Socrates, Epictetus and the
concept of harm
After analyzing Epictetus’ and Socrates’ principles, I have come to the conclusion that their view that other people cannot harm a person is rather extreme. Although both Epictetus and Socrates provide good reasoning to show that a person cannot be harmed by other people, it is hard for an average person to grasp this concept. As a result, Epectetus may categorize ordinary people as ‘uneducated’, writes Salman Tanveerul Haque
In Plato’s Apology, Socrates makes an intriguing claim that death cannot harm him. Epictetus, a Greek Stoic philosopher born almost 450 years after Socrates’ death, endorses this view by quoting Socrates’ saying that “Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they can’t harm me.” in The Encheiridion (Epictetus 29; 53).In order to understand why Epictetus would agree with Socrates on this point, we need to examine how each of these two philosophers would define harm.
According to Epictetus, one will be harmed just at that time when he takes himself/herself to be harmed. This implies that Epictetus thinks that a person is harmed by his/her own judgment and not by an external object, i.e., harm is self-inflicted. On the other hand, Socrates believes that the majority cannot harm a person. He thinks that the majority is incapable of inflicting either the greatest good or the greatest evil. Thus, Socrates implies that harm is not inflicted by other people and that it is self-inflicted.
Although both Socrates and Epictetus have the same view that harm is self-inflicted, they differ on what harms us and where it is directed. Socrates thinks that it is unjust actions that harm us. He thinks that if we do not follow the good opinions of wise men, “we shall harm and corrupt that part of ourselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions.” By “that part of ourselves”, he is probably referring to our soul or mind. Thus, he thinks that harm is directed towards a person’s soul or mind. On the other hand, Epictetus clearly states that a person is harmed only when he takes himself/herself to be harmed (Epictetus 20; 30) i.e. judgments harm us. However, Epictetus is not as explicit as to where the harm is directed. He states that “Illness interferes with the body, not with one’s faculty of choice, unless the faculty of choice wishes it to.” In another instance, he talks about bringing our own faculty of choice into accord with nature (Epictetus 21; 30). A faculty of choice designates a rational faculty of the soul. Perhaps Epictetus implies that harm is directed towards this “faculty of choice”.
Now that we have examined how Epictetus and Socrates define harm, we can clearly understand why Epictetus would agree with Socrates on the point that death cannot harm Socrates. In Apology, Socrates claims that the majority cannot inflict either the greatest evil or the greatest good. To him, the greatest evil is to make a person foolish (Plato 47; 44d). Since Socrates implies that he is wiser than Meletus and Anytus, he thinks Meletus and Anytus are incapable of making him foolish, even if they decide to kill him. Thus, they cannot harm him. Instead, they will be harming that part of themselves that is improved by just actions and destroyed by unjust actions (i.e. their souls or minds) by unjustly executing an innocent man. Socrates further argues that death cannot be bad after all since it can either result in a dreamless sleep or relocation to Hades (Plato 43; 40d). He claims that he would count both as blessings since the former would give him an eternity of peace and the latter would give him the opportunity to examine famous and wise people, which is his passion.
According to Epictetus, it is not death that is harmful, but instead “the judgment about death that it is dreadful – that is what is dreadful.” Epictetus might have agreed with Socrates on the point that death could not have harmed Socrates, although from a different perspective. He might have argued that Socrates had reached a level of consciousness where he did not judge death to be something dreadful and therefore, could not have been harmed by it. He might have also agreed with the point that instead Anytus and Meletus would have caused a greater harm to themselves based on the assumption that perhaps both Epictetus and Socrates might have agreed that unjust action results in harmful judgment, e.g., a person seeks revenge from the judgment that someone harmed him/her. Epictetus might have argued that it was the harmful judgment that Socrates was harming the society and, in turn, Anytus and Meletus that would have harmed them whereas Socrates might have argued that it was the unjust action of executing Socrates that would have harmed their souls or minds.
The above discussion about Socrates’ concept of harm has given us an insight into the principles which Socrates believes in. In Apology, Socrates recalls how these principles were put to test when he had to decide whether or not he would participate in the execution of Leon of Salamis (Plato 37; 32c). Eventually Socrates disobeyed the order to fetch Leon and later did nothing to prevent Leon’s execution. Although it may seem, at first glimpse, that Socrates contradicts his principles by not following the authority, a careful examination reveals that it is not quite so. A brief illustration using Socrates’ principles as to why he disobeyed the order to fetch Leon follows.
Premises
It is wicked and shameful to disobey one’s superior, be he god or man (Plato 33; 29b). In other words, it is wrong to disobey one’s superior.
One must never do wrong (Plato 52; 49b).
Conclusion (a): It follows that one must never disobey one’s superior, be he god or man.
Premises
The Oligarchy of Thirty orders Socrates to fetch Leon for execution (Plato 37; 32c).
Socrates does not regard the oligarchy of Thirty as his superior. This can be inferred from Socrates’ statement that they did not frighten him. (Plato 37; 32d).
Conclusion (b): It follows from the above premises and conclusion (a) that it was not necessary for Socrates to follow the Thirty’s order to fetch Leon.
Additional Premise
It is unjust for Socrates to fetch Leon.
Final Conclusion: Adding the last premise to the argument means that it was just for Socrates to not fetch Leon. Thus, Socrates chose not to fetch Leon.
As for why Socrates did nothing to prevent Leon’s execution, the brief illustration below will show Socrates’ reasoning.
Premises
Death is something Socrates did not care about (Plato 37; 32d) since death cannot harm a person (Plato 35; 30d).
After Leon was brought in, he was to be executed.
Conclusion: It follows that Socrates did not have to care about Leon’s execution. This is because Socrates did not believe that Leon would be harmed by death.
Following is another argument as to why Socrates did nothing to prevent Leon’s execution.
Premises
One must never do wrong (Plato 52; 49b).
Returning wrong for wrong is wrong (Plato 52; 49b).
Conclusion: One must never return wrong for wrong,
Additional Premises
Socrates’ whole concern is to not do anything unjust or impious (Plato 37; 32d).
By helping Leon escape his unjust execution, Socrates would be returning wrong for wrong by disobeying his country’s laws.
Conclusion: It follows that Socrates must not help Leon escape his execution.
From both the above arguments it follows that there was no need for Socrates to help prevent Leon’s execution. Since Socrates has a very strong belief that death cannot harm a person, as shown by his repeated use of the principle in real life situations, it may have played a greater role in determining whether or not he should help prevent Leon’s execution. Since he did not have to prevent Leon’s execution, there was nothing much he could have done. Thus, he decided to go home (Plato 37; 32d). Although this may have seemed like a bizarre course of action at first glimpse, close examination has shown that Socrates had ample reasons to do so.
Epictetus would have probably agreed with what Socrates did although his reasoning may have been different. Epictetus would have probably argued in the following manner:
Premises
One must not be concerned about externals i.e. things that are not up to him/her. (Epictetus 11; 1).
Leon’s execution is not up to Socrates.
Conclusion: It follows that Socrates must not be concerned about Leon’s execution.
Throughout The Encheiridion Epictetus asserts his view that one must not be concerned with externals in order to live well. Epictetus, being a Stoic, would have agreed with Socrates’ eventual ignorance of Leon’s execution, although it may have been for a different reason.
After analyzing Epictetus’ and Socrates’ principles, I have come to the conclusion that their view that other people cannot harm a person is rather extreme. Although both Epictetus and Socrates provide good reasoning to show that a person cannot be harmed by other people, it is hard for an average person to grasp this concept. As a result, Epectetus may categorize ordinary people as “uneducated”. However, average people being the majority, I beg to differ. While their reasoning may seem logical, it is not practical to assume that other people cannot harm us. It is hard to grasp the concept of someone being murdered for no just reason as not being harmed. Indeed, I find this aspect of their view very compelling.
LETTER FROM DELHI
United States in the future
All Americans are not neoconservatives or born-again Christians or Christian right evangelists, but they seem, all of them, to be consumed by hubris and the belief that America is not merely the greatest thing to have happened in the history of human civilisation but has a God-given right to greatness,
writes S Nihal Singh
One of the prevailing myths of the transatlantic relationship is that the two sides share the same values and hence cannot but remain friends and allies. As President George W. Bush’s European tour proved, the prevailing values of America and Europe are vastly different. What keeps them together up to a point is Nato, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and, above all, the web of trade and economic relations, unadvertised as they are as the great cementing factor.
For George Bush, it was a kiss and make-up trip, after the crisis engineered by the American decision to invade Iraq, and Europeans were keen enough not to appear churlish. But it was plain for all to see that the American side gave nothing away nor did the Europeans cry uncle. In fact, a significant outcome was German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s surprise intervention suggesting that Nato was no longer serving as a forum for decision-making on major transatlantic issues. This was little short of a body blow to an organisation that has been America’s main instrument of exerting influence in Europe.
True, even the European sceptics offered to train Iraqi security forces, for the most part outside Iraq, and made modest financial contributions while reluctantly accepting Nato’s imprimatur (France will send one officer to Iraq). But the tone of the Europeans who count France and Germany was a studied friendliness, which accentuated the underlying tensions. For his part, President Bush paid lip service to a strong united Europe, instead of diving the continent into new and old, as his defence secretary so famously did.
No one mentioned the great schism that was staring President Bush and his European interlocutors in the face. As America has evolved in the last four years of the Bush presidency, with four more years to go, it could as well be living on another planet. There have been revisionist powers and empires in history and America’s status has been described as the Second Roman Empire in shorthand, but never has any nation claimed the divine right to rule the world ostensibly to spread democracy and liberty.
President Bush’s argument is that since terrorists hurt his country on September 11, 2001, America will not only conduct a war on terrorism but also take upon itself the burden of spreading democracy in West Asia, the breeding ground of terrorism, to keep the mother country safe. And as demonstrated in Afghanistan and, more controversially, in Iraq, one method of waging the new war will be through invasions and preventive strikes. Such strikes will not be restricted to fighting terrorism but also extend to preventing any other country or set of countries that dares to challenge the supremacy of American power now or in the future.
Europe, on the other hand, spent the second half of the last century moving away from fighting wars and running empires. It has been engaged in the breathtaking experiment of surrendering sovereignty of each nation state for running a unique organisation that subsumes conflicts through the co-option of Germany into a web of cooperative relationships. Even more remarkably, the reunification of Germany has been achieved without an upheaval. There have doubtless been divisions in European ranks on the nature and depth of the European enterprise, with Britain in particular given to schizophrenia, but the marvel is in how far the present European
Union has travelled.
As long as the Cold War lasted and Europe and the world were subjected to the logic of MAD (mutual assured destruction), Europe was glad to remain under the copious American protective umbrella while cementing its own economic links. But once the Soviet Union disappeared and the Berlin Wall fell, Europe breathed free and sought to graduate from American tutelage.
German reunification would have not been possible without US help and support, and a fatal mistake Europe made under American prodding was to agree to the re-division of the continent by expanding Nato, to the detriment of Moscow’s interests. For then President Bill Clinton, it was a logical move because Nato was the main instrument of exerting influence in Europe; for Europe, it jeopardised the prospect of including Russia in the future scheme of what Mikhail Gorbachev once described as the common European home.
The concept of the egalitarian welfare state Western Europe evolved after the reconstruction years following the ruins of World War II was, indeed, a high water mark in governance throughout the world. It achieved what the communist countries tried and failed to achieve. And after the end of the
Cold War, the European Union basked in an era of peace among once bitter rivals although the continent was still battling the legacy of the past, as became clear in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, with the Europeans going to America for help, cap in hand. Their handicap in coping with the Balkan crisis later became an incentive for organising European forces outside Nato.
The Nine Eleven tragedy stirred Europe because it was taken to represent a common danger to the West and civilisation itself. Little did Europe then realise how far America had travelled in its vision of dominating the world, arraigning to itself a God-given right to bend the planet to its desires and interests. It was not simply the Cold War mantra of countries being for America or against America; now it was a test of loyalty and the only way to seek redemption. Initially, Europe swallowed and swallowed hard. But ultimately it could no longer suffer the supreme arrogance of a power claiming a divine charter by unilaterally launching a war against Iraq.
It is the all-consuming web of trade and economic relations that saves the transatlantic alliance. There are any number of “new” Europeans of American description keen to please the Bush administration, either out of their historic fears of Russia or for other opportunistic reasons. But the frozen smiles that greeted President Bush in Europe the only country displaying warmth was “new” Slovakia told their own tale. Yes, Europe was glad he came, he saw, but did not conquer. Whether there will arrive a meeting point between Europe and the United States in the future will depend upon the longevity of George W. Bush’s legacy. All Americans are not neoconservatives or born-again Christians or Christian right evangelists, but they seem, all of them, to be consumed by hubris and the belief that America is not merely the greatest thing to have happened in the history of human civilisation but has a God-given right to greatness.
Cedar revolution
Can the French and the Anglo-Saxons walk the road to Damascus together? writes Timothy Garton Ash
Has Osama bin Laden started a democratic revolution in the Middle East? One of very few universally valid laws of history is the law of unintended consequences. The effects of what men and women do are rarely those they intend, and sometimes they are the exact opposite. If that happens here, it would be hard to imagine a nicer illustration of the law.
Suppose al-Qaida had not destroyed the twin towers in New York. Would the Middle East be in such ferment? Would there be demonstrators for Lebanese independence on what people have already called “liberation square” in Beirut? Would there now be a serious beginning for a Palestinian state, elections (however flawed) in Iraq and even tiny palm shoots of democratic reform in Egypt and Saudi Arabia? And would the democratisation of the wider Middle East be a central preoccupation of American and European policy?
We can never know with certainty “what would have happened if ...” But we do know what George Bush’s foreign policy looked like before September 11 2001: build up US military strength but avoid Clintonian foreign entanglements; concentrate on great power relationships, especially the rivalry with China. There was precious little talk of spreading democracy back then. Democracy-promotion was Clintonspeak, except among a few neocons who did not yet have the president’s ear. And we do know what the Middle East looked like before 9/11: fetid Arab dictatorships, tolerated or even supported by the west because of oil, laziness and fear; political stalemate and constant bloodshed between Israel and the Palestinians.
To say this does not mean that George Bush has been right all along. It doesn’t mean the Iraq war was right. There’s a crowing triumphalist narrative out of Washington which is to be resisted - not because it comes from Washington, but because it’s wrong and counter-productive. Here, for example, is what the undersecretary of state for global affairs, Paula Dobriansky, said on Monday: “As the president noted in Bratislava just last week, there was a rose revolution in Georgia, an orange revolution in Ukraine, and most recently, a purple revolution in Iraq. In Lebanon, we see growing momentum for a ‘cedar revolution’ that is unifying the citizens of that nation to the cause of true democracy and freedom from foreign influence.”
Spot the odd one out. “Purple revolution” in Iraq? Purple, as in the colour of blood? There’s a vital difference between a democratic revolution which is peaceful, authentic and generated by people inside a country and one that is imposed, or kick-started, by a military invasion and occupation. To be sure, the former can and should be encouraged from outside. This help may even extend to the branding of the revolution. Vaclav Havel always insisted that the term “velvet revolution” came originally from a foreign journalist in Prague in 1989. I suspect the same may be true of the orange revolution in Ukraine, although these things are almost impossible to establish afterwards. But there’s a problem if the brand name for Lebanese people power - cedar revolution - seems to come from a senior American official, who in the next breath talks about “freedom from foreign influence”.
What is happening on the streets of Beirut is not a result of the invasion of Iraq, nor does it retrospectively justify that invasion. But it does, obviously, have something to do with American policy. The truth is that, starting with the shock of September 11 2001, Washington has groped its way, by a process of trial and error, to a strategic position which it is entirely possible for democrats in both Europe and the Arab world to engage with. A key part of that groping was the realisation in Iraq that, while the United States could win any war on its own, it could not win the subsequent peace; and that democracy would not come overnight, out of the barrel of a gun. If we Europeans do not stand for the long haul to democracy, by peaceful means, what do we stand for?
Now a remarkable thing is happening on the road to Damascus: America and France are walking down it arm in arm. At Tony Blair’s London conference about Palestine on Tuesday, the French and American foreign ministers appeared together to demand “the immediate withdrawal of all Syrian military and intelligence forces from Lebanon”. Meanwhile, the demonstrators in Beirut held up banners saying “Independance”. In case you’re wondering, that’s not bad English but the spelling in another language of liberty. In Lebanon, freedom speaks French.
And the France of Jacques Chirac - that friend of dictators from Baghdad to Beijing - has responded by itself, putting in a word for freedom. At least, the president has allowed his foreign minister to do so. One Lebanese opposition leader, Camille Chamoun of the National Liberation party, commented: “The free world is really helping Lebanon restore its sovereignty”. The free world! When was the last time you heard that phrase, not from Washington but from someone on the ground in the Arab world?
Of ourse we should not fool ourselves that the next steps will be easy. The demonstrators waving those cedar of Lebanon flags were mainly Maronite Christians, Druze and some Sunni Muslims. Members of the country’s largest community, the Shia Muslims, have so far largely stayed away from the anti-Syrian rallies. For them, there is also the problem of Hizbullah, both a political party and a militia, branded by Washington as a terrorist organisation. Politicians such as Camille Chamoun and Walid Jumblatt have their own chequered pasts. They are hardly Havels. Anyway, there is no guarantee at all that the Syrians will swiftly or peacefully withdraw. And this is just one small corner of the Middle Eastern jigsaw.
But whatever happens in Lebanon and Syria, the fact that France and America have lined up together in the cause of freedom is a hopeful sign. Next time, we should be looking for a joint European-American statement rather than just a French-American or British-American one. Triangulate the lessons of Baghdad, Bush in Brussels last week, and the events in Beirut: what you get is an imperative for Europe to come up with its own proposals for enlarging liberty in the Middle East. It’s not enough to say Iraq was the wrong way; we must go on to suggest the right one. (Excerpts)
— The Guardian
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