by M Harun-Ar-Rashid, Bir Pratik (Lieutenant General, retired)

By April 10, the Pakistani Forces from the Comilla Cantonment had launched a column towards Brahmanbaria. As they moved out of the Cantonment and moved towards Brahmanbaria they started facing minor oppositions organized locally by indigenous freedom fighters. The enemy column, led by 12 Frontier Force (FF) Regiment, a newly-arrived Battalion at Comilla Cantonment, consisted of two regular battalions supported by Artillery as well as the Air Force. At that time, the resistance movement was still in the growing phase and did not have adequate fire power. The resistance groups also lacked proper leadership and logistic backup. With all these limitations the brave people faced the advancing, well-equipped and well-supported Pakistani forces. Because of the very unconventional nature of the opposition, the Pakistani forces faced difficulty in estimating the strength as well as the capability of the resistance fighters. The Pakistani’s morale was at the lowest ebb and the advancing column felt the presence of resistance fighters in every bush, village, pond or any other structure on their way along advancing lines. As a result, they launched clearing operations on every bush, village, market or any place they thought resistance forces could take up position. They not only cleared those areas, they burnt/destroyed the villages as well resorted to indiscriminate killing of innocent occupant of those areas.

Preamble The 4 East Bengal Regiment, one of the forces of the Pakistan Army stationed in Bangladesh, was moved out of the Comilla Cantonment prior to the night of March 25, 1971. One battalion minus, led by commanding officer Lt Col Khizir Hayat Khan, a West Pakistani, was stationed in Brahmanbaria, while another, led by second-in-command Major Khaled Mosharraf, was stationed in Shamshernagar. It was a move taken on purpose, to split up the Bengali soldiers prior to the planned attack on the night of March 25. ‘We were told that Indian guerrillas were infiltrating the country through the Sylhet border. When we went there, it all turned out to be a hoax,’ recalls retired Lt General Harun-Ar-Rashid, a company commander with the 4 East Bengal Regiment based in Brahmanbaria at the time.    By March 26, news of what happened in Dhaka, the barbaric attack of the Pakistani forces upon the masses, had reached Brahmanbaria. People had already started fleeing the towns and some had reached Brahmanbaria. The Bengali soldiers in the regiment were seething inside with rage, restlessness and uncertainty.    Major Shafayet Jamil, the senior-most Bengali officer in Brahmanbaria, waited no longer, and took over the command by arresting his commanding officer and two more Punjabi officers on the morning of March 27. From that point onwards, they had declared war against the Pakistan Army. Soon, Major Ziaur Rahman’s voice broke through the radio while news of Major Shafiullah defecting from the Pakistan Army with the 2 East Bengal Regiment also reached the Brahmanbaria camp. Major Khaled Mosharraf came over from Shamshernagar and took command of the 4 East Bengal the same night. Troops were placed at the different edges of the town to occupy the territory.    In two days however, the jubilant mood that had infected the area with slogans of ‘Joy Bangla’ settled down. The reality of taking on a full-force Pakistan Army carrying sophisticated weapons began to appear daunting. On April 2, two jets of the Pakistan Air Force fired down on the liberated territory heavily. Major Khaled had already decided that the liberating forces would spend their initial period trying to organise into a proper force instead of going to combat immediately. Casualties were to be kept at a minimum. After the initial gunfire, he ordered the troops to fall back towards Sylhet, where later the famous meeting at the Teliapara Tea Estate would take place.    Capt Ainuddin, a member of 9 East Bengal Regiment, who had defected from Comilla leaving his wife and two young daughters there, was handed over command of Brahmanbaria. He was to defend Brahmanbaria for as long as possible. ‘Inflict maximum casualty and then retreat,’ were his orders. Outside of the town, Captain Nasim and Lt Helal Morshed Khan were placed in Ashuganj to block the advance of the Pakistan forces towards Brahmanbaria.    ‘On April 14, I could see helicopter movement in the air — they appeared to be coming and going rapidly,’ recalls Ainuddin, a retired Major General now. ‘I told the rest of our people that they were heli-dropping their soldiers beyond the Ashuganj line. The MI8 helicopters of the Pakistan Army were capable of holding 28 soldiers at a time, and with three drops, you could have an entire platoon of soldier,’ he adds.    Capt Ainuddin’s premonition proved right. Despite a valiant effort from the Ashuganj based troops, in which Capt Nasim himself was injured, the group had to fall back to Brahmanbaria in a few days.    By April 17 the Brahmanbaria troops were stationed at Akhaura where the famous battle of Gangasagar took place. Gangasagar is a tributary of the Titas River and runs from east to west of Akhaura. It is even considered a canal by many because it remains dry most of the year. They were only four miles away from Agartala. ‘Our frontal troops were placed at the Kella Fateh Mazar, at the mouth of the canal, under the leadership of company commander Corporal Monir Ahmed. The company headquarters were at a primary school at the Noadil village,’ recalls Ainuddin.    The enemies, meanwhile, were close by. At the foot of Ujjannosher Bridge in two villages named Binoti and Batamatha, the Pakistan Army had deployed two battalions of the 24FF and one artillery battery of the 59 Field Regiment.    ‘From the afternoon of April 16, we went through heavy artillery shelling. While visiting the frontal troops I was shot at from a range of 200 to 250 metres. I was simply saved because I had ducked on hearing the split-second click of the bullet going off,’ says Ainuddin.    ‘By April 18, we were predicting a dawn or dusk attack. Our orders were to resist the Pakistani forces until they made their way to this side of the canal. Then, we were to retreat.    ‘At ten that night, while I was visiting Major Shafayet Jamil at Agartala I received news that the troops were retreating. I went back to the spot to discover that the entire crew of two battalions had retreated safely without any visible casualty or loss of weapons.’    But not before the Battle of Gangasagar had taken place.    — Mubin S Khan

   The defence at Brahmanbaria continued to receive information through the ‘Gonoline’ about the advancing column as well as their heinous activity en route. Our defences at Ujanishar as well as Akhaura, which were occupied by composite forces consisting of regular troops of 4 East Bengal, Rifles and the volunteer freedom fighters, were reinforced with some automatics from the main defence. By the 12th afternoon, leading elements of the enemy advancing column established contact with our Ujanishar defence. The bridge at Ujanishar was about three hundred feet long and built on Rod Cement Concrete (RCC) structure. We did not want the bridge to fall intact, in the enemy’s hand. As such we decided to destroy a panel of the bridge and made it impassable for the enemy. Captain ATM Haider (Later Colonel) and his team from Battalion Headquarters was deputed for that purpose and they did the job successfully. Subedar Ambia of East Pakistan Rifles, the defence commander, conducted his battle very intelligently and never gave out the total layout of the defence. However, appreciating (assessing) the potential of the area, the Pakistanis considered there would be a strong Company defence in the area. They also found out that the defence is well prepared with Over Head Protection (OHP). In view of that, the Pakistanis assessed that a sizeable force would be required to dislodge the defence. The area to the East as well as the West of road in Ujanishar area is marshy, as such any manoeuvre on the flank of the defence was extremely difficult. They also calculated that launching frontal attack across the river would be very costly in terms of men and material. Considering all these factors, the Pakistanis decided to advance through the Comilla-Akhaura Railway line. As a result, they left some troops to contain the Ujanishar defence and moved major column towards Gangasagar area, using the link road.
   On April 13, since establishing contact, the Pakistanis continued Artillery Mortar as well as other automatics on both the positions. They also extended air attack to Brahmanbaria defence. By the end of the day on 13th April, we could feel that the enemy was adamant to cross the line as soon as possible. By this time, 2 East Bengal had also crossed the Bhairab Bridge and was moving towards Brahmanbaria, under pressure of the enemy forces. From the Battalion Headquarters, Major Shafayet moved to Brahmanbaria to take charge of the developing situation. I was ordered to move forward with my Company (D Company) and reinforce the defence at Gangasagar and Ujanishar. Capt Gaffar (Later Colonel) was also ordered to move to Teliapara for further tasks. Capt Ainuddin was tasked to evacuate all possible Government assets from Brahmanbaria before we abandon the defence. On receiving the orders, we straight away started our preparation for the move. Again, because of the continuous air attack the lunch for the day could not be supplied to the troops.
   As per plan we moved out of Brahmanbaria on the evening of April 13 around 8:00pm. We planned to reach Akhaura by midnight and occupy the defensive position before first light. Hardly after half an hour of our move when the leading column was just crossing the Bhadugar village, a gathering of about hundred local people blocked our way. They felt that we were abandoning them because of the fear of Pakistani attack. It took a lot of effort on our part to explain to those people that we were not abandoning anyone but relocating ourselves for tactical reasons. We also informed them that the Pakistanis have already reached Ujanishar–Gangasagar line and if we do not reinforce the defences there the Pakistanis will reach Brahmanbariain in no time. We were not moving behind rather moving forward to join the battle line. After about one and half hour of discussion and persuasion we could move.
   We reached Akhaura at around 3:00am on April 14. A local volunteer Md Ishaque and a few volunteers under his leadership received us near the Akhaura Railway Station. These volunteers trained at Akhaura along with the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) persons and were holding Gangasagar defence line. On receiving us at the Railway Station Ishaque gave a briefing on the defence as well as Pakistani activities. While Ishaque was briefing us, we could hear the sounds of sporadic Artillery as well as automatics fire. Ishaque informed us that Pakistani column had reached Gangasagar Railway Station area in late afternoon using the link road between Tantar south of Ujanishar and Gangasagar. Pakistani Forces were also continuously firing at our defence. Our defence under Subedar Mamtaz of EPR had about forty people. Major Shafayet the Commanding Officer directed me to move quickly and occupy the defence before first light. As I could not see the ground during day time I had to depend on the local volunteers to guide me to the defensive locality. The forward line was already established by EPR troops. Leaving the main dody near Akhaura Railway Station, I along with three Platoon Commanders i.e. Subedar Anowar, Subedar Rezaul and Havildar Munir moved forward to select the locations of the platoons.
   Keeping the existing forward line intact, I deployed Subedar Anowar’s platoon on the forward edge of Noapara village on the east of the railway line. Subedar Rezaul’s platoon was placed on the west of the railway line on the home bank of the canal. Havildar Munir’s platoon was placed in the depth covering both sides of the railway line. However, occupation of the defences in those areas was extremely difficult as the Pakistanis were continuing to fire Mortar, Artillery as well as Automatics. Considering that it would be more difficult to occupy the defence during the day time, we decided to move and occupy the location before first light and hold the defence for the day. We planned to dig in if we got the opportunity or wait till last light. The platoon commanders did a splendid job by moving the troops to their designated locations before first light. As I had only one Machine Gun I placed it near the railway line to cover the open field on the western side as well as fire between the Gangasagar Bazar and Noapara village towards the east.
   When our troops started moving-in and occupy the defences the Pakistanis probably understood our reinforcement activity and intensified their firing. As most of our troops were in the open we had to suffer some casualties, mostly injuries. By morning we had about six seriously injured persons. By about 10:00am my troops were more or less in position and were ready to fight back. By afternoon the enemy realized that our defence at Gangasagar has been reinforced. We could feel their reconnaissance parties were trying to probe and find out the extent of the new defence as well as the layout. The enemy continued their probing action throughout the day. By evening all the subordinate commanders finalized the layout of their sections as well as automatics. I also made visits to all the platoon locations to finalize the deployment plan. I asked all Platoon Commanders to accommodate all the existing EPR as well as volunteers within their respective area of responsibility in their own strength. As a result Platoons were over-strength and it gave added manpower and firepower to the platoon commanders.
   Immediately after the last light of April 14, we got busy digging weapon trenches and other bunkers to improve the existing defence. In fact, we were apprehending enemy attack by night or at least by first light. As the defence preparation was in full swing, lot of sound was also produced in the defensive localities. The enemy kept on firing Artillery, Mortar as well as other small arms aiming at the locations producing sounds. In the midst of all that soldiers were determined to complete the job before first light. Again because of Artillery and Mortar firing food could not be supplied to the troops.
   As we expected, the enemy made an attempt to cross the canal from the East i.e. from the left flank of the defence at first light on April 15. Because of the area being restricted and low-lying, the enemy could not make much headway. Firing continued up to 8:30am. Thereafter the enemy was forced to withdraw. However, engagement from the front by Artillery, Mortar and other heavy weapons continued. As we did not have any indirect fire weapon, the enemy had absolute free hand to utilize their Artillery and Mortars. The defensive battle had to be fought under extreme adverse situation. The enemy was located in a more advantageous tactical position. The enemy had absolute superiority in indirect fire support as well as fighting strength. The enemy had sound logistic backup including casualty evacuation. Under all these adverse situations, our troops were fighting with high morale only.
   During the night of April 15, we had to suffer some casualty. Again the casualties were evacuated to Akhaura Check Post. By this time Captain Ainuddin had established a Headquarters at the Akhaura Check Post. This helped the fighting forces tremendously as he spent a great deal of his effort to organize the logistic including the treatment of the casualties. However, the enemy’s continuous shelling over the defence became major cause of concern. Moreover, movement and communication within the defence was also extremely difficult. However, volunteers from distant places from all around the country were joining us to fight the battle. On a number of occasions it so happened that volunteers managed to reach platoon/section locations directly and started fighting with the group whichever way they could. During the battle a number of volunteers became martyrs whose identity could not be established. The spirit shown by the volunteers comprising students, peasants, workers, etc cannot be described in language.
   
   The battle
   We were sending desperate messages to Battalion Headquarters to give us some indirect fire support. In the afternoon of April 16 I was informed that by evening we will receive some Mortar support. At last light I received a message that Battalion Commander Major Khaled Mosharraf has arrived at Akhaura Check Post and I should go to meet him there and brief him on the battle situation. I met Major Khaled Mosharraf near the broken bridge on the Akhaura-Agartala road at around 8:00pm. There I briefed him on the enemy layout and probable targets for the Mortar fire. Along with him there was a BSF officer who was introduced to me as Mortar Platoon Commander of 91 BSF Battalion located at Agartala. I also briefed him regarding the enemy locations as well as probable targets. After that I was directed to go back to the Company and wait for the Mortar action. Thereafter I left for the defensive location. At around 10:30pm BSF Mortars started firing on the enemy location. Mortar Platoon was located on the Western edge of village Simrail South of Akhaura-Agartala road. From there enemy position of the Mortar Platoon location was at maximum distance. As a result some of the fired shells also started falling on our own location. This created tremendous confusion within the defence. Anyway, due to fire coming from our side after about 48 hours of contact, enemy was also surprised. However, after firing for about half an hour BSF Mortar Platoon withdrew to their own location.
   We apprehended that the enemy would launch another attempt to dislodge us. As expected this time the enemy made an attempt from the Western flank on the early morning of April 17. The attack was more difficult on this side as the area was open as well as marshy. The fighting continued till about 10:00am, then the enemy was forced to withdraw. However, the enemy kept our heads down by heavy indirect fire. As a result we could not collect the casualties suffered by the enemy.
   Due to the depth of the canal, frontal assault from the South was a difficult proposition. However appreciating the enemy’s superiority in indirect fire weapons as well as manpower we thought the enemy may make an attempt to cross the canal from the South along the railway line. We also made some adjustments of weapon positions. However nothing much happened during the night except sporadic fire by Artillery, Mortar as well as other heavy weapons. On 18th morning as daylight was becoming brighter the rate of enemy indirect fire intensified. The intensity of fire was so much, we could feel that it was the preparatory bombardment for an attack. At around 7:30am we found two MI-8 Helicopters flying on our west flank towards village Noadil at the rear of our defence and West of the railway line. The enemy made about 4 rotations with those two helicopters within an hour.
   At around 8:30am the enemy troops that landed at Noadil formed up and launched the assault on our defence from the Northwest which is right rear of one Defence location. At this stage we were facing enemy from the front as well as right rear flank. As I was ordered by the Commanding Officer to avoid any pitched battle and also the enemy attack was advancing with all fire support, I decided to withdraw towards Noapara and thereafter to Akhaura. As per plan the Platoon on the West of Railway line was to withdraw on the East of the railway line under the covering fire of the Platoon on the East of the Railway line. As Subedar Rezaul organized withdrawal of his Platoon and started moving, the LMG group located near the railway line on the west was hit by an enemy rocket. Both the operators of the LMG became martyrs on the spot. Sepoy Mohd Mostafa Kamal was operating another LMG group about 75 metres away on the right of the destroyed LMG group. Seeing the enemy come from the rear, Mostafa refused to withdraw with the Platoon and rather shifted his position to the previously destroyed LMG position and faced the rear. He told Subedar Rezaul to withdraw the Platoon under cover of his LMG fire. He had two LMGs. He continued to fire at the advancing enemy with both the LMGs alternatively. Due to the effectiveness of his fire, the enemy attack had to be halted half way. The attack got delayed and this delay helped us to withdraw the rest of the troops to safe distance. Later on the enemy sent a special squad across the railway line to destroy the LMG position from where Sepoy Mostafa was firing. After the capture of Mustafa’s post by the special squad, the enemy resumed the attack again and captured the whole area.
   The valour and courage displayed by Sepoy Mohammad Mostafa Kamal is unparallel in the history of our warfare. By firing two LMGs alternatively and effectively on the attacking formation of the enemy he created havoc on the assault line of the enemy due to which the attack had to be halted half way. His supreme sacrifice allowed rest of the Company to withdraw safely.
   In recognition to his outstanding display of valour, courage and dedication to the cause of the Nation, the Nation awarded him the highest gallantry award ‘Bir Srestha’ posthumously. It was learnt from the locals that the Pakistan Army also gave a guard of honour to Shaheed Mostafa Kamal noting that he displayed unique example of a soldier trained and motivated by the Pakistan Army.