Election engineering is a favourite term for politicians in Bangladesh. It means rigging election for victory. How is it done? For a long time, the favourite means have been cited to be many and varied. These include use of black money, impersonation in the form of casting votes by hired people, intimidating genuine voters not to go to the polling centres to cast votes, snatching away of ballot boxes by mastans and stuffing with filled-up ballot paper etc. Since the nineties came choosing favourites to fill up top positions in the election commission (EC), inflating the voters’ list by fake names and shuffle and reshuffle of key officials engaged in election duty.
   Prior to 1971, the results of referendum in the form of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ votes of confidence in the leadership of Ayub Khan was questioned by many. Many people in the then East Pakistan thought it was manipulated or engineered in his favour. Afterwards came the presidential election of 1964 in which Ayub khan got elected defeating his rival Miss Jinnah of combined opposition parties. Some scholars of politics interpret the results as less than credible. Under the Basic Democracies (BD) system, the entire nation was disenfranchised except for the 80,000 BD members who constituted the Electoral College. It was thought BDs were influenced by pumping in more money for local-level planning and development. Thus state resources were used to buy voters for the president in power.
   The trend set by Ayub Khan reappeared in Bangladesh after 1975. First, there was a referendum and then presidential election followed by elections to the parliament. The only welcome departure from the past tradition was absence of a limited electoral college. However, currying favour of local bodies like Union Parishad continued to be topped up in 1980 by the creation of Gram Sarker. The next military president also tried to introduce what he called Palli Parishad on the lines of Gram Sarker. It is interesting to note that when the upazila system was put in place, the report of the Committee on Administrative Reorganization and Reforms (CARR) of 1982 did not recommend the creation of Gram Sarker. Gram Sarker has now been re-established by the four-party alliance government. It has become highly controversial. A leading Bengali daily on October 17, 2006 in an editorial emphatically stated that release of taka sixty nine crores by the government is a move to strengthen election engineering process by the four-party alliance.
   
   Use of black money
   The use of black money has long been listed as one of the major tools for election engineering. Much of the debate centred on election expenditure in excess of the ceiling imposed by law. This debate is still on but results are less than encouraging. Apart from the ceiling, the relevant law provides two mechanisms to deal with the issue. First, the provision scrutiny of expenditure by the EC and allowing interested parties to have access to information on statement of expenditure by a candidate contesting elections. This has not proved to be effective primarily for two reasons. One of these relates to the inability or unwillingness on the part of EC to conduct professional scrutiny on expenditure. The other reason lies in the fact that, as alleged by some civil society organisations, attempts to obtain copies of election expenditure have not yielded results. These issues need to be looked at and acceptable solutions found. The second check provided by law is to debar the loan defaulters from contesting elections. Much of this restriction is bypassed by loan shirkers contesting elections through the mechanism of what is called rescheduling of loans by the banks. This issue also needs more attention from the relevant authorities than is being given now.
   Black money is not spent on publicity and propaganda alone. It is also spent apart for payment to party workers on hiring mastans or criminals to rig elections. The paid mastans are said to (a) intimidate voters either to cast votes in favour of the candidates making the payment or to ask the voters to remain indoors on the day of polls. In the latter method, hired people supplant genuine voters. It is believed that this latter method is employed particularly for minority voters who, for reasons of reprisal in the post-election stage, choose not to go to the polling stations to exercise their right to vote.
   Criminalisation of the polling process is thus linked to the criminalisation of politics. That is why the media and through it the civil society have recently been vocal about making it mandatory for the contesting candidates to declare their criminal antecedents at the time of filing nomination papers as part of the electoral reforms. EC is sitting idle on the issue. The existing law does provide for disqualification criterion if a candidate is convicted for at least two years of certain offences prescribed in the electoral law. What about other laws, specially the penal code? Besides, the intention of the reform proposal is to allow the voters to make informed decisions on the criminal antecedents. Some cases of grievous nature may be pending against a candidate seeking election.
   
   Capturing polling centres
   Instances of capturing of polling centres by hired mastans and stuffing blank ballot boxes with fake votes is also related to the use of black money. The incidence of such cases is not believed to be very high but is nevertheless there. There is need to obtain more information on this issue. The check in this regard is there in the law. The responsibility lies with the polling agents of the respective candidate and then with presiding officers. The law does provide for conviction if such cases are proved. Few cases of conviction had in the past been reported by the media.
   Indeed, the existing electoral law has penal provisions relating to attempts for election rigging. The provisions appear to cover all possible types of offences. The remedy lies in strict vigilance and enforcement of the relevant provisions of law. How it will be done is a matter of details that needs attention.
   Abuse of authority by public servants on election duty
   Rigging of elections through handpicked public servants is a much discussed issue. Politicisation of civil servants is a fact of life, which cannot be denied. In this regard, the law does provide for penalties up to five years with a minimum of one year in jail if the case is proved. In addition, fine may also be imposed. The offence is defined as misuse, by a person in the service of the Republic of his official position in a manner calculated to influence the result of the election. Needless to say that till now there is nothing on record to suggest that any public servant has been found guilty of such an offence even though media reports do sometimes point specific cases, although the number is not large.
   At the other end, the EC is authorised under the law to withdraw any officer engaged in election duty, or any other law enforcing personnel who obstructs or prevents or attempts to obstruct or prevent conduct of fair and impartial poll or attempts to influence the same. Further, EC has the power to refer the matter to appropriate authority for taking disciplinary and other action in relation to such officer or person.
   
   No statistical data
   It is not possible to say in how many cases has EC intervened or exercised the authority in this regard. This is because statistical data in this regard are not available to the citizens at large. This clearly is a case of lack of transparency. It is felt that in all cases of (a) registering a criminal case against any public servant for influencing or attempts to influence the results of election and (b) disciplinary cases referred to appropriate authority, EC should issue press releases so that the citizens are able to know the legally admissible interventions have been made by it. Otherwise the gap between the fact and fiction of law will continue to widen and public confidence in EC diminished.
   
   The debate on a stronger EC
   There has been a continuing debate on a stronger EC. The EC, on its part, is also clamouring for more powers. In the recent past, a former CEC argued in favour of restoring to the EC the authority to cancel elections. If the EC shows minimum efficiency in strict vigilance and have the ability and willingness to enforce the existing provisions of the law without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, further powers appear unnecessary.
   It is felt that the debate on the need for a stronger EC to be meaningful should take into account the existing provisions of electoral law and make an assessment of the extent to which EC is able to exercise the same. What is happening now is endless debate in general terms. True, some of the civil society organisations like Shujan and CPD have made a check-list of reform measures that relate to electoral laws. Most of these are within the jurisdictional competence of EC to initiate action which it has not done. Rather than leaving this initiative to the political masters, it would be more in consonance with the concept of a stronger EC if the EC itself, in addition to exercising the available powers, sets the ball of further reforms rolling or else the dependence on party or parties in power will negate the very concept that the citizens wish to see it in action.