Dealing with the Islamic
extremism in Bangladesh
For achieving an effective unity, the government must also demonstrate its commitment against militancy. Thus far, it has definitely not done enough. If it really wants to fight from a common ground, it has to first convince people about its sincerity and dedication. The opposition can and will cooperate only when the dominant feeling is that the government is truly on the course of handling the problem ably, write Ghulam Quader and
Syed Imtiaz Ahmed
After 15 years of democratic rule, Bangladesh is still fraught with anxiety, insecurity and fear. The perpetual state of enmity between the two major political parties, the growing criminalisation of the political process, and the real or imagined threat of interference by external powers, all these continue to stifle the prospects of democratic consolidation in this country. In such a context, the violent rise of Islamic extremism has posed a critical challenge to the future of democracy. As we enter the election year in 2006, people are overwhelmed with genuine concerns about the security and stability of Bangladesh. If the two major political parties fail to promote the much-needed unity among people against extremism, the future of democracy and even sovereignty appears to be bleak indeed. This essay attempts to evaluate the impact of Islamic extremism on the democratic process of Bangladesh, and tries to suggest some practical measures for dealing with the problem.
Politics of Islamic Militancy and Democracy in Bangladesh
Compared to the previous election years, 2006 will have a special significance for the future of democracy in Bangladesh because of the complicated transnational political scenario of the post 9/11 world. Given its Islamic identity, Bangladesh has been facing a critical challenge to its image immediately from after the incidents of 9/11. Since the publication of Bertil Lintner’s report in the Far Eastern Economic Review (4 April 2002), there has been a trend of growing concern in the international community about the possible emergence of Islamic militant groups. This concern obviously led to an increasing political pressure being exerted on the ruling coalition led by BNP, both from inside and outside. The religious credentials of the second most important party of the coalition in power now, Jamaat-e-Islami, added significant weight to such pressure.
The Alliance Government’s preliminary strategy was solely concentrated on denying the allegations, and blaming the opposition for conspiring to damage the image of the government and the country. The strategy was neither innovative nor far-sighted. On the other hand, the government could have cleaned up its own backyard while the tiger was still inside the cage. However, the dramatic rise of Bangla Bhai and Jammat-ul-Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) thereafter, left it with a far more serious situation to contain. Incidents of bombings and killings jeopardised the very image the coalition government wanted to protect by denying the existence of the militants, thus giving away a critical advantage to the opposition parties.
Since the August 17 bombings, the government has shown a touch of urgency in dealing with the militants, but it will be difficult to restore people’s confidence unless some of the top leaders are arrested. It has made the task of dealing with the donor agencies, and the regional and extra-regional powers even more difficult than before. The entire international politics is now passing through a phase where any sign of Islamic militancy is treated with utmost suspicion and impatience. It has significantly undermined the government’s bargaining power, leaving it vulnerable to outside pressure and coercion.
In the case of Bangladesh, such a situation could play into the hands of any outside power seeking to dictate its terms of politics. The developments during Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina’s high profile visit to India were clearly indicative of the possibility of such pressure. It would be superficial to interpret India’s gestures to Hasina merely as a hint of their lenience towards the Awami League. Rather, it revealed the broader picture of how an outside country can now try to dictate Bangladesh’s internal affairs on the grounds of cross-border militancy threats. Given the fact that these Islamic militants will not simply whither away, even if the Awami League could capture power in the next election, India is most likely to continue to put immense pressure on Bangladesh over this issue. When combined with the support of an influential international community, this is likely to shape into an effective coercive-diplomatic tool, far better than the waters of the Ganges, or the issue of the insurgents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts has been. Obviously, this would make democratic consolidation a difficult goal to achieve. The only way out for Bangladesh lies in a firm demonstration of unity of the people with the political parties, which would endorse a clearly anti-terrorist image of the country, thus reducing the scope of interference by the outside powers.
Unity, however, cannot be achieved in a vacuum. The time has come for both the government and the opposition to understand that their parochial confrontation can severely undermine their own positions and interests. This series of bomb blasts can inevitably lead to a situation where the state structure will start to crumble, and anarchy set in so that ultimately, a situation like Iraq or Afghanistan cannot be ruled out. Neither BNP nor Awami League is likely to be a gainer in such a situation. The simple fact that they are failing to understand now is that their very survival depends on the existence of Bangladesh as a sovereign, stable and democratic state. And that requires a firm recognition of the common nature of threat emanating from Islamic militancy. Wasting resources and energy on playing the blame game is only strengthening the hands of the militants while time is indeed running out slowly but surely.
For achieving an effective unity, the government must also demonstrate its commitment against militancy. Thus far, it has definitely not done enough. If it really wants to fight from a common ground, it has to first convince people about its sincerity and dedication. The opposition can and will cooperate only when the dominant feeling is that the government is truly on the course of handling the problem ably.
An effective strategy in this respect must contain three sets of measures, which are: administrative, political and socio-economic.
Administrative Measures: Finding the militant hideouts, arresting the leaders and the workers of the militant groups, gathering critical information and strengthening the overall security system are all important for effectively curbing militancy. The government’s strategy is also concentrating on such measures, but meeting with a lot less success than necessary. The crucial element missing from the government’s efforts thus far has been the failure to arrest any of the top leaders of the JMB. Such arrests would not only weaken the terrorist organisations, but have a significant effect on people’s confidence and morale. Failure in this regard is giving scope for the creation of suspicion about possible underhand dealings between some sections of the government, and the militant groups. The more such violent attacks are carried out the more will be frustrations among the people, fueling such suspicions. This is why the demonstration of commitment to such ends is urgently necessary.
Second, given the very nature of suicide bombing, protective security arrangements are unlikely to be successful against the militants. Unlike the terrorists of the 1970s or 80s, the goal of these Islamic militants is not to earn political sympathies or support in society. Rather, they want to create widespread panic which, to their way of reasoning, could ultimately crumble the government and society. Thus, their target is flexible: if they cannot bomb a courthouse, for example, they will settle for killing three or four police officers on guard. That would be enough to spread fear. Their larger goal would be achieved even if they did not reach a particular target. Thus, if the government continues to concentrate more on the protection aspect, its credibility will be undermined each time there is a ‘breach’. Then the fact that the government has successfully protected a particular target will not be sufficient to convince the people of its effectiveness. People would be far more concerned about the loss of lives during every ‘failed’ suicide bomb attack, so their confidence would erode. Moreover, it is not practically possible to provide high level protection for an indefinite period. Thus, the only way out is to concentrate and invest more on finding and arresting the terrorists than defending and protecting against their attack.
Last but not the least; political leadership has to maintain effective control over its security agencies that are in charge of carrying out the operations. Their reluctance or inefficiency can seriously damage and perjure the government’s image, providing a legitimate ground for the opposition’s anti-government stand and non-cooperation. This is why, a constant monitoring of the security agencies should also be an integral part of administrative measures taken.
Political Measures: In the long run, the problem of Islamic militancy cannot be resolved through security measures alone. However irrational it may sound, a sizable number of people of this country are ready to take extreme and violent political measures for what they believe to be their ideology. The existence of such belief indicates people’s frustrations with the available ideological options. A major function of political ideologies is to provide a common belief system that would promote unity, not only among the common people, but also between the rulers and the ruled. This unity-promoting function of ideology is particularly crucial for underdeveloped countries like Bangladesh where ideological zeal, even in a rhetorical form, can provide an outlet for daily social and economic frustrations. The last fifteen years of democratic rule in Bangladesh has indeed failed to perform this function. Accusations and evidence of rampant corruption of political leaders, the very questionable quality of leadership, and above all, the chronic confrontations between BNP and Awami League have severely thwarted the ideological functions of democracy, and hence alienated a large section of the masses, especially from non-urban areas. It is this ideological vacuum that helped create the atmosphere and space for extremist movements to nurture and flourish in the soils of Bangladesh.
In a sense, the rise of militant movements has provided a unique ‘opportunity’ for the two political powers to unite around a national cause. If the two parties could overcome their parochial confrontations for at least once and vow to fight against extremism from a common platform, it would generate a high level of nationalist enthusiasm among the people, and retrieve their confidence on democratic politics. Only such confidence could transform their growing frustrations into a sense of resolve, their growing fears into reassurance. The demonstrative impact of such a unity would inevitably undermine the morale of the militant groups.
(To be continued)
(Major General Ghulam Quader (Retd) is the executive director of the Center for Strategic and Peace Studies (CSPS). Syed Imtiaz Ahmed is an assistant professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka)
Why our liberation movement
was successful
The Mujibnagar government played a major role in mobilising guerrillas, Indian forces and Soviet support for its cause. Our liberation movement was a complex product of history, geography and human folly. The production had a cast of thousands inside and outside Bangladesh resisting actively and passively. A just cause triumphed,
writes Mumtaz Iqbal
Basically, this success was due to three interlocking factors. One’s intangible (popular participation). Two others are tangible (geography and demography; and sanctuary and external support).
Popular participation
The most important reason is the determination of the peoples of Bangladesh to be masters of their own destiny. This aspiration crystallised after Islamabad’s military action of 26 March 1971.
A crucial development was the formation of a Bangladesh government-in-exile. It had enough credibility to enjoy popular support within Bangladesh and reach understandings with the host authorities in Delhi.
The exile government adopted a pragmatically innovative strategy. This helped mobilise internal and external forces and resources to bring into existence a spirited resistance movement and expanded guerrilla warfare operations, especially after Indian artillery destroyed 50 per cent of the Border Out Posts by July 1971. This facilitated infiltration and exfiltration.
As in Occupied Europe in the Second World War (WWII), resistance and guerrilla warfare kept the people’s hope alive, a priceless asset.
But could these two factors alone have led to independence? Probably not, at least in the short-term, to judge by historical evidence.
Guerrilla war is the instrument of the militarily weak against stronger conventional forces. England’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) in WWII extensively implemented Churchill’s order to set Europe ablaze through spying and sabotage.
This action sustained civilian morale in occupied Europe. But it merely pinpricked the Germans (see SOE 1940-1946 by MRD Foot; Baker Street Irregular by B. Sweet-Escott; and The White Rabbit by Bruce Marshall).
Guerrilla’s hit-and-run tactics ensure their survival. These unsettle but seldom defeat regular forces as in the former Yugoslavia and USSR (see Eastern Approaches by Fitzroy Mclean and Soviet Partisan Warfare by Otto Heilbronner).
Guerrillas invariably lose in pitched battles against regulars. Thus, the Wehrmacht (German army) mauled Tito’s guerrillas and Soviet partisans in bandit suppression campaigns in 1942, and decimated Gen. Bor-Komarowski’s Polish Underground Army in Warsaw in 1944 (while the Red Army 20 miles away didn’t lift a finger to help the Poles).
The Viet Cong lost heavily in the Tet offensive of 1968 though this one factor probably more than any other irrevocably turned US public against the Vietnam War (see White House Years by Kissinger).
Mao retreated from Kiangsi to Shensi in the epic 16 months Long March of about 5,000 kms when cornered by Chiang’s fifth extermination campaign of autumn 1934 (see The Long March by Harrison Salisbury & The Selected Works of Mao Dze Dong). Our own Mukti Bahini (MB) got indifferent results when directly assaulting Pakistani fixed positions (Kamalpur).
Special Forces operating as guerrillas at different scale levels in WWII produced mixed results with little effect on the conflict’s final outcome. Col. David Stirling’s Special Air Service (SAS) in the Western Desert in 1941-42 destroyed many German and Italian planes on shoestring resources (see Winged Dagger by Roy Farran).
Force 136 in Malaysia achieved modest success (see The Jungle is Neutral by Spencer Chapman). Wingate’s Chindits and Merrill’s Marauders performances in Burma were arguably incommensurate with the resources used (see The Marauders by C. Ogburn, The Wild Green Earth by Bernard Fergusson and The Road Past Mandalay by John Masters).
Thus Gen. MAG Osmany’s ops plan of September 1971 to send the EBR battalions in small commando groups inside Bangladesh would not have helped much. That’s why the sector commanders were lukewarm to this proposal, especially as they wanted to conserve their forces-in-being (see Muldhara 71 by Muyeedul Hasan, a close associate of Tajuddin’s).
Cuba excepted, guerrillas are most effective in support of regulars when victory is certain or probable. Thus, the operations of the French resistance (Maquis) and Tito’s guerrillas were carefully calibrated and peaked to coincide with Operation Overlord (the Allied invasion of Normandy) in June 1944. The MB’s effectiveness increased dramatically from October 1971 when the smell of victory was in the air (see Muldhara 71).
Many Frenchmen claimed to be overt or covert Maquisards after France’s Liberation in 1944—the fake ones were dubbed the soldiers of 32nd August! The equivalent phenomenon in Bangladesh was the 16th Division that emerged after 16 December 1971 following Niazi’s surrender.
Victory has a thousand fathers. Defeat is an orphan. This is the iron law of logic.
Geography and demography
Lack of geographical contiguity of Pakistan’s two wings, with the east having the majority of the population is the second reason. The former made national integration impractical, two economies inevitable and military logistics impossible. The latter gave legitimacy to Bengali aspirations.
Geographical contiguity and minority demands rarely spawn successful liberation movements irrespective of the breadth and depth of popular support and participation. This happens because the centre’s staying power exceeds the insurgents.
Fatigue eventually overwhelms the rebels. The long-running but unsuccessful insurgencies in Baluchistan, Chechnya, CHT, Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram, Sri Lanka and Tibet validate this point.
A successful insurgency becomes national liberation; its participants freedom fighters (FF). A failed one is an insurrection; its members’ terrorists. One man’s freedom fighter is another’s terrorist. The classic examples are PLO’s Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Menachem Begin.
Whether Bengali dissatisfaction in a contiguous Pakistan would have spilled over into a successful national liberation movement is an interesting question. The interplay of accommodation, reform, threats and use of force—tactics employed in Baluchistan— probably would have kept the pot boiling without engendering a fatal explosion beyond the point of no return.
Sanctuary and external support
These two factors make up the third reason for our successful liberation.
A sanctuary is vital for guerrillas’ survival. It gives them time and space to organise political and military resources to defeat the opposition.
Sanctuaries can be internal like Mao’s Yenan or Castro’s Sierra Madre mountains (see The Cuban Revolution by Tad Szulc). Or they can be external like Yunnan was for the Viet Minh, Nagas and Mizos; Laos and Cambodia for the Viet Cong; Tunisia for the FLN; and India for the LTTE and MB.
A sanctuary is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for success. The hemorrhaging insurgencies in India’s Seven Sisters and Sri Lanka bear this out. The host country and others, preferably a superpower, must give sustained moral and substantial material support sufficient to tilt the balance in the insurgents favour.
PRCs establishment in 1948 gave a big fillip to Ho Chi Minh’s Vietnamese. So did Soviet SAMs (Surface to Air Missiles) to Hanoi during the Second Indo-China War (the first was against the French— see Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall).
Our liberation struggle got boosted after India decided to support the MB initially with arms and training and later with its armed forces under the security umbrella provided by the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1971.
This combination ensured the success of the Indo-Bangladesh forces under India’s Eastern Command (GOC-in-C Lt. Gen. JS Aurora).
Aurora’s forces enjoyed several advantages. These included: a favourable political and diplomatic environment; time for operational planning, war-gaming and logistical build-up; absolute air and naval supremacy; excellent tactical intelligence; substantive and substantial support from guerrillas and local population; and a weary, demoralised and tactically unbalanced enemy with poor command and control and without a cause and the will to fight (see Surrender at Dacca by Lt. Gen JFR Jacob— he was Aurora’s chief of staff — and The Betrayal of East Pakistan by Lt. Gen. AAK Niazi).
If Napoleon’s dictum that the moral is to the material as three is to one is relevant, then Aurora’s operating environment was a commander’s dream.
Eastern Command astutely exploited these assets. With the help from MB and local civilians, it bypassed, infiltrated and set roadblocks to unhinge and destroy the Pakistanis. This was similar to Macarthur’s island-hopping strategy in the SW Pacific in 1943-44 during WW II (see American Caesar by William Manchester).
The allied forces conducted no set piece battles. Instead they fought a series of heavy somewhat independent sector skirmishes involving battalion occasionally brigade level forces supported by artillery and air strikes, and occasionally tanks. Extensive mopping-up operations followed these skirmishes.
The Pakistanis surrender of Jessore (abandoned on 7 December, also Pearl Harbour Day), Mainamati and Sylhet without fighting shows their low morale and reluctance to incur casualties. Where fixed positions as in Bhaduria, Hilli, Jamalpur and Kamalpur were assaulted, the defenders resisted stoutly.
Aurora’s Eastern Command did a good job. But to describe its operations as a lightning campaign (Blitzkrieg), as do Maj. Gens. DK Palit and Sukhwant Singh, is to exaggerate (see their The Lightning Campaign and Victory in Bangladesh, respectively).
A contrary exaggeration is the remark by another Indian general to Muldhara’s Muyeedul Hasan that the exertions of Aurora’s forces after 10 December were comparable to that of a hazardous and extended route march!
Blitzkrieg’s essence is speed. All arms combine to punch holes along a narrow front. These are exploited to become the floodgates for an expanding torrent (BH Liddell Hart The Strategy of Indirect Approach).
Thus, tank spearheads of Rommel’s 7th. Panzer Division (dubbed Ghost Division by the French) aggressively advanced from Ardennes across the Meuse to Amiens on the Channel coast in May 1940 to cover at times 50 kms a day, leaving its accompanying infantry well behind on occasions. The panzers sowed havoc and confusion in their passage (see Blitzkrieg by Len Deighton).
The Indian Army’s equipment, training and outlook plus the Bangladesh terrain made such prolonged and swift movement impractical and unimaginable.
Nevertheless, Aurora’s three corps made good gains in the war’s early days. This is evidenced by the capture of Jhenidah by II Corps (Lt. Gen. later COAS Gen. TN Raina), Palashbari by XXXIII Corps (Lt. Gen. ML Thapan) and the Meghna Bulge river ports of Ashuganj, Daudkandi and Chandpur by IV Corps (Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh) by 9 December.
Thereafter, movement slowed down due to terrain difficulties and lagging logistics. Thus IV Corps took four days despite negligible opposition to establish an effective bridgehead in Narsingdi because of insufficient amphibious and heli-capability to cross the Meghna.
2 Para of the crack 50 Independent Para Bde captured Tangail on 11 December afternoon. It took three days for advance elements of 101 Communications Zone (Maj. Gen. GC Nagra replacing the injured Maj. Gen GS Gill on 4 December) to reach the almost defenceless outskirts of Dhaka 90 kms away because of transport constraints.
In retrospect, it’s clear that Indian ops plan would have been more effective had it allocated more resources including armour and 6th Mountain Division from Sikkim to the northern sector under 101 Comm Zone. The terrain around and north of Tangail is tankable and is the shortest route to Dhaka. The war conceivably could have ended a few days sooner than 16 December, with salutary results and benefits.
Dhaka became the prime objective after the Seventh Fleet entered the Bay of Bengal on 11 December. Thus Jacob’s criticism of Army HQ’s including COAS Gen. later Field
Marshal Manekshaw’s role in supervising the preparation of the ops plan where Dhaka incredibly was not the main objective is not without merit (Surrender at Dhaka, pp 65-67).
But these observations are hindsight footnotes. They in no way detract from the successful performance of the Allied forces.
An interesting statistic is that the fight between the Indian and Pakistani regulars occurred essentially between the so-called martial races. Niazi’s troops were PMs (Punjabi Mussalmans), Pathans and Baluchis. Sixty-one of Aurora’s 71 infantry battalions that saw action were Garhwalis and Rajputs (11 battalions each), Dogras/Jats/Punjabis and Sikhs (18 battalions in total; see Surrender at Dacca, Appendix 9).
Summing up
Iron cuts iron. Regular armies are needed to defeat other regulars. The MB’s resistance inside and outside Bangladesh kept hope alive and physically and psychologically softened the enemy.
The Mujibnagar government played a major role in mobilising guerrillas, Indian forces and Soviet support for its cause. Our liberation movement was a complex product of history, geography and human folly. The production had a cast of thousands inside and outside Bangladesh resisting actively and passively. A just cause triumphed.
The writer is a free lancer
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