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Policy reforms and policy influencing thus is not just about policy as an undifferentiated process. Understanding the three critical ‘moments’ of the process and shaping agendas accordingly will determine the prospects of policy success. It is of course possible to ‘jump’ the political moment in some instances as happened in the case of freeing of the print media through executive action by the caretaker government of 1991. While such opportunities need to be exploited, in general agenda-building has greater chances to be effective if the realities of the policy ‘moments’ are adequately factored in.
   
   II Why Corruption and Mis-governance?
An Unorthodox Reading of Causalities
   II.1 Breakdown and decay in oversight functions
   The administrative structure in Bangladesh, notwithstanding its colonial roots built on a mistrust of the people by the state, had a certain strength in internalizing functions of inspection and oversights within routine administration. The police superior was required to inspect thanas, the deputy commissioner had to go on inspection tours, the education officer had to inspect schools. One of the more unfortunate trends in recent times has been the neglect and decay in these oversight functions which played an important role in containing corruption and mis-governance at the base of the system. The reasons for this decay has been manifold: lack of time due to involvement in a variety of other duties (most frequently protocol and project duties) beyond core responsibility, having to bear the burden of ‘VIP visitor entertainment’, lack of logistical support to undertake inspection tours, loosening of supervisory pressure from above etc. The net outcome is that a powerful source of routine oversight pressure has fallen into disuse leading to poorer standards of governance and corrupt practices.
   
   II.2 Weak system development on the
politician-administrator interface
   The onset of parliamentary democracy in 1991 in Bangladesh has introduced a new challenge of system development with regard to the politician-administrator interface. In a way, the novelty of this challenge is not sufficiently appreciated by many who are engaged on the goal of good governance. The administrative class has far deeper roots in the exercise of state-power than the political class a majority of whom assume offices with little or no training in statecraft or policy-making. A healthy transition on the politician-administrator interface has been anything but assured. Politicians have often over-reached (eg. members of parliament seeking to command all institutions within their jurisdiction) to overcome a sense of insecurity while administrators resist system change which could lead to a more productive distribution of administrative power. Such tensions have been compounded by authoritarian tendencies which have deep roots in the exercise of state-power and which are too readily adopted by democratic power-holders. Inevitably, attempts to address the politician-administrator interface has been pursued through the language of power rather than the language of responsible checks and balances. Consequently, sustained policy engagement on the goal of good governance has been a frequent casualty.
   
   II.3 Quality of Political Competition
   Another key constraint on the goal of good governance has been the quality of political competition which has underpinned the democratic period since 1991. Burgeoning election expenditures has narrowed the field of political competition to a moneyed class and fuelled a propensity for corrupt practices to ensure ‘recovery’ of expenditures incurred. Politicians have also had to respond to electorate’s expectation of ‘development results’ in their individual constituencies and this has often been pursued with a certain disregard for governance standards. Another factor at work for poor governance standards derives from the fact that while parties have become an essential aspect of the political reality, they have not generated any noteworthy grooming process through which leaders and candidates become equipped for office. Poor preparation for office has exacerbated governance standards and generated little attraction to reform concerns.
   
   II.4 Capacity Deficit
   As the expectations of the state has grown vis-à-vis the pursuit of a more complex development strategy to realize rapid poverty reduction and to engage with the new challenges of globalization, the need for higher professional standards within the bureaucracy has correspondingly grown. The situation here, however, is marked by serious capacity deficits. HRD policies and institutions seem woefully inadequate. The opportunities for professionalization of the bureaucracy through the two-way traffic of secondments and outsourcing to social and private sector are generally overlooked if not actively resisted. It is also the case that HRD policies and institutions within the private sector and within civil society too remain equally inadequate. The capacity deficit leading to poor governance is compounded by a poor incentive and sanction regime. Good practices, where they exist (and there indeed are many instances of these), tend to remain invisible as a knowledge pool which could be utilized for wider emulation.
   
   II.5 Project Cycle
   Development has come to mean projects and unpacking the project cycle reveal a great deal of where and how opportunities for routine corruption arise. Field experience reveal that there is one particular segment of the project cycle which contributes more than any other to institutionalized corruption. This is the phase of ‘cost estimation’ wherein a much inflated ‘estimate’ lays the groundwork for a corrupt distribution of resources among key project stakeholders. Specifically targeting this segment of the project cycle and institutionalizing a significantly higher level of scrutiny and oversight for this segment can go a long way to deal a decisive blow to institutionalized corruption in the development field.
   
   II.6 Unreformed Strategic Sectors
   The problem of corruption and mis-governance also has its roots in the fact that certain strategic sectors remain largely unreformed. Three such sectors are most noteworthy, namely, police, judiciary, and transport. There are corruption issues involved in various service sectors too but it is the above three which contribute most to transforming corruption and poor governance into systemic issues. Both police and judiciary have been untouched by serious reforms. Progress here has been scanty partly because compelling reform plans as well as serious reform constituencies have been scanty. The other strategic sector which merits attention here is transport and communication. By its very nature, the sector draws in a wide range of stakeholders including transport-owners, transport workers, travelers, traders, market-places and police. The sector has seen an exponential growth in post-independence Bangladesh but this has been accompanied by an atmosphere of lawlessness without the benefit of a coherent regulatory framework and its effective enforcement. The net consequence of these unreformed strategic sectors is a systemic sense of poor governance.
   
   II.7 Value Deficit
   However significant they maybe, institutional explanations alone do not explain why corruption has emerged as a core governance problem. An erosion in the value-system which glorifies material success at any cost and in the sense of guilt around corruption have served to create a social milieu in which corruption has come to be easily tolerated. The problem is not limited to governments alone but apply equally to professional groups as well as the private sector.
   
   III Towards a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Strategy through Improved Governance: A Search for Entry Points
   The starting point for a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy through improved governance has to be a recognition of the tensions which describe as it were the initial conditions for transitional societies such as Bangladesh. Three such tensions merit re-statement: the uneasy interface of politicians and administrators, a ‘winner-takes-all’ orientation to political competition, and lastly, the pressure from the population on policy-makers for delivering ‘development results’. It is from within such difficult initial conditions that the search for entry points has to be pursued.
   Consultations with practitioners and policy-makers have identified five major intervention issues towards building a comprehensive approach to the problems of corruption and poor governance. These are: Administrative competence
   Quality of political process Promoting champions/drivers Public ethics Information flows and performance/outcome indices.
   The operational challenge here is to identify entry points which carry the greatest strategic promise and which satisfies the requirement of political feasibility. Five broad groupings are suggested.
   
   III.1 Quality Institutions
   The political capacity to undertake and expedite systemic changes are often limited in transitional societies. An important second-best choice here is to ring-fence certain strategic aspects of the governance process to facilitate creation of critical pools of higher institutional quality. Crucial institutions to focus on here are those which deal with intake/recruitment and with HRD. Two core intake institutions to target for strategic ring-fencing here are the Election Commission (for political intake) and Public Service Commission (for administrative recruitment). The basic rationale here is that ensuring higher levels of institutional quality in intake/recruitment institutions and phases will serve to enhance the floor standards on the quality of the administrative and political class. The focus on HRD too is critical though the choice of institutions for strategic attention here is less obvious.
   The argument about strategic ring-fencing can be extended to the issue of appointment to top positions. While a partisan orientation has become a feature of political reality, this need not by itself defeat the good governance goal as long as eligibility standards are enforced through a blue-ribbon selection process.
   
   III.2 Opportunities of the Political Cycle
   The political process does not offer upfront and easy entry points to reformers for the goal of system improvement. A strategic opening here may be the opportunities which may lie in the impending political cycle. Beyond the issue of Election Commission strengthening which has already been referred to, three other such opportunities merit strategic exploitation, namely:
   influencing election platforms of 2006. The major parties differ very little in their policy platforms. Effective groundwork which can generate compelling new policy ideas on difficult reform ideas such as police reform, civil service reform etc have good opportunities of finding their way into election platforms of the parties and can subsequently be used to advocate for specific action.
   improving eligibility criterion for candidacy.
   advocating for post-election codes of conduct such as declaration of assets etc.
   
   III.3 Promoting Champions and Drivers
   Promoting champions and drivers is often a more effective route to bringing about desired systemic outcomes, in particular from the standpoint of political feasibility. The following offer the most meaningful entry points on this goal:
   Targeted training to civil servants. The key operational concern here is to create a reform constituency within the bureaucracy through targeting a higher level of training to a minimum number of civil servants. Training content is also a crucial concern here, in particular a focus on interface training i.e. working in partnership with other critical actors such as private sector, civil society, NGOs, local governments, politicians.
   Information flow. Within the authoritarian and bureaucratic institutional culture, freeing up information itself can act as a powerful driver for building accountability pressures and improving the governance process. The long-term goal to pursue here is perhaps a legislation which can enshrine the freedom to information. In the short to medium term, however, a necessary focus has to be on developing relevant information-related services and delivery mechanisms such as community radio, village notice-boards, information kiosks etc.
   Better indices and evidence on governance. The quality and efficacy of the governance discourse often suffers from poor standards of knowledge of the process and indicators which can capture such knowledge. In lieu of such knowledge, a folkloric approach often hold sway making consensus building for viable intervention difficult. The development of indicators which capture the governance reality better, not just from the standpoint of international capital but also from the aspirations of common people, offer the prospects of being a powerful driver for change.
   
   III.4 Micro Solutions Window
   Changes in ground reality often comes through micro solutions such as the recent announcement of direct allocation for Union Parishads. Reformers have often overlooked the potential of such a micro solutions window. While the focus on the ‘big solutions’ cannot be slackened, there is a critical need to address also the ‘small solutions’, solutions which can get started right away with much less of a challenge in policy innovation. Micro-governance agendas are important not only because they can prove to be effective entry points to pry open intractable macro-governance agendas, they can also provide real-life demonstration of what is do-able.
   Some of the readily available ‘micro solutions’ opportunities include the recently announced decision on direct allocation to union parishads. There is great potential here to link such allocation to performance through ensuring appropriate eligibility and operational procedures and also to advocate for a significantly enhanced fund allocation. Another ‘micro solutions’ opportunity is to re-focus on routine oversight and inspection functions within the administrative process which have fallen into disuse. Still another opportunity is to explore effective mechanisms to link the traditional chowkidari (community police) system with the formal thana police system. An active search for micro solutions opportunities is likely to pay large dividends for the goal of good governance.
   
   III.5 Strengthening Choice and Connectivity
   Governance goals are often facilitated when competition and choice become fundamental features of physical and social life. A case in point is rural roads which since early 90s has fundamentally freed the rural population from the yoke of remoteness. While poverty remains, ties of dependence have been loosened and choice horizons significantly expanded. A contributory factor has been the deepening of market ties among all stratas of the population. Rural roads, rural electrification, market access and market participation have thus been as critical to governance outcomes as governance interventions per se. In this sense, a focus on infrastructure which strengthens connectivity and a focus on market which strengthens choice and competition offer a crucial entry point to pursue the governance agenda.
   (Concluded)

It is difficult not to be impressed by the swanky Beirut Central District, spread over 120 acres, 50 of them reclaimed from the sea. It has a city centre, with marinas and promenades and an array of modern buildings hotels, offices and residences. On a visit in July 1999, I found an air of optimism. Built on the ruins of a tragic civil war, it is the legacy of Rafik Hariri, the rags to riches billionaire, five times prime minister of Lebanon, and now classed as a martyr, killed in a massive car bomb in the new Beirut he nurtured.
   Whoever killed him, Lebanon weeps, not only for him but also for its own future. He gave the country hope and brought tourists back. Despite the immense budget deficits he ran, he used his own money and influential contacts around the world to build the city anew. A small country of many religions and tribal passions, hemmed in by larger and more powerful neighbours, now faces the prospect of being sucked into America’s “shock and awe” enterprise in Iraq, Washington’s desire to remake the Greater MiddleEast.
   The question the Hariri assassination poses is whether the United States will use it to make Lebanon a pawn of its ambitions. Syria has been Lebanon’s overlord and maintains 14,000 troops in the country, and America has been targeting Syria and Iran as the next dominoes that should fall. And there is a United Nations Security Council resolution of last September asking Syrian troops to leave Lebanon. The Hariri killing has triggered a new resolution asking the secretary-general to report on the circumstances, causes and consequences of the killing, an international inquiry the Lebanese government has been shunning.
   The United States has many quarrels with Syria. It accuses Damascus of aiding Iraqi insurgents, encouraging the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon to target Israel and the State Department has classed it as a “state sponsor of terrorism”. In November 2003, the US Congress passed an act to “halt Syrian support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon and stop its weapons of mass destruction”. After the assassination, Washington promptly recalled its ambassador from Damascus, apart from imposing economic sanctions on it.
   Who killed Hariri? The vast crowds at his chaotic burial ceremony blamed Syria. Syria (and many Arabs) blames Israel and most dismiss the claim of an obscure organisation owning the deed. The truth is that Hariri, who adroitly walked the fine line between promoting his country’s development and Syria’s red lines, resigned as prime minister last October in his power struggle with the Syrian ally, Lebanese president Emile Lahoud, who was given a three-year extension of term under intense pressure from Damascus. Hariri was preparing to return to power through elections scheduled for May.
   Hariri, with Syria’s help, had brokered the Saudi-sponsored Taif agreement of 1989 that brought the Lebanese civil war to an end. Damascus’ unspoken condition was the retention of its troops in Lebanon, a presence that dates back to 1976. The troop issue has since divided Lebanon, with Hariri against their continued presence. It has now been brought to a head by his murder, with America having its own axe to grind. The French, for their part, are playing an intriguing role. They had backed the UN resolution and President Jacques Chirac paid a personal condolence visit to Hariri’s family, much to the annoyance of the Lebanese government, which viewed it as a snub.
   The Lebanese and larger Arab press is haunted by the spectre of the ruinous 1975-90 civil war, fearing that the planned election in May might be postponed. The Syrian press says the Lebanese reaction (blaming Damascus for the murder) is “hasty” because the gain from it is Israel’s. The Lebanese press warns that international intervention “could once again make a wilderness of the Levant”. The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, for his part, has administered a body blow, calling the Lebanese government “illegitimate” , one allegedly appointed by Syrian intelligence.
   Conspiracy theories are never far from people’s minds in West Asia and in as murky an area as Lebanon, the Hariri murder has provided a rich harvest.
   Indeed, Syrian complicity makes little sense because the consequences are anything but welcome for Damascus. Al Qaeda’s reach into Lebanon presents problems. Logically, the immediate beneficiaries are the United States and Israel, the latter now being in a batter position to pressure Russia not to sell missiles to Syria. And the murder has neatly fitted into the American game plan. President George W. Bush had declared in his State of the Union address, “We expect the Syrian government to end all support for terror and open the door for freedom”.
   Syria’s President Bashar Al Assad, who condemned the Hariri murder, has appointed his brother-in-law, Brigadier General Asef Shawkat, as his new military intelligence chief and Iran and Syria have vowed to form a “common front to face threats”, particularly those emanating from Washington. In Lebanon, an embattled government is digging his heels in even as a rejuvenated opposition is demanding its resignation. The opposition has called for a peaceful uprising to bring down the government and reiterated calls for Syrian troops’ withdrawal. Syrian troop presence dates back to 1976. Both the Lebanese government and Syria are admittedly on the defensive.
   The question, Who Killed Hariri?, is less important today than the consequences of the murder. In the first instance, the initiative rests with Washington. How cynically will the Bush administration use Lebanon to encourage a regime change in Syria and pressure Iran, the latter on its nuclear ambitions? The administration’s track record would suggest that Washington would go after the bigger prize Syria to try to destabilize the region further. With the passions the Hariri murder has aroused in Lebanon and the nation divided down the middle, the ghosts of the civil war have made their appearance.
   If Syrian troops were to withdraw from Lebanon an unlikely prospect in immediate terms what would become of Hezbollah? Will it withdraw from Lebanon’s border with Israel? Hezbollah is a considerable political presence in Lebanon and is capable of giving the ruling party in Beirut many anxious moments. What form President Bush’s “transformational diplomacy” will take will define Lebanon’s fate to a large extent.

In its effort to remake the global rules America has not acted alone. The legacy of Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston Churchill’s visionary Atlantic charter, which led to the establishment of the United Nations, is now in the hands of the Atlantic cowboys, George Bush and Tony Blair. When Roosevelt and Churchill sprang their charter on the world in the summer of 1941, the threat to the two countries was of a wholly different order. And yet, 60 years on, an American president can show contempt for international obligations, in actions and in words: “I don’t care what the international lawyers say.”
   His British counterpart pays lip service to international law, and then proceeds to override the views of those government advisers who know something about the subject. He feels able to proclaim, as he did in his speech in March 2004, the need for global rules as though the achievements of the past 60 years count for nought. What is left of the transatlantic commitment to international law?
   The attacks of 9/11 brought Blair and Bush together to give rise to one of the great enigmas of modern British political life: why did Blair lend British support to the war on Iraq? His support for that war and the “war on terror”, as well as the implicit support for the regime put in place at Guantánamo, provided oxygen and international legitimacy to acts of dubious legality and effectiveness, which had virtually no international support.
   Why has Britain associated itself so closely with an administration that has such scant regard for the international rule of law? That is a difficult question that only Blair himself can answer. If an illegal war in Iraq had made the world a safer place, then arguably it might be justified. But there is little evidence that the world is a safer place, and a great deal more evidence that the Iraq war has provided a major distraction to the challenge posed by global terrorism and al-Qaida. Neither can it be said that the Middle East is more stable or peaceful, nor that the existence of the detention camp at Guantánamo and the failure to apply human rights and humanitarian law are the best way to win hearts and minds, or persuade the occupied of your humanitarian intentions.
   The only plausible answer is that the prime minister believed that solidarity and self-interest required him to place Britain alongside the US, more or less whatever it chose to do. History will tell whether that was the right choice. In the meantime, Britain’s stock as a law-abiding global citizen has taken a beating. Its authority and leadership role are degraded. Many British and American diplomats have expressed disquiet, recognising that their job has been made that much more difficult by the events of the past three years. It could be argued, I suppose, that Britain is following the US because it has taken a considered decision that the wholesale reconstruction of the international legal order is justified. But so far I have seen no hint that that is in fact the case, with the exception of a somewhat emotive speech by the prime minister, which suggested he was out of his depth on what the law required or permitted.
   But the insurmountable difficulty with this argument is that it is based on a false premise. The US cannot go it alone, much as its behaviour might suggest it wishes it were otherwise. American unilateralism is not isolationism: the US’s exposure to the world is premised on economic objectives, among others, not military objectives. The use of military power is a means to an end, not the end itself. The business community will be the first to say that commerce cannot be dictated by brute force. You cannot intimidate consumers into buying US goods, or supplying oil and other strategically significant products. Military and economic considerations cannot be separated, any more than free trade and environmental objectives can be disconnected. Once that is recognised, and you accept that some of your foreign policy objectives are premised on the application of global rules, the marginalisation of international law becomes more difficult to justify. Moreover, if Iraq and the war on terrorism have shown anything, it is that the US is dependent on alliances and coalitions whose members require something in return.
   Extracted from ‘Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules’ by Philippe Sands, Penguin. This article first appeared in The Guardian