needs. Vulnerable regions face multiple stresses that affect their exposure and sensitivity to various impacts as well as their capacity to adapt. These stresses arise from, for example, current climate hazards, poverty, and unequal access to resources, food insecurity, trends in economic globalization, conflict, and incidence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
Within other areas, even those with high incomes, some people (such as the poor, young children, and the elderly) can be particularly at risk.
Migration and movement of people is a particularly critical source of potential conflict. Migration, usually temporary and often from rural to urban areas, is a common response to calamities such as floods and famines. But as in the case of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, where multiple stresses could be at work on account of a diversity of causes and conditions, so also in the case of migration, individuals may have multiple motivations and they could be displaced by multiple factors.
Another issue of extreme concern is the finding that anthropogenic factors could lead to some impacts that are abrupt or irreversible, depending on the rate and magnitude of climate change. For instance, partial loss of ice sheets on polar land could imply metres of sea level rise, major changes in coastlines, and inundation of low-lying areas, with greatest effects in river deltas and low-lying islands.
Global average warming above about 4.5ºC relative to 1980–99 (about 5ºC above pre-industrial) would imply
l Projected decreases of precipitation by up to 20% in many dry tropical and subtropical areas.
l Expected mass loss of Greenland’s ice if sustained over many centuries (based on all current global climate system models assessed) leading to sea level rise up to 4 metres and flooding of shorelines on every continent.
l The implications of these changes, if they were to occur would be grave and disastrous.
However, it is within the reach of human society to meet these threats. The impacts of climate change can be limited by suitable adaptation measures and stringent mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.
Societies have a long record of adapting to the impacts of weather and climate. But climate change poses novel risks often outside the range of experience, such as impacts related to drought, heat waves, accelerated glacier retreat, and hurricane intensity. These impacts will require adaptive responses such as investments in storm protection and water supply infrastructure, as well as community health services. Adaptation measures essential to reduce such vulnerability, are seldom undertaken in response to climate change alone but can be integrated within, for example, water resource management, coastal defence, and risk-reduction strategies. Adaptation is essential to address the impacts resulting from the warming which is already unavoidable due to past emissions. But, adaptation alone is not expected to cope with all the projected effects of climate change, and especially not in the long run as most impacts increase in magnitude.
There is substantial potential for the mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions over the coming decades that could offset the projected growth of global emissions or reduce emissions below current levels. There are multiple drivers for actions that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and they can produce multiple benefits at the local level in terms of economic development and poverty alleviation, employment, energy security, and local environmental protection.
The Fourth Assessment Report has assessed the costs of mitigation in the coming decades for a number of scenarios of stabilisation of the concentration of these gases and associated average global temperature increases at equilibrium. A stabilisation level of 445–590ppm of CO2 equivalent, which corresponds to a global average temperature increase above pre-industrial at equilibrium (using best estimate climate sensitivity) of around 2.0–2.4ºC would lead to a reduction in average annual GDP growth rate of less than 0.12 per cent up to 2030 and beyond up to 2050. Essentially, the range of global GDP reduction with the least-cost trajectory assessed for this level of stabilisation would be less than 3 per cent in 2030 and less than 5.5 per cent in 2050. Some important characteristics of this stabilisation scenario need careful consideration:
For a CO2-equivalent concentration at stabilisation of 445–490ppm, CO2 emissions would need to peak during the period 2000–15 and decline thereafter. We, therefore, have a short window of time to bring about a reduction in global emissions if we wish to limit temperature increase to around 2ºC at equilibrium.
Even with this ambitious level of stabilisation the global average sea level rise above pre-industrial at equilibrium from thermal expansion only would lie between 0.4–1.4 metres. This would have serious implications for several regions and locations in the world.
A rational approach to management of risk would require that human society evaluates the impacts of climate change inherent in a business-as-usual scenario and the quantifiable costs as well as unquantifiable damages associated with it, against the cost of action. With such an approach the overwhelming result would be in favour of major efforts at mitigation. The impacts of climate change even with current levels of concentration of greenhouse gases would be serious enough to justify stringent mitigation efforts.
If the concentration of all greenhouse gases and aerosols had been kept constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming of about 0.1ºC per decade would be expected. Subsequent temperature projections depend on specific emission scenarios. Those systems and communities, which are vulnerable, may suffer considerably with even small changes in the climate at the margin.
Science tells us not only that the climate system is changing, but also that further warming and sea level rise is in store even if greenhouse gases were to be stabilised today. That is a consequence of the basic physics of the system. Social factors also contribute to our future, including the ‘lock-in’ due, for example, to today’s power plants, transportation systems, and buildings, and their likely continuing emissions even as cleaner future infrastructure comes on line. So the challenge before us is not only a large one, it is also one in which every year of delay implies a commitment to greater climate change in the future.
It would be relevant to recall the words of President Gayoom of the Maldives at the Forty Second Session of the UN General Assembly on the October 19, 1987: ‘As for my own country, the Maldives, a mean sea level rise of 2 metres would suffice to virtually submerge the entire country of 1,190 small islands, most of which barely rise 2 metres above mean sea level. That would be the death of a nation. With a mere 1 metre rise also, a storm surge would be catastrophic, and possibly fatal to the nation.’
On September 22, 1997, at the opening of the thirteenth session of the IPCC at Male, the capital of the Maldives, President Gayoom reminded us of the threat to his country when he said, ‘Ten years ago, in April 1987, this very spot where we are gathered now, was under two feet of water, as unusually high waves inundated one third of Male, as well as the Male International Airport and several other islands of our archipelago.’ Hazards from the impacts of climate change are, therefore, a reality today in some parts of the world, and we cannot hide under global averages and the ability of affluent societies to deal with climate-related threats as opposed to the condition of vulnerable communities in poor regions of the globe.
The work of the IPCC has helped the world to learn more on all aspects of climate change, and the Nobel Peace Prize Committee has acknowledged this fact. The question is whether the participants in Bali will support what Willy Brandt referred to as ‘reasonable politics.’ Will those responsible for decisions in the field of climate change at the global level listen to the voice of science and knowledge, which is now loud and clear? If they do so at Bali and beyond then all my colleagues in the IPCC and those thousands toiling for the cause of science would feel doubly honoured at the privilege I am receiving today on their behalf.
Abridged text of the Nobel Lecture by RK Pachauri, chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in Oslo on December 10.
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