Main Page «
Front Page «
Metro «
Business «
International «
Sports «
National «
Editorial «
Home «
Timeout «
Letters «

Archive «
Launch Supplement «
Special Supplements «

New Age: In your electoral reforms proposal, your party has demanded that the armed forces be put under the command of the non-party caretaker government instead of the president during national polls. Do you really think that bringing the armed forces under the caretaker administration would help improve the quality of elections?
   Abdul Jalil: Yes, we do. You see, the president of the republic is actually being elected by a political party — the majority party in parliament. In normal circumstances, the president does not enjoy any executive authority, as he is to function on the advice of the prime minister.
   But as soon as parliament is dissolved, the president, under the existing constitutional scheme, is empowered with the executive authority, while the chief adviser of the non-party caretaker government, who is supposed to be the ‘replacement’ of the prime minister, is accountable to the president. This is not consistent with the principles of parliamentary democracy in the first place.
   Besides, the president is elected by a political party, and it is only natural that he will have some loyalty to the party that made him president, and thus he might pay back the party during the parliamentary elections. So, you cannot rule out the possibility of abuse of executive authority of the state by the president to influence the polls in favour of the political party in question.
   For instance, we feel former president Shahabuddin Ahmed gave magistracy power to the armed forces and law enforces and manipulated the election result.
   Do you think that your party would have got more seats in 1996 had the army been under the command of the chief adviser of the caretaker government instead of the president? And how?
   1996 was different. A conspiracy to misuse the army was hatched at that time too. But it was the then chief adviser Habibur Rahman who foiled the bid. He brought in a check and balance of power.
   But what happened in 2001? By way of promulgating an ordinance, the president gave magistracy power to members of the law enforcing agencies and armed forces. We objected to the idea of indiscriminately giving magistracy power to various agencies, and we raised questions about the way the armed forces were deployed. But the president did not pay heed to our objections.
   Then, does it depend on the person designated for the task or on the system that we develop?
   Look, Habibur Rahman and Latifur Raham are not the same. You will not always get a person like Habibur Rahman.
   You are talking about a financially stronger, autonomous election commission these days. Why didn’t you incorporate such provisions when your party was in power for five years?
   When we were in power, we did not feel it that important, particularly the way we understand now. Besides, the then opposition parties did not make any demand. On our part, we came to realise the importance of the issue following the last general elections. I should rather say that the last general elections forced us to realise the importance of a stronger, independent election commission.
   Only in the October 2001 general election did we detect the defects in the electoral system and we now want to remove the defects.
   Your party, like many others, was found to violate some of electoral rules like submitting returns of election expenditures by the parties during the last elections. Why?
   True, many a political party or candidate violated certain laws, but the Election Commission is to be held responsible for that to a large extent: they did not enforce those laws properly. If the commission took steps to enforce the laws, we all would have obeyed them.
   The BNP often alleges that your party always wants to get its own political and constitutional agenda implemented by others…
   Why should there be an allegation? The demands have been raised as a consequence of certain political demands. Incidentally, the BNP remains in an advantageous position to amend the constitution. As incumbents, and that too having two-thirds majority in parliament, it is the responsibility of the party to amend a defective system by amending the constitution.
   Do you have any plans to boycott the next general elections if the BNP refuses to entertain the demands of your party, particularly the ones relating to the composition and jurisdiction of the caretaker government?
   We will not allow anyone to hold the elections without carrying out the reforms that we have proposed.
   Your party has proposed that the chief of the caretaker government be selected through a consensus of ‘all political parties’. On the other hand, your party has reacted sharply to the Election Commission’s move to hold dialogue with ‘all political parties’. Do you want the number of political parties to be limited?
   The Election Commission created a circus by inviting a huge number of ‘letterhead’ and unknown political parties. We are not for controlling the number of political parties, but the political parties should have people’s support, be familiar in society, and be experienced in conducting movements.
   By ‘all political parties’ we mean significant political parties enjoying support and confidence of the people.
   Do you support the Election Commission’s idea of having a law empowering the commission to cancel candidature of an errant contender for violating electoral laws during a general election?
   Yes, we do. The Awami League and its allies in the their proposal say, ‘The EC will be able to postpone or cancel election for violation of election laws and rules and issue order of arrest and to punish the violators during the period that the EC will be given judicial power.’
   Have you received any positive response from the people or the governing parties to your proposed reforms?
   We placed the reform proposals so that the people can properly exercise their right to franchise. The people have accepted it. As for the governing parties, they have apparently become puzzled, and have so far failed to clear their stance on the issue.
   We have called upon the incumbents to hold discussions on the proposals outside the parliament. If the government, following detailed discussions, accept our demands, we may go to parliament. Discussions on such proposed reforms were held outside parliament in 1991 and in 1996.

New Age: Does the BNP have genuine political grounds in rejecting the opposition’s proposal for reforms to the non-party caretaker government system, or are your objections based merely on political egotism?
   Khandaker Mosharraf Hossain: No, our differences on the issue are not due to political egotism. Certainly, there are some political reasons.
   First and foremost, the Awami League’s reform proposal is the concern of the next caretaker government. It is not the BNP’s business to hold a free, fair and transparent election. Moreover, it is not the BNP’s responsibility to appoint the chief adviser of the caretaker administration. According to the constitution, the president appoints the chief adviser of the caretaker government that will be responsible to hold the election in a free, fair and transparent way. So, it is the president’s prerogative what he will do after the BNP quits from power. The BNP, after departing from government, will be on the same footing with the Awami League.
   Secondly, if we theoretically agree to consider their key proposal — which is to appoint a chief adviser in consultation with ‘all’ political parties — then finding a ‘person acceptable to all parties’ will be impossible. It is a harsh reality that no one in the country believes that the Awami League and the BNP — who fail to reach consensus on minimum national issues — would be successful in jointly agreeing on a person to be appointed chief adviser. The political parties’ failure to agree on such a person will definitely create a constitutional vacuum in the country.
   Thirdly, there is an ‘intellectual dishonesty’ in the proposal. We doubt if the Awami League really wants to realise its demands. If they really mean business, they would have given alternative proposals, which would be helpful to maintain constitutional continuity and create scope for political parties to discuss the proposals. But they did not do so. There would be no government if the president fails to appoint a chief adviser after consulting with all parties. In fact, the lawyers, who helped the Awami League in preparing the proposals did not do justice to their wisdom and integrity.
   The then BNP government had refused to meet opposition demands for incorporation of the caretaker system into the constitution in 1996. But eventually it was compelled to accept the demand in the face of street agitation by the opposition. If in a similar situation again this time around, how do you plan to tackle it this time?
   It is not correct to say that we amended the constitution to include the caretaker administration system in the face of street agitation in 1996. In fact, negotiation between the government and the opposition parties had broken down despite repeated efforts of the then Commonwealth secretary general. In this backdrop, we had felt that the government needed a two-thirds majority in parliament to amend the constitution. We held a general election on February 15, 1996, got two-thirds majority and amended the constitution to incorporate the caretaker administration system. The Awami League cannot claim credit for the provision.
   What is your party’s problem with discussing electoral law reforms?
   We refuse to discuss the caretaker issue because some of the key opposition demands, including finding out an ‘angel’ to be appointed as the chief adviser and entrusting him/her with the charge of the armed forces, are unconstitutional, impossible, impractical and unnecessary. We, however, can hold discussions to make the election procedures more transparent. We can discuss the methods of restricting participation of criminals, black money holders and the use of arms during elections. But this discussion should be held in parliament.
   The constitution cannot be amended by holding round-table discussions, with participation from parties that have one leader, one activist and one supporter. Street agitations cannot make the forthcoming elections more transparent. The Awami League should join parliament and place its proposals there. We can even form committees to hold discussions outside the parliament once the demands are placed in the house.
   The Awami League has said it would return to parliament if the government agrees, in principle, to the caretaker reforms proposals…
   How can a government agree to proposals that are devoid of the basic spirit of the constitution of the state, and particularly when such agreement would lead to a constitutional crisis in the country? As for joining parliament sessions, it is a prime responsibility of all lawmakers to do so, and should not be dependent on controversial political proposals.
   Have you discussed the reform proposals within the BNP or the four-party alliance?
   No, we don’t think it important to discuss the proposals as we have doubts about whether the Awami League really wants to make the initiative a success.
   Why is the BNP opposed to entrusting the armed forces with the chief adviser instead of the president?
   Entrusting the armed forces with the chief adviser, who takes office for three months only, does not go with the spirit of the constitution. The spirit of the constitution is that an elected person will command the forces. The president is the only elected person when the caretaker administration governs the country.
   Do you think the BNP would have won fewer seats in the 2001 elections if the armed forces were under the chief adviser?
   Firstly, we won as many seats as the people wanted us to through their votes. No more, no less. Secondly, after three general elections under the caretaker system that were all appreciated at home and abroad, we strongly believe that the ‘four-person factor’ — of the president, the chief adviser, the chief election commissioner and the chief of staff of the army — does not influence the election results.
   Before the 1996 elections, the president Abdur Rahman Biswas, the chief election commissioner Abu Hena, and the army chief Lieutenant General Nasim, were either elected or appointed by the then BNP government with a belief that they would not be harmful to the party. And according to the constitution, Justice Habibur Rahman was the obvious choice as the chief adviser. But the Awami League won the election.
   Then, when the Awami League was in power, they elected Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed as the president, appointed MA Syed as the chief election commissioner and some controversial persons as election commissioners. There were rumours that Syed was a pro-Awami League man. The then army chief, Lieutenant General Harun-ur-Rashid, was also Sheikh Hasina’s choice. Following the constitutional provisions, Justice Latifur Rahman was appointed as the chief adviser. But the BNP-led four-party alliance got absolute majority in parliament.
   It is therefore pretty clear that it is the people who determine the results.
   Awami League leaders have said that there will be no election before implementing the reform proposals. What will the BNP do if the AL decides to boycott the next elections?
   The Awami League, which had fixed April 30, 2004, as a deadline for the ouster of the BNP government, has some dubious motive behind the reform proposals. In fact, they have been repeatedly trying to create grounds to boycott the next elections as they have calculated that they would not win the polls. You see, when the party was in power between 1996 and 2001, it did not take any initiative for electoral law reforms. However, whether the Awami League takes part in the polls is up to them: we cannot force another political party to participate in or boycott the elections.
   Your party has been claimed that it also feels necessary to reform electoral laws and rules and to strengthen the Election Commission. But your party, like many others, have not followed many a provision of the existing rules in the past…
   Yes, we, the political parties, cannot observe many provisions as there are practical difficulties. But we believe the Election Commission should be strengthened; and the parties can discuss the issue.
   Will you support the idea floated by the chief election commissioner to cancel candidature for violating major election rules?
   No one can oppose the idea if the Election Commission exercises its authority logically. In fact, the commission has huge authority that is yet to be exercised.

Of all the things that have been said about Robin Cook over the last few days, the one that has made me smile the most is the suggestion that he didn’t suffer fools gladly. Thankfully for me, that wasn’t true. I hadn’t been working for him very long when I accompanied him by train to a Labour conference in Birmingham. My first mistake was to persuade him, against his better judgment, to get off at the wrong station, leaving us miles from the venue. My second was to turn away as some local youths made off with his briefcase and the only copy of the speech he was about to give.
   If he had sacked me on the spot I wouldn’t have complained. But realising my distress, his first instinct was to reassure me that everything would be OK. When we eventually arrived at the conference, late and flustered, he delivered a barnstorming, off-the-cuff speech far better than the one in his missing briefcase. Robin was certainly capable of being irritable and abrupt under pressure, but he also had an immense capacity for personal kindness and understanding that stood in sharp contrast to his public image.
   This came across in the consideration he showed to colleagues on all matters, personal and political. He was so upset by the loss of several of them at the recent general election that he organised a special dinner in their honour. It was a typical gesture of comradeship, a trait that conflicted with another aspect of his reputation: the idea that he was a loner. This label was the one he probably resented the most. He took pride in a strong collegiate ethos, telling me when I joined his staff that I should think of myself as working for the Labour party first and him second. I can’t think of many politicians who would even appreciate the distinction.
   Even so, it wasn’t difficult for those who knew Robin to understand why people saw him as they did. For reasons that have as much to do with personality as intellectual choice, he never developed the habit of gathering round him a closed circle of political intimates who would do his bidding. He disliked factionalism, but was in any case too self-contained to relate to others in that way. Consequently, although he had many admirers, there were no Cookites in the way that there are Brownites and Blairites.
   One of the keys to understanding this became apparent to me several years ago when Robin confided that he often found it difficult to overcome his own natural shyness in dealings with others. This translated into a certain awkwardness that was too easily mistaken for aloofness or arrogance. It is certainly true that he had immense intellectual self-confidence, yet he always seemed to doubt his ability to inspire affection and respect in others. In this he sought constant reassurance. As foreign secretary, he was so anxious to live up to the expectations of high office that he adopted a style that was stiff and unnatural. His detractors put this down to pomposity; it was the opposite.
   The myths about Robin abound, not least in relation to other senior Labour figures. Hate is one of the most overused words in political journalism, and I heard Robin express personal animosity towards very few politicians, and none of the ones you might imagine. There is no doubt that he found Gordon Brown’s behaviour exasperating at times, but I was often struck by how generous he would be in private about his rival’s strengths and instincts as a politician. There was genuine admiration there, affection even.
   Much the same could also be said about his attitude to Tony Blair. Here his overwhelming emotion was one of disappointment that Blair’s immense talents could not be allied to a more progressive purpose. When I last saw Robin, 10 days before his death, the prime minister had just called on judges to respond to the public’s desire to get tough on terrorism and he was shaking his head in disbelief that a trained barrister could be so contemptuous of judicial independence. Yet there was no personal animus, even after the bitter disappointment of his demotion. Robin’s lack of rancour was one of the things I admired about him most.
   Not all of the myths about Robin counted against him. The widely held belief that he read the Scott report in two hours cemented his reputation, but it also obscured the real source of his effectiveness as a politician. The reason he was able to master its contents so quickly was that he had familiarised himself with the inquiry’s proceedings in such detail that he was able to anticipate which sections would contain the most damning conclusions. In this, the truth is scarcely less impressive than the fiction.
   He liked to prepare thoroughly for every political encounter, setting aside most of the day if he was appearing on Question Time, for example. Part of this was intellectual pride, but a larger part still was his desire to take his audience seriously. He was never happy simply to repeat prepared lines on the issue of the day. He always wanted to understand the issues for himself and give his own thoughts in his own words. That’s why he came across as independent and authentic. He was both.
   One thing that has been remarked on that no one should doubt was his political courage. In February 2003, when Robin first told me that he might have to quit the government over Iraq, I urged caution. We both agreed that the threat from Iraq had been grossly inflated and that Saddam was being effectively contained. But I said that the invading troops would probably unearth some rusting stockpiles of chemical weapons left over from the first Gulf war and that Blair would be able to claim vindication. His allies were already briefing that those who opposed the war would put themselves ‘on the wrong side of history’.
   Robin agreed with my assessment, but dismissed it as a consideration: ‘This war is wrong and I will oppose it in any case.’ Those who knew him well will agree that by putting his intellectual reputation on the line he risked losing something far dearer to him than his ministerial limousine. That was the true measure of his courage.
   Robin Cook was never allowed to realise his full potential as a politician, but he did meet that one essential standard of greatness. History is made by those prepared to risk being on the wrong side of it. Those content to go with its flow may achieve high office as a result, but they will never be anything more than passengers. In this, he set an example that others would do well to follow.
   David Clark was an adviser to Robin Cook. This article first appeared in The Guardian